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Displaced people in Africa who are the product of
antagonistic foreign policies have been unjustifiably
labeled refugees. The displaced people in the Horn, South
western and "Heart of Africa" are only victims of external
aggression who did the natural thing under the circumstances
i.e. flee into safety.
This study will analyze and synthesize the causes and
objectives of the foreign policies of the principal
countries, namely, Somalia and Ethiopia; Zaire and Angola'
and Libya and Chad chapter by chapter with the intention
of unravelling the root cause of the problem. It goes
without saying that the motive behind the interference of
the superpowers and other interested parties in those
countries internal affairs and the region is also the
object of our investigation.
The conflictual and/or cooperative relations of all
the countries of our concern have to be viewed within the
context of the present international system. It is our
opinion that there is a dialectical relationship between
the action of states in the system and the reaction of the
international system. In other words, the international
system could contribute to either the relaxation of tensions
or exacerbation of tensions between the conflicting states
and vice versa. Thus the international system, the
"loose bipolar" world is the framework of our analysis.
Finally, the study recommends that all the principles
of the Charters of the UNO and the OAU be respected and
also pleads with the Office of the High Commissioner for
Refugees in collaboration with the OAU to find solutions
to the predicament of the displaced people.
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The incessant political instability, the unslacking
coups and countercoups, the> fragility and snail pace
development of its dependent economy, the high rate of its
population growth, the declining of its mortality rate,
the ever growing of its unemployment and underemployment
rate, the increasing of income-gap between the top ten
percent and the bottom forty percent, the frequency of its
internecine wars, wars of liberation, wars of secession and
wars of expansion, surely give an alarming picture in which
Africa finds itself. With all these problems prevailing and
escalating to the point where they are endangering the
precarious existence of the Organization of African Unity
(OAU), the ever-spiralling of displaced people and refugees
from both independent nations and settler occupied territories
further aggravate and exacerbate the situation.
This is so if one looks at the picture divorced from
the socioeconomic and historical development of the world.
Compared to the period of the 13th and 14th centuries of
Europe, Africa's present position can only make us opti
mistic. Irving L. Markovitz in his book Power and Class in
Africa (1977), described the era as follows:
1
Famine laid waste the whole of Europe from
1315.to 1317. Thirty years later, the Black
Death, the most horrible of all reported
epidemics from 1347 to 1350, helped carry off
a third of the population of Europe. Plague
and famine followed each other in intermittent
outbursts for the whole century. Political
holocaust no less cruel accompanied natural
devastation. Civil war and banditry were
endemic, surpassed in their toll finally by
the Hundred Year War, which ruined France and
exhausted England...and then continues to say
...could there have been a worse time to live.-'-
At the outset I would like to point out that I am not
trying to depict the complex and intricate problems facing
Africa as simple and easily manageable. And I am aware
that the above statement depicts a different reality'both
in magnitude and historical context from the present one.
However, there are reasons to be optimistic about the
future especially on the question of displaced people,
which I think is surmountable provided that the principles
of the OAU which are enshrined in its charter are respected,
Jon Woronoff in his article, "Africa's Expanding Crisis,"
notes that:
after all, every major political cataclysm
has left its human debris of refugee, men,
women, and children without a home. Indeed
the biggest refugee problem the world has
ever seen, the millions upon millions of
displaced persons and refugees resulting
from the Second World War, had been reinte
grated in their home countries or sought and
found refugees abroad, in Europe, or farther
off in America and Australia.2
Irving L. Markovitz, Power and Class in Africa
(Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, inc., 1977), p. ll.
Jon Woronoff, "Africa's Expanding Crisis," Africa
Report (March-April 1979), p. 42.
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There is no doubt that the Marshall Plan, which
infused billions of dollars into Europe, had a lot to do
with the economic recovery of Europe thereby facilitating
the voluntary repatriation and/or settlement of refugees
in their new found homes. Africa's "refugee" problem is a
legacy of colonialism which carved out its boundaries, in
1875 at Berlin, arbitrarily. As pointed out in the OAU
Final Report, after the conclusion of its Conference"on the
Legal, Economic and Social Aspect of African Refugee
Problem, 1967,
the causes of the refugee problem in independent
African states are...to some extent, part of the
colonial legacy...As a result of rather arbitrary
manner in which the continent of Africa was carved
out among the colonial powers, most of the
present nation-state of Africa consist of a
medley of different ethnic, cultural, and tribal
groups, and very often refugees are the product
of clashes between these groups.3
The arbitrariness of the boundaries and the need for
their rectification was the paramount concern of the First
All African Peoples Conference when it met in Accra, Ghana,
from the 13th to 18th of December 1958. The conference
denounced the artificial frontiers drawn by
imperialist .powers...particularly those which
cut across ethnic groups and divide people of
the same stock (and) called for the abolition
or adjustment of such frontiers and called
upon the independent states of Africa to
support a permanent solution founded upon the
wishes of the people.4
OAU Final Report, Conference on the Legal, Economic
and Social Aspect of African Refugee Problem, 1967.
4
Quoted in Rupert Emerson, 'Tan-Africanism,"
International Organization 16:2 (Spring 1962), p. 278.
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This call for a revamping of the boundaries sent an
unacceptable message not only to the leaders of Ethiopia who
foresaw in it a potential and inevitable problem with their
neighbor to the east but also the leaders of the then
colonies like Togo and Ivory Coast whose territories were
being claimed by Ghana. Also, Kenya's colonial leaders
figured that they would have the same kind of problem with
their neighbor to the northeast. The fears of these
countries were realized when Presidents Nkrumah of Ghana
and Abdulla Osman of Somalia issued a joint communique in
October 1961, emphasizing the unacceptability of the
boundaries drawn under colonialism. The communique read:
A union of African states as the step which
would automatically make obsolete the frontiers
problems inherited from the colonial regime,
but also recognized the imperative need to
■call upon the principle of self-determination
as a means of removing the artificial colonial
frontiers which were drawn without respect for
ethnic, cultural or economic links.5
Indeed, the call for the "unity of African states" and
for "self-determination" of people must have unnerved the
leaders of the newly independent nations in the 1960s. It
is likely that this call was one of the factors which
contributed to the creation of the Brazzaville group* in
5Ibid.
*The Brazzaville, the Casablanca and the Monrovia groups
were the three political groups that were formed early in
1960 and 1961. While the Brazzaville group was composed
of French colonies, with the exception of Guinea, Mali and
Togo, the Casablanca group was composed of countries like
Ghana, Egypt, Morocco, Guinea and Mali. These two groups
had diametrically opposed positions on the independence of
5
1960. To counter its influence and balance its political
weight, which was considered to be reactionary/ there came
the formation of the Casablanca group in 1961. Hence one
can deduce from this that the years between 1958-1962 were
a time of great antagonism and cleavages in the history of
independent Africa. This heightened tension between the
Brazzaville group and the Casablanca group convinced other
leaders of the need to cool the political atmosphere, thus
leading to the establishment of a third group called the
Monrovia group in 1961. The Monrovia group, motivated by
its fear of the progressive.and ambitious ideas of the Casa
blanca group which was advocating unconditional political
unity of African States, called in its resolution for
"absolute equality of states, non-interference in the
internal affairs of states, respect for sovereignty of each
state and condemnation of outside subversive activities."
It is amid this complex and intricate political
atmosphere ridden with contradictions and antagonisms that
the OAU was born. This is not to deny the fact that the
of the Congo (Zaire) and Algeria. The Monrovia group was
the moderate of the three groups and which was able to
reconcile the differences between the former two groups and
forge unity that led to the creation of the Organization of
African Unity. (For more see Vernon McKay, Africa in World
Politics (New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1963),
pp. 115-117.
6
Quoted in Carol Johnson, "Political and Regional
Groupings in Africa," International Organization 16:2
(Spring 19620, p. 439.
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then heads of state had common interest that could bind
them together. They had identical stands on the question of
decolonization, Apartheid, racial discrimination, maintenance
of international peace and security and the need for economic
cooperation.
The principles of the organization as they are laid
down in the Charter reflect the overriding concern of the
Monrovia group on the one hand and the common position of
all three groups on the other: 1) the sovereignty equality
of all member states; 2) non-interference in the internal
affairs of states; 3) respect for sovereignty and territorial
integrity of each state and for its inalienable right to
independent existence; 4) peaceful settlement of disputes
by negotiations, mediation, conciliation or arbitration;
5) unreserved condemnation, in all its forms, of political
assassination as well as subversive activities on the part
of neighboring states or any other states; 6) absolute
dedication to the total emancipation of the African terri
tories which are still dependent; 7) affirmation of policy
of non-alignment with regard to blocs.
These are the principles that were agreed upon by the
fathers of the organization to guide them and their policies
in international relations. And these principles were, more
or less, respected in the 1960s and early 1970s. It can be
argued that decolonization and a concerted action against
Apartheid and settlers colonialism were the call of
the time. Hence, it is not surprising that in 1970 the
number of refugees in Africa was estimated to be at three-
quarters of a million. However, as illustrated on the
following page, the number today has reached five million.
Problem Statement
It is ironic that the OAU encountered the problem of
refugees (displaced persons) from independent nations before
it even finished celebrating the independence of Portuguese
colonies. Its principles have unashamedly and unwarrantedly
begun to be either ignored and/or tampered with, opening the
Pandora's box of problems of displaced people. Out of the
seven principles, five have been shattered, leaving the
organization impotent. Aderanti Adepoju in his article,
"The Dimension of the Refugee Problem in Africa," observed:
In the 1950s and early 1970s the majority of
African refugees originated mainly from three
territories still under Portuguese rule,
namely, Angola, Guinea Bissau and Mozambique
...Correspondingly, the number of refugees
was relatively small, estimated at about half
a million persons.8
On giving the reasons for the escalation, he says that the
number
took a traumatic turn in the 1970s especially
during the last three years of the decade...
the deteriorating situation has been caused
largely by a series of political crises that
meanwhile erupted in several African countries,
notably, Zaire, Ethiopia, Somalia, Angola,
United Nations International Conference on Assistance
to Refugees (ICARA) 9-10 April 1981, p. 3.
O
Aderanti Adepoju, "The Dimension of the Refugee
Problem in Africa," African Affairs 81:322 (1982), p. 22.
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This problem has embarassingly become one of the
major problems faced by the OAU. The U.N. Chronicle of
May 1981 exposed the shocking magnitude of the displaced
people's crisis when it declared "Africa, with some twelve
percent of the world population, has almost fifty percent
of its refugees."
It is not the intention of this study to limit the
causes of the problem to only the breakdown of the peaceful
coexistence of neighborly states. Natural disasters such
as drought, famine, desertification and the like have
also contributed to the rise of the number of displaced
people. However, this study will only concentrate on the
political problems.
In this review, we can detect three different
approaches to the study of the causes and/or problems of
refugees and displaced people in Africa. There is the
work by Aderanti Adepujo discussed above. Argued along
the same line is the work of Jake C. Miller. In his
article, "The Homeless of Africa," Miller advances a theory
contending that, "massive displacement in Africa is a result
of many factors including internal conflicts, colonial/racial
9Ibid., pp. 21-22.
domination, oppressive governments/ foreign invasion and
natural disasters.1' Having established this, he went on
to say that "many refugee situations are caused by internal
oppression" and gives Uganda and Equatorial Guinea as two
examples. While the above two scholars have come close to
the question of "political crisis," it appears to me that
they have stopped short of identifying the real cause of
the problem.
The second approach is the one ventured by Jon
Woronoff and W.T.S. Gould, respectively. After having
uttered his moralistic opinion, "But there must be an end
to this! It is not good for a person to remain permanently
12
uprooted," Woronoff goes on to undermine the severity and
primordial nature of the problem:
Africa has many problems: decolonization,
modernization, economic development and so
on. The refugee problem is just one more.
And in a continent with so few resources
and so much to do, there is not much sense
in insisting that the refugee problem is
one of the most., important or that more
should be done.
I have no serious disagreement with Woronoff's con
tention that decolonization, modernization and economic
Jake C. Miller, "The Homeless of Africa," Africa
Today 29:2 (1982), p. 5.
Ibid., p. 9.
Jon Woronoff, "Africa's Expanding Crisis," p. 45.
Ibid.
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development are some of the problems to which Africa has to
address itself. However, in light of the prevailing intra-
African states' conflict which has opened doors to non-
African states involvement thereby exacerbating the
situation and contributing to the ever-growing number of
displaced poeple, it is only logical that the concern of
Woronoff should be relegated to secondary importance. In
order to tackle these problems, African states must be able
to resolve their differences and forge unity. This makes
the resolution of the displaced people's problem a primary
consideration whereas decolonization, modernization, and
economic development become a secondary concern.
Expounding on this position is in order. The laws of
dialectics teach us that nothing remains the same and that
everything changes. Whatever was primary could be relegated
to a secondary position and whatever was secondary could be
transformed to a primary status. For instance, from the
early 1930s to the end of the Second World War, when China
was occupied by Japanese imperialism, the Communist Party
of China took a principled political position by making
Japenese imperialism the primary enemy of the Chinese people
and forging a united front with the Koumintang, which was
relegated to a secondary status. Right after the end of
the Second World War and the defeat of Japan, however, the
Kuomintang became the primary enemy. Another instance is
when the Soviet Union, during the Second World War, made an
11
alliance with the Western capitalist countries against the
then primary enemy, fascism. Right after the war, imperialism
became the primary enemy.* • So, depending upon time and
space, one thing changes into another or one leaves its
place for another and vice-versa. And this is the case with
the displaced people, which became prevalent right after the
independence of the Portuguese colonies, as demonstrated
above, thus becoming the primary concern of African states
and the OAU.
With Somalia fighting Ethiopia and vice versa, with
Sudan encouraging and supporting the secessionists in the
northern administrative region of Ethiopia in order to
either subvert or stifle the revolution in that country,
with Libya trying to incorporate Chad therby affecting the
security of Sudan, Nigeria, and Cameroon; with Zaire having
its problem with Angola; Morocco waging war against the
Polisario in the Western Sahara thereby alienating and
antagonizing Algeria and Libya; with the OAU sick and on
its deathbed as a result of its recognition of the Saharawi
Arab Democratic Republic, economic development, modernization
and decolonization have been shelved to a secondary position.
It is logically assumed that the resolution of the problem
*And according to the Western version of the story, Soviet
communism and expansionism became the primary enemy as
explained in the theory of containment, thus necessitating
the establishment of NATO.
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of displaced people via the recognition of the principles of
the Charter of the Organization of African Unity, would
transform economic development, modernization and de
colonization back to their original primacy.
W.T.S. Gould admittedly wrote that the purpose of his
essay was not
to review the historical, legal and political
situation of refugees in tropical Africa, or
to consider possible solutions to refugee
problems...but to identify refugees as inter
national migrants and in particular to
examine their economic situation in countries
of asylum.14
The third approach is that of Gaim Kibreab. Kibreab's
work has two interrelated objectives. While the first one
is to expose the fallacious nature of the theory of "tribal
factor as the main cause of the refugee problem in Africa"
advanced by many scholars in the West, the second objective
is to establish his own theory. He contends that,
present day African societies are not only
marked by international conflicts and by
the presence of brutal and coercive power
but it can be argued that it is these
conflicts and violence unleashed to
suppress them by the class that has the
monopoly of state power that constitute
the main problem of refugeeism.^
14
W.T.S. Gould, "Refugees in Tropical Africa," Inter
national Migration Review 8 (Fall 1974), p. 419.
Gaim Kibreab, Reflections on the African Refugee
Problem: A Critical Analysis of Some Basic Assumptions,




With due respect to the effort of this scholar, I
would like to make the following remarks: 1) he has either
shied away from giving us the whole picture of his evidence
and/or refused to pursue it to its logical conclusion, and
2) he has distorted the facts and by so doing has lost
himself in wishful thinking.
In order to prove my contention, I will take issue
1 8
with two of his "empirical examples," Rwanda and then
Eritrea.
Rwanda
After rejecting the tribal thesis about the conflict
in Rwanda, Kibreab tried to depict it as a class conflict
between the politically conscious oppressed majority - the
Hutu - and the numerically small but economically strong
ruling class - the .Tutsi. He preferred not to say a word
about the role and allegiance of the "Tutsi proletarians"
during the so-called social revolution. Instead of giving
the breakdown of what percentage of Hutu voted for the
"militant" "Parti du Mouvement de L1emancipation Hutu"
and what percentage of the Tutsi voted for the "Union
Nationale Rwandaise" (UNAR) and vice versa, he pre





oppression, exploitation and domination was brought to an
20
end by eighty percent of the majority." Had we been given
the breakdown of the balloting, we would have confirmed the
obvious, i.e., the majority of Hutu - 84 percent of the
population - had voted for the 'militant' "Parti du
Mouvement de L'emancipation Hutu" and the majority of the
Tutusi - 15 percent of the population - had voted for the
Union Nationale Rwandaise. Thus the outcome substantiating
not the class nature of the conflict but the Hutu-Tutsi
historical and longstanding animosity.
One thing is certain, however; and that is, Kibreab
could go down in the history of African social scientists
as the first to champion a "revolution" assisted by
Belgian military and police force as "a social revolution
21
for justice, democracy, property, etc."
Eritrea
As he had tried to overlook the contradictions and
conflicts between the two nationalities in Rwanda with
the intention of protraying the problem as a class
struggle, Kibreab has likewise attempted to portray the
many nationalities that inhabit the Northern Administrative
Region of Ethiopia - Eritrea - as unified, transcending




In a sample of 190 households of Eritrean
refugees in Qala en Nahl, refugee settle
ment in the Sudan, the Surveyor asked the
refugees to state their "tribal affiliation"
and 46 or 24 percent of the sample answered
that they were Eritreans. This is very signi
ficant not only that it showed the national
unity and identity of Eritreans but...22
A critical look at the quotation exposes Kibreab to a
serious problem. Once again he has preferred to remain
silent on the responses of the other 76 percent of the
interviewees. Furthermore, in light of the propaganda
bombardment and the state-of-siege the displaced people
are under - by the liberation movements - how sincere and
genuine would the response of the 24 percent be? In fact
there are antagonistic contradictions between the different
nationalities which manifest themselves at the war front.
It is an open secret that the antagonistic contradictions
between the three "liberation movements," EPLF, ELF-PLF
and ELF* are beyond reconciliation, thus undermining once
again his assertion of class solidarity.
Is the Problem Generalizable?
It is assumed that the problem outlined here and the
solution that will be charted could have positive impli
cations for areas where "interference in the internal
22Ibid., p. 61.
*EPLF = Eritrean Peoples Liberation Front
ELF-PLF = Eritrean Liberation Front Popular Liberation
Forces
ELF = Eritrean Liberation Front - Revolutionary Council
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affairs of other countries" has become the order of the day,
"respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity of states"
is neglected, where the "sovereign equality of all states"
is trampled upon, and where "peaceful settlement of disputes"
by negotiations, mediation, conciliation or arbitration are
not exercised or opted for. In this connection it is
sufficient to mention the following: the Soviet Union's
involvement in and occupation of Afghanistan and the
resultant problem of displaced people and Vietnam's
involvement in and occupation of Cambodia and the
resultant problem of displaced people are prime examples.
Hypothesis
Our hypothesis is twofold. First, we want to as
certain that, contrary to the widely accepted view that
"ethnicity" and "class oppression" are the fundamental
cause of the refugee problem in Africa, we shall argue that
antagonistic foreign policies reflecting conflicting
national interests of the countries in Groups I, II, and
III are the primary causes. Second, we shall also argue
that contrary to accepted wisdom, those people are dis
placed people and not political refugees in the true sense
of the term.
Who is a refugee? The problem of the utility and
applicability of the term, for the regions under study,
has continuously manifested itself in many of the studies
we have come across. For instance, Africa magazine, in
17
one of its reports, has chosen to use the terms "refugee"
and "displaced person," simultaneously. It read: "Africa
has some four million refugees, of which large numbers are
in desperate need of assistance. The greater of these
displaced persons in social and financial distress come
23
from OAU members states." (emphasis mine).
Few studies done by the Public Information Section of
the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees also
demonstrate the confusion that surrounds the term refugee
and its applicability to the peoples of the regions of our
concern. In one of its reports it said, "the overall
guestion of uprooted people in Africa today, whether they
are termed refugees, displaced persons, migrants or un-
24
documented aliens." Sadruddin Aga Khan, Special
Rapporteur, in his Study on Human Rights and Massive
Exoduses seemed to air the frustration of everybody when he
said, "Terminology can cause confusion, and problems of
nomenclature have contributed to the lack of understanding
of the phenomenon of mass exodus." He went on to say,
In recent years, greater attention has come
to be paid by the media and governments to
events surrounding the creation of refugees.
23
Special Correspondence, "The Refugee Headache,"
Africa 107 (July 1980), p. 42.
24
Independent Commission:on International Humanitarian
Issues, "A Message to ICARA II," Refugees 7 (July 1984), p. 30,
25
Sadruddin Aga Kahn, Study on Human Rights and Massive
Exoduses E/CN.4 1503, 31 December 1981, p. 12.
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Here again, confusion in terminology is a
strong contributing factor to the lack of
cohesive global attitude towards the over
all problems. Many different terms such as
"asylum seeker," "illegal immigrant,"
"defector," "expelle," "migrant," "displaced
person," "border-crosser" and so on are all
used, just as victims of natural disasters
are frequently called "refugees" as well.
Various categories of people are thus lumped
together under the same general heading.26
Now that we have made the problem of the utility of
the concept for the regions of our concern evident, we
would like to ask who is a refugee? The 1951 UN Convention
gives the "universally accepted" definition:
Any person who, owing to well-founded fear
of being persecuted for reasons of race,
religion, nationality, or political opinion,
is outside the country of his nationality
and is unable or, owing to such fear or for
reasons other than personal convenience is
unwilling to return to it. '
Does this definition apply to the displaced:people of
the regions of our concern? The answer is categorically
no. However, what made it applicable is the 1969 OAU
Convention which stipulated the following to the 1951
definition:
The term refugee shall also apply to every
person who, owing to external aggression,
occupation, foreign domination of events
seriously disturbing public order in either
part of (sic, or) the whole of his country
of origin or nationality, is compelled to




Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees, General Information Paper HCR/50B/l/82/Rev.2,
5 November 198 2, p. 3.
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order to seek refuge in another place out
side his country of origin and [or]
nationality.28
It is our view that there are significant differences
between the 1951 UN definition and that of the 1969 OAU
convention. Whereas the 1951 definition depicts the
situation as a clear choice of conscious free will, based
on a clear understanding of the circumstances one is in and
the consequences of his/her choice, the 1969 OAU convention
is an imposition. It is an imposition by those who drafted
the convention without taking the right of the conscious
free will of the displaced people into consideration. The
displaced people of the regions of our concern are victims
of external aggression and in most instances arc children,
old men, woman, etc. On giving the number of "refugees"
in Somalia, the periodical Africa observed:
Of the million refugee population in the
camps, there are 41,000 men many of whom
are either elderly or in poor health. And
the women number 143,000, there are 153,000
children between the ages of a few weeks to
six years old and 137,000 children aged
seven to 14. So three out of five refugees
are children.29
And we hasten to add that the majority of displaced people
in different camps in Somalia are nomads who are non-
political. The same is true with Ethiopian displaced
O Q
Quoted in Sadruddin Aga Khan, Study on Human Rights
and Massive Exoduses, p. 14.
29
John Madeley, "Who Cares About Africa's Refugees?"
Africa 103 (March 1980), p. 75.
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people in the Sudan. The only difference being that the
majority of the latter are peasants and sedentary farmers.
To consider these people as refugees flies in the face of
the truth. The same could be said of the displaced people
from Chad to Cameroon and Sudan, from Angola to Zaire and
vice versa. Are we then to consider and much worse to
equate these people with the ones who made their conscious
choice, the genuine refugees? In our opinion, of all the
displaced groups, the only group that can qualify for
refugee status are the 52,000 or so southern Sudanese who
left their country "owing to well founded fear of being
persecuted for reasons of race, religion and nationality."
The refugees are Christians and animists and fleeing a
government dominated by Moslem northerners and mostly
Arabs. The rest of the groups are displaced or uprooted
people who fled the war zones depending upon the initial
stage of war, i.e. who was in the offensive? With respect
to the Somali-Ethiopia war, Somalia was the aggressor and
hence in the offensive the displaced people chose to cross
into Somalia in order to avoid being enmeshed by the in
evitable defense and counterattack of the Ethiopian forces.
This situation, is also true for the Chadians who fled into
Cameroon and the Sudan as a result of Libya's attack.
Public Information Section of the UNHCR, "Sudanese




So also it is true for the Angolans who fled into Zaire when
Zaire invaded Angola. Thus this study will adopt the concept
displaced people throughout.
Time Span of the Study
For the purpose of analysis/ a time demarcation has to
be made. That is, our study will be limited to an examination
of the displaced people from 1975 to 1982. The year 1975
is selected to mark the independence of Portuguese colonies,
Angola, Guinea Bissau and Mozambique which by the same
token became our watershed for the exodus of displaced
people from independent African countries, Angola 1976,
the Horn of Africa 1977-78 and Chad 1978-82. The year 1982
is chosen not because it signified or heralded the end of
the problems of displaced people but because of the scant
of materials and scholarly works of any scientific and
academic significance.
Methodology
The study is an analysis of the goals and objectives
behind the foreign policies of Group II and Group III
countries which have interfered in Group I countries'
internal affairs producing displaced peoples.


















Group I countries are those countries that are the
source of displaced persons. Group II countries are those
African countries which have interferred in the internal
affairs of Group I countries based on geographical
proximity and self-proclaimed national interest. Group III
countries are the non-African countries that have inter
ferred in the internal affairs of Group I countries
directly and/or indirectly based on political, economic/
ideological and strategic interests.
The study utilizes case by case approach, analyzing
the foreign policy objectives of all countries and their
regions. In this connection, the chapters will be
organized as follows: The Horn of Africa. While the main
protagonists are Ethiopia and Somalia, the interferers are
Somalia, Egypt, Cuba, China, USA and USSR.
In the next chapter Central and South Western Africa,
the main protagonists are Zaire and Angola. The interferers
in this conflict are Zaire, South Africa, USA, USSR, Cuba,
and China. Angola's reactive interference in the internal
affairs of Zaire will also be looked into.
Following that is the chapter on the "Heart of Africa"
where the main protagonists are Chad and Libya. The
interferers being Libya, Egypt, Sudan, France and the USA.
As the study is not a field study but a library one,
the sources of information include such primary sources as
are available: government publications and statements made
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by officials. Secondary sources include books, journals,
magazines, and newspapers.
It goes without saying that the study will utilize
causal explanation,* such as what are the causes for the
conflict between Somalia and Ethiopia?; teleological
explanation,* such as what motivated the superpowers to
get involved in the internal affairs of Ethiopia? To
the extent that the study deals with purposes, goals,
and justification used by the respective governments, it
will analyze the psychic element of the behaviors of the
policymakers. Thus, we recognize the importance not only of
empirical evidence but also of logical proposition* and
psychological explanation.* For example, what were the
undisclosed psychological goals of Libya's interference
in the internal affairs of neighboring Chad?
While it is assumed that the foreign policy objectives
of Group I countries, as related to the specific problem,
is of "core value"** of first type, i.e. primarily main
taining the territorial integrity of their respective
countries; Somali, Zairean and Libyan foreign policy
*The concepts are adopted, without any amendment from
Eugene J. Meehan, The Theory of Methods of Political
Analysis (Chicago: The Dorsey Press, 1965).
**These concepts are being utilized as understood and ex
pounded by K.J. Holsti in his book International Politics;
A Framework for Analysis (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall,
Inc., 1977), pp. 138-163. It is wise to point out, however,
that Holsti does not classify the "core value" as of first
type and second type. We have taken the liberty to classify
them as such to make the distinction that is so needed in
this study.
24
objectives are assumed to be core value of the second type,
i.e. interests that are motivated by the control or defense
of neighboring territories that are endowed with natural
resources that can enhance state's capabilities. The
foreign policy objectives of Group III countries could be
characterized as middle range** objectives of the third
category, i.e. different forms of self-extention of
imperialism.
In trying to address and analyze the foreign policy
objectives of Groups I, II, and III countries as related to
the specific problem, it is pertinent to raise the
following questions:
I. Somalia-Ethiopia
- What are the problems between these two neighboring
countries?
- What are the objectives of their foreign policies
towards one another?
- Do their foreign policies mirror non-alignment? If
not, why not?
- Are their conflictual relationships aggravated by
superpowers involvement?
II. Zaire-Angola
- What are the problems between these two countries?
- What are the objectives of their foreign policies
towards one another?
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- Do their foreign policies reflect non-alignment? If
not, why not?
- What has been the impact of superpower involvement in
their relations?
- What are the objectives of the superpowers in the
area, etc.?
III. Libya-Chad
- What are the problems between these two countries?
- What are the reasons for Libya's involvement in
Chad's affairs?
- What has been the response of Chad's neighboring
countries, namely, Egypt and Sudan, towards Libya's
involvement in Chad's internal affairs?
CHAPTER II
THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM: A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS
In studying the confict among states/ the
first thing to consider is the system in
which relations take place. Just as relations
among individuals are influenced abovo all
by conventions and customs of the society
within which they live, so the relations
of states themselves are influenced by the
conventions and customs of their system.^
The above quotation recognizes the dialectical relations
between the states, which in this case are the actors, and
the international system to which they are part. The type
of relationship - cooperative or conflictual - between the
actors in the system determines the general atmosphere of the
environment. While the international system is a reflection
of the type of relation that prevails among the actors,
their relationship is in turn affected or influenced by the
system.
In order to concretize this theoretical underpinning, we
would empirically investigate the conflictual relationship
between Angola and Zaire, between Ethiopia and Somalia,
and between Chad and Libya. It goes without saying that
the international system is also the object of this study.
Evan Luard, Conflict and Peace in the Modern Inter




Within what type of international system do these conflictual
relationships take place? Are the problems between these
countries aggravated and exacerbated by the international,
system? What are the problems between Angola and Zaire,
between Ethiopia and Somalia, between Chad and Libya? What
are the objectives of their foreign policies towards one
another? What are the objectives of the superpowers in
these countries and their geographical location? Pertinent
questions of these types would be entertained.
It has been claimed that "all politics is a mixture
of conflict and cooperation but international politics has
2
less cooperation and more conflicts." Is it so? If so,
why? Before we delve into the analysis of why conflictual
relation is dominant and prevalent in international politics,
it is imperative that we examine the definition of the
concept "conflict1 for the development of our theoretical
framework.
Charles Kegley and Eugene Wittkopf offer a succinct
definition of the concept:
Conflict entails, at a minimum, the existence
of two or more parties who perceive differences
between or among them and who are committed to
resolving those differences to their own satis
faction. Conflict may be seen as an intrinsic
product of communication and contact between
people; when groups interact, some conflict
is inevitable...conflict should not necessarily
David W. Ziegler, War, Peace and International
Politics (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1977),
p. 108.
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be regarded as either infrequent or an anomaly.
Arguing along the same line, Synder and Mack set the
following conditions that characterize every conflict:
1) Two (or more) distinctive parties must exist and have
contact with each other. 2) They must pursue mutally
exclusive, and/or mutally incompatible, scarce values.
3) This gives rise to mutually opposed actions and
reactions. 4) Those actions exhibit behavio.r aiming at the
destruction, injury, impediment or control of the other
party or parties. 5) Attempts are made to acquire power
by acquiring scarce resources used to pressure the opposed
4
parties.
The consensus among many scholars of international
politics that international politics is conflict-ridden
forces us to investigate every conflict thoroughly so as to
reach the root cause of it.
Many divergent theories ranging from the teaching of
the Bible to the biology of human, nature, i.e. the search
for power and overdrive of nationalism have been propounded,
Perhaps the popularity of this theory (human
nature) is a legacy of the Christian tradition,
for it has been the orthodox Christian view.
Christian teachers have held that human nature
is not basically good or even (by itself)
Charles W. Kegley, Jr. and Eugene R. Wittkopf, World
Politics: Trend and Transformation (New York: St. Martin's
Press, 1981), p. 353.
4
Quoted in Friedrich V. Kratochwil, International
Order and Foreign Policy (Boulder, Col.: Westview Press,
1980),
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capable of becoming good...according to
Christian teaching/ every person has in
herent evil desires, sometimes called
"Original Sin," a metaphor derived from
the biblical story of Adam's fall from
grace...collective violence, carried out
by states against each other, is in the
Christian view only a manifestation of
this basic individual nature, because
states are composed of individuals.5
Advancing his "search for power" theory, Hans J.
Morgenthau has the following to say:
It is sufficient to state that the struggle
for power is universal in time and space and
is an undeniable fact of experience. It cannot
be denied that throughout historic time,
regardless of social, economic, and political
conditions, states have met each other in
contests for power...if the desire for power
cannot be abolished everywhere in the world,
those who might be cured would simply fall
victims to the power of others...the drives
to live, to propagate and dominate are common
to all men.&
Morgenthau's contention of man's innate wish to
dominate and the drive for power has of late, obtained
the support of biologists, particularly those who concentrate
and specialize in the branch of biology known as ethology
or the study of animal behavior. The reputed biologist,
Konrad Lorenz, argued in 1962 that human beings, like other
animals, have instincts which are inherited. Among the
instincts discovered by Lorenz is agressiveness. This is
why he argues that human beings are ready to counterfight
5
Ziegler, War, Peace and International Politics,
pp. 114-115. ~
6
Hans J. Morganthau, Politics Among Nations (New York:
Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1973), p. 34.
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when challenged by another.
Although we would accept the second premise that human
beings are ready to counterfight when challenged, Lorenz
has failed to explain the initial motive and reason for the
one to provoke the other. As quoted above, Christian teach
ing has no difficulty in explaining this for it has as
certained from the outset that human1 nature is basically evil,
Hence it can be inferred that both the biologist and the
theoretician of power politics have failed to dissociate
and/or differentiate their argument from that of biblical
teaching. Put succinctly, Christian teaching would say
"these desires (evil) make people want what they have no
business wanting and prompt them to use violence if that is
Q
necessary to fulfill these desires.
Another theory of conflict is that of "troublemakers."
In this case individuals who are trigger-happy are the
culprits. Eliminate these troublemakers, the theory goes,
. . 9
and you eliminate war. Ziegler reminds us that Alan
Bullock's book on Hitler portrays the subject as the devil
who is to blame for the Second World War. By the same
token, could we argue that President Mobutu is responsible
for the conflict between Zaire and Angola? Is President







Siad Barre responsible for the many wars between Somalia
and Ethiopia? Should we hold President Gadaffi responsible
for the ongoing war between Libya and Chad? While our
theory does not contest the role of individuals in history,
we prefer a holistic approach. We argue that the role of
these individuals has to be explained within the global
context of the international environment. It would be
unwise not to look at the class and mode of production
these individuals represent. Theodore Abel comes close to
this position when he writes:
Throughout recorded human history, the
initiators of war were individuals and
groups who held power: political power,
control over natural resources, means of
production, land, markets, credits and
other sources of domination.11
Although we are in complete agreement with Abel's
contention, we would, however, like to point out one signi
ficant difference between the wars of yesteryears and
present day wars, especially those fought by small nations.
Today's wars are not absolutely limited to the'nations waging
them. There is superpower involvement based on ideological
commitment, geo-political and stragetic concern as well as
economic interests. This has in fact become commonplace,
influencing the outcome of wars one way or the other.
A third theory to explain international conflict is
Theodore Abel, "The Element of Decision in the
Pattern of War," American Sociological Review 6:1-6 (1941)
p. 854. :
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that of "nationalism." It is argued, for example that the
Austrians went to war with Serbia in 1914 because of Serbian
nationalist claims. France went to war to retrieve her lost
provinces, Alsace and Lorraine. It goes without saying
that in the 1930s Hitler argued for the right of the
Germans to live together in one state. Thus the theory
would argue that nationalism is a cause of war. We will
not dispute such a claim. It could be a factor just as is
the theory of the "troublemakers." However, our endeavour
is to find the root cause of war. There is an underlying
reason that could accommodate all other suggested reasons
and explain them. Those who attribute evilness to human
nature, who allege that the drive for power is the supreme
goal of human beings, and those advocates of the theories
of "troublemakers" and "nationalism," consciously or un
consciously, overlook the importance of natural resources
which are responsibile for our continued existence. It is
the scarcity of natural resources which is significantly
responsible for our development and/or underdevelopment
and that is the underlying cause of war. It should also
be stressed that not only the scarcity of these resources but
also their uneven distribution compounds the problem.
Hence the drive for conquest and domination!
Silviu Brucan, in his book, The Dialectic of World
PP
12^.
Ziegler, War, Peace and International Politics.
• 122.—123.
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Politics has argued eloquently and convincingly that it is
not the biological nature of human beings that is to blame,
He observed:
Marxist theory rejects biological reductionism
in explaining social phenomena, and criticizes
both the application of Darwin's theory to
society and Spencer's organicism. Rather,
Marxists hold that while society certainly
comprises biological processes, it represents
a more complex type of material unity quali
tatively different from the biological aggregate.
In society, biological laws are integrated
within the economic and social relations
established among people as well as within
the political and ideological conceptions
generated by this framework, eventually form
ing a whole that functions in accordance with
social laws that are distinct in many ways from
biological principles. Accordingly men who are
biologically strong may well become socially
underprivileged and economically poor because
of specific societal conditions.
Marxists thus maintain that power should be
explained in social rather than biological
terms? in society power is an effect rather
than a cause, a means rather than an end. Far
from being the prime mover in international
politics, power is the result of historical
states of affairs defined both by material
conditions of society and by social and national
inequalities. Power politics would not and could
not exist if nations were equal in size and might.
While Morgenthau's proposition that power is a
major factor in both domestic and international
politics is valid, his generalization that the
struggle for power is a permanent element of all
social relations is highly debatable. Hypotheti-
cally, if one eliminates the main cause of power,
namely, social and national inequality, there
would be no reason for domination and struggle
against domination? there would be no reason to
exercise power. Nor could industrially advanced
nations exploit poorer countries if all nations
were at the same level of economic and technolo
gical development. In the real world, however,
nations are great and small, mighty and weak,
developed and underdeveloped, rich and poor. As
long as such differences exist power will remain
34
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an important factor in international politics.
We can therefore conclude that the scarcity and uneven
distribution of these natural resources which determine our
strengths and weaknesses, our development and underdevelop-
ment and the blind but compelling drive for control of
these resources, is the prime cause of war. To this we
would like to add that the strategic location of a country
endowed with resources and the desire to control such a
country have contributed significantly to the deterioration
of relations among states. The fact that Ethiopia and
Somalia are located in the Horn of Africa forming part of
the "arc of crisis;" and the fact that Chad is situated in
North Africa sharing a boundary line with "expansionist"
Libya to the north, and Sudan to the east, Niger and
Nigeria to the west, and the fact that the resource rich Angola
is located in southwestern Africa bordered by Namibia to
the south which in turn shares a borderline with Apartheid
South Africa that illegally occupies it; and the fact that
socialist Angola shares a boundary line with capitalist
and Western oriented Zaire to its northeast and the fact
that Angola is on the Atlantic Coast with access to the
sea lanes have all to be seen within the context of
present international system as factors contributing to
conflicts between and among states. It is a truism to
Silviu Brucan, The Dialectic of World Politics
(New York: Free Press, 1978),
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state that nations formulate their foreign policies based
on their national interest. To this we would like to add
that the international system affects and influences the
formation of policies of member states of the system. The
following pages examine the type of international systme
the world has today and discusses how it affects member
nations in their relations with one another.
The Present International System
We start from th following observations that contri
buted to the modification of the post World War II inter
national system: 1) the emergence of the Soviet Union -
a socialist country - as one of the two superpowers; 2)
the emergence of the United States - a capitalist country -
as the other superpower; and 3) the emergence of the Third
World, a bloc of countries with a declared motto of non-
14
alignment.
It is evident, however that many scholars have been
at variance in their depiction of the present international
system. While Cecil Crabb sees a multipolar world system,
Morton Kaplan sees a loose bipolar world system16 and the
14
Cecil V. Crabb, Jr., American Foreign Policy in the
Nuclear Age, 4th ed. (New York: Harper and Row, 1983),
p. 8.
Ibid., p. 10.
Morton a. Kaplan, "Variants on Six Models of the
International System," in James Rosenau, International
Politics and Foreign Policy (New York: Free Press, 1969),
pp. 291-304.
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Chinese theoreticians see Three Worlds. Joan Edelman
Spero in her book, The Politics of International Economic
Relations/ sees Three Systems, i.e. the Western system
of interdependence, the North-South system of dependence
18
and the East-West system of independence. Henry
Kissinger and former President Nixon shared the perception
of achieving peace only when there is a balance of power.
And to that end they saw a strong and healthy United States,
Europe, Soviet Union, China, and Japan balancing each
other.
The Multipolar System of Cecil V. Crabb
Crabb contends that the bipolar world which came into
being at the end of World War II ceased to be a reality
around 1960. According to him what distinguished the bi
polar system from the previous international system -
balance of power - was the acguisition and use of atomic
bombs by America in 1945 and the successful development of
nuclear weapons by the Soviet Union a few years later.
Added to this is the fact that most crucial decisions
Editorial, "Chairman Mao's Theory of the Differentia
tion of the Three Worlds," Peking Review 45 (November 4,
1977), pp. 10-39.
18
Joan Edelman Spero, The Politics of International
Economic Relations (New York! St. Martin's Press, 1981),
pp. 12-18.
19
President Nixon in Kegley and Wittkopf, p. 391.
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affecting the global system were made by the two super-
20
powers. We believe an analysis of the causes for the
degeneration of the system into multipolarity as seen by
Crabb and his peers should be in order. Kegley and Wittkopf
seemed to read Crabb's mind when they said the following:
The decline of East-West tension in Europe,
the emergence of Japan and the European
community as significant and powerful new
actors, the rise of China and its open
conflict with the Soviet Union are all
ingredients of a transforming international
political system. These trends make a
multipolar system a potential model for
describing emerging political realities.
Crabb supplements the above contention by including
the Third World countries in the picture. He argues that
while the Soviet Union and the United States are, militarily
speaking, the two superpowers of the system, neither has been
able to impose its will upon the Third World.
We are convinced that the above contention, on close
ideological, empirical and theoretical scrutiny is only
sophistry. It is so because, ideologically it fails to
acknowledge the antagonistic and contradictory nature of
the two antipodal systems. Whether we try to cover it up
or not, the planet earth is divided into the socialist
camp and the capitalist camp. It is due to the non-
20
Crabb, American Foreign Policy in the Nuclear Age,
p. 9.
21
Kegley and Wittkopf, World Politics: Trend and
Transformation, pp. 395-396.
22
Crabb, American Foreign Policy in the Nuclear Age,
p. 10.
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existence of any other camp that we witness the vascilla^-
tion of the so-called non-aligned countries between the
two camps. It is a weak argument because the non-anta
gonistic and easily reconcilable differences between the
Western capitalist countries have been taken at their face
value thus convincing them of a split in the camp.
France for example, is a country that has earned
notoriety for encouraging dissension and supernationalism
in the Western world. However, an empirical study of its
ideological and policy relations with the Western countries
in general and the United States in particular, would
reveal no qualitative differences. It is true that France
and the United States may not see each other eye to eye
on the problem and solutions in Latin America.23 However,
this does not demonstrate France's ideological independence
vis-a-vis the U.S. It merely shows that France's position
is dictated by its national interest which in the case
of Latin America is very insignificant. It would be
ridiculous to construe this as an ideological difference.
Let us not forget Vietnam, which was France's colonial war
initially and which was passed on to the United States.
It did so not because it was convinced that the war it was
conducting was unjust but because it lost the war both in
the military and political field. . Nor should we be
23T
_ Jean-Pierre Cot, "Winning East-West in North-South,"
Foreign Policy 46 (Spring 1982), pp. 3-18
39
oblivious to the fact that it is the intransigent Western
countries of which France is part and parcel that stubborn
ly resist pressuring for changes in South Africa. It has
stood, and firmly so, shoulder to shoulder with the United
States in defending Apartheid South Africa and obstructing
and/or delaying the independence of Namibia. With the
collusion of the United States it has frustrated and
thwarted people's uprising in Zaire 4 and elsewhere. It
has recently sent its soldiers as part of the so-called
peace-keeping force - which is a misnomer - to Lebanon.
The actual responsibility of the force is to protect from
collapse the American backed government of Gemayel.25
Under the pressure of the Reagan administration it has
also sent its soldiers to Chad to frustrate the expansion
ist moves of Colonel Gaddafi. And detente with the Soviet
Union might have brought Western European, France
included, the benefits of trade with the socialist camp.
The West Germans could be enthusiastic about detente for it
has brought the repatriation of 200,000 Germans from the
East. Because of these and other advantages West
24
New York Times, 6 October 1983, p. 6. For more on
U.S. role in the uprisings and subversions in Zaire, see
George V. Wright, "President Carter's Response to Shaba II,"
Ufahamu 9:3 (1979-80), pp. 103-105.
25
New York Times. 20 September 1983, p. 1.
_ Robert J. Art, "Fixing the Atlantic Bridges,"
Foreign Policy 46 (Spring 1982), pp. 67-85.
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Europeans could opt for "east-west dialogue" while the
Reagan administration stresses increasing the strength of
27
the U.S. and its allies. It would be spurious to
consider these differences as a rupture in the alliance
of the capitalist world. When the chips are down they
are in the same camp. The affirmative position taken by
the Western countries on the deployment of new U.S. ground
launched cruise missiles and Pershing II missiles in their
countries is an eloquent testimony of their unity.
Margaret Thatcher, on a recent visit with President Reagan
had the following to say, "the United States should proceed
with its planned deployment of Pershing II and cruise
missiles in Europe in December." Explaining France's
position on the matter, Jean-Pierre Cot, Minister for
Cooperation and Development in Mitterrand's government
wrote:
Contrary to certain predictions, the French
government has taken a firm attitude toward
problems such as the deployment of U.S.
intermediate range nuclear forces in Western
Europe and the Polish crisis. The presence
of Communist ministers in the French govern
ment has at no time impaired France's relia
bility as a partner within the Atlantic
alliance.^y
27
Ding Yuanhong, "Crisis of West European-U.S.
Relations," Peking Review (March 21, 1983), p. 2.
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New York Times. 30 September 1983, p. 3..
29
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And the West German position was expressed by
President Karl Carstens, he said:
His country would not waiver in its
commitment to strengthen the Western
alliance. We are dealing with a highly
armed superpower which is making great
efforts in order to increase its influence
in many parts of the world.30
It is clear that the struggle between the two social
systems is not limited to the spheres of military and
economic power only. It is also waged in the field of
politico-ideology. In addition to the print and radio
media such as BBC, VOA, Radio Free Europe, and Radio Moscow,
etc. there are Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and
philanthropic organizations like the World Council of
Churches, Amnesty International, World Peace Council, the
Norwegian Nobel Committee and many more which have become
the mouthpiece of their respective sponsors thus forfeiting
their objectivity and neutrality. For instance, the
Peace Prize to Henry Kissinger, in 1970 for his effort
in trying to bring a "peaceful solution" to the U.S.-Vietnam
conflict. In 1983 the Nobel Committee awarded its peace
prize to Lech Walesa, the "founder of Poland's Solidarity
30
New York Times, 6 October 1983, p. 9.
It was a sad irony for the world to witness
Kissinger, who was directly responsible for the escalation
of the war into Cambodia, receive the award.
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Labor Union." The timing of the selection of Walesa by the
Committee manifests the politico-ideological motives not
only of the Committee but also of the Western countries
which exploited the occasion and the opportunity as a
pretext to interfere in the internal affairs of Poland.
Reagan claimed that it was "a triumph of moral force -over
33
brute force." French Prime Minister Pierre Mauroy told
France's parliament that "Walesa is a man who fights for
34
freedom in an almost universal way." A foreign ministry
spokesman in the Hague said, "The Dutch government hopes
that the award to Lech Walesa will act as a stimulus for the
Polish government to open a constructive dialogue with the
free trade unions."
The Polish government, cognizant of the motive and
intention of the ballyhoo, had the following to say:
The Norwegian jury awarded this year's
prize in conditions of a vehement rise of
international tension and an escalating
propaganda agression against Poland and the
other socialist countries...voices were heard
in world opinion that the humanitarian idea
behind the Nobel Peace Prize is abused for
political struggles ends in international
relations.36
32
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Closing the chapter on the Europeans theater, we would
now go to the so-called third force - the non-aligned
movement and see if it is actually a real independent
force.
To begin with, what were the causes for the creation of
the so-called non-aligned movement? How did the capitalist
camp and the socialist camp react to the formation of the
group? Has there been any effort by either or both camps
to woo the movement? Has the movement been able to live up
to its intended and initial declaration? A methodological
study of this sort will validate or invalidate Crabb's
contention of the independent role of the group vis-a-vis
the two camps.
It is an open secret that the purpose of founding the
movement was to assist the newly independent nation-states
to play an independent role vis-a-vis the two blocs.
Complementary to this noble intention was the wish of the
founding fathers, Nehru, Nasser, Sukahrno, Tito among them,
to ensure a conducive and peaceful world atmosphere in
which to build their nations. Margret Legum in her article,
"Africa and Non-Alignment" outlines three broad common
interests shared by the then 32 independent African states
which they expected the movement would address and advance.
According to her, the first was to establish the principle
and the practice that the sovereignty of small states is as
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important as the interest of the large ones. The second
major objective "was to abolish colonialism and alien rule
throughout the African continent...while these systems
remain in Southern Africa the dignity of Africa's people
is felt to be violated." The third objective was the
interest in a rapid economic development through the
application of capital from the developed world to the
resources of Africa. For this to be possible aid must be
obtained free of political conditions. It is fair to assume
that the concerns of the rest of the members were similar to
those of Africa. If there were additional points, they
would be complimentary. The additional points were the
criteria that were adopted at their preparatory meeting
in Cairo from June 5 to 8, 1961: 1) a country should pursue
an independnet policy based on coexistence of states with
differing political and social systems and on non-align
ment or demonstrate a desire to conduct such a policy;
2) a country must not be a member of a multilateral military
alliance concluded in the context of big power confronta
tion; 3) a country should permanently support movements for
national independence; 4) if a country has concluded a
bilaterial military agreement with a great power or is a
Margaret Legum, "Africa and Non-Alignment," in J.W.
Burton, ed., Non-Aliqnment (London: Heineman, Inc., 1966),
pp. 56-61.
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member of a regional defense treaty, such an agreement or
treaty must not have been concluded expressly in the context
of big power confrontation; and 5) if a country has ceded
military bases to a foreign power, this concession must
not have been made in the context of big power confronta
tion.38
The criteria confirm our original contention: a) the
existence of two different socio-political systems? and
b) that the confrontation in the world is between or
involves the two antagonistic social systems led by the
two superpowers.
On reading between the lines of the criteria, it would
seem that the movement at its birth recognized the diffi
culties it was to encounter. Constituted of small newly
independent states tied to the metropoles economically,
culturally and politically (neo-colonialism) the movement's
efficacy in international relations was to be very limited.
However, at the time both the Soviet Union and the United
States viewed the movement as immoral. The Soviet per
ception was later to change with the death of Stalin,
while the U.S. persisted until President Kennedy came to
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power. Leaving the ideological competition of the two
superpowers in the newly independent states for a later
38Ranko Petkovic, "Evolution of the Criteria of Non-
Alignment, " Review of International Affairs 28:652 (June 20,
1977), p. ii.
-^Ziegler, War, Peace and International Politics,
pp. 53-54.
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discussion, it is necessary to examine whether the non-
aligned countries have lived up to their pledges.
This question will be explored in the case studies pre
sented in the following three chapters. Ethiopia, once a
neo-colonial empire of U.S. imperialism, was host to the
U.S. military and had given it a base in its northern
province, Eritrea. The Republic of Somalia on adopting
"socialism" in 1969 as its socio-economic system, was host
to the Soviet Union and had provided it with a naval base
at Barbara. The irony is that both Ethiopia and Somalia
were to exchange guests as Ethiopia became socialist and
summoned the Soviet Union to replace the U.S. and Somalia
invited the United States to substitute the Soviet Union.
The problems of Angola and Zaire and Chad and Libya
should be viewed within the same prism. The problems in
the Middle East and the problems in Latin America can all
be viewed in the same light. Tito of Yugoslavia illuminated
this point as follows:
The picture of the world today is still a
far cry from what we would like it to.be. The
world continues to be divided into blocs
and is encumbered by dangerous confronta
tions which are more and more frequently
being transferred into the regions of the
non-aligned and other developing countries.
Far from being eliminated, new hotbeds of
conflict are unfortunately cropping up.40
40
Yugoslavia News, "Interview: President Tito," Borba
14 August 1979, p. 4.
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Speaking about the problems that confront the non-
aligned movement, J.R. Jayewardene, President of the
Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka said:
Several of the political issues that threaten
to divide us, and therefore catch our attention
and consume our time, are intrinsically im
portant. They cannot be glossed over because
if they are neglected, they will continue to
grow until they are beyond solution.41
Miljan Komatina, Yugoslavia's Ambassador to the United
Nations, put the difficulties encountered by the movement in
perspective as follows:
The end of the seventies and the beginning of
the eighties has likewise brought with them
new problems for the non-aligned, for they
will now have to find answers to a series of
new events, phenomena and trends in inter
national relations. What they have to do now
is above all, to ensure the independent anti-
bloc character of the non-aligned movement,
not by "purging" it from countries which have
voluntarily or involuntarily become part and
parcel of political alliances and blocs, but
by creating such as will make it easier for
these countries to act in a truly non-aligned
manner. In other words, the issue at stake is
how to protect the non-aligned countries from
bloc inroads, how to transcend polarization
on bloc foundations in situations when non-
alignment is exposed to attempt subjection of
individual or groups of countries to bloc
interests, trying to transform them into a
reserve of bloc policy or into a "natural
ally" of one or the other bloc. These pressures
were clearly evident as far back as the 1978
ministerial conference in Belgrade, and more
especially so during preparations for the
sixth non-aligned summit in Havana. The
discussions conducted during preparations
for both these meetings clearly showed that
41
President J.R. Jayewardene1s Statement to the Sixth
Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned
Countries, September 3-7, 1979, Havana, Cuba, p. 12.
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some of the non-aligned countries, hiding
behind the cloak of "progressiveness" or
equi-distance in relationship to the blocs,
are trying to introduce bloc criteria of
behavior among the non-aligned, which nears
turning these countries into the protagonists
of one or the other bloc, even in the cases
of blatant intervention and aggression.42
The above three straightforward statements unequivocally
depict the problems that the non-aligned movement, constituted
mainly of Third World countries, is encountering. Unlike,
Crabb who viewed the Third World as another bloc, and who
stated that these countries have been able to resist the
influences of the superpowers, the three contend otherwise.
Although they stop short of spelling it out in black and
white, their contention is tantamount to recognizing the
existence of only two blocs, thus contradicting Crabb1s,
Kegley's and Wittkopf's assertion of a multipolar inter
national system.
The Role of Ideology in the Struggle for Control and
Influence of the Third World
The struggle for control of the minds of the leadership
of the Third World countries thereby charting the avenues of
the socio-economic development in these countries, is pursued
by all means. However, for the sake of clarity and in keeping
with the scope of this work, the analysis will concentrate on
the following key works: The Stages of Economic Growth: A
42
Miljan Komatina, "Confrontation of the Non-Aligned,"
Review of International Affairs 31:724 (June 5, 1980), p. 30.
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Non-Communist Manifesto by W.W. Rostow and the Non-Capital
ist Path of Development by R. Ulyanovsky.
Rostow presents the reader with a methodology for the
"modernization" of the independent nations which is an
antithesis to Marxist methodology. He argued:
If this system is to challenge and supplant
Marxism as a way of looking at modern history
it must answer, in its own way, the question
posed under the rubberic of 'imperialism' by
the Marxist analysis, as elaborated by Marx's
successors.43
And on explaining the importance of the Third World to
the capitalist world he said:
We must demonstrate that the underdeveloped
nations - now the main focus of communist
hopes - can move successfully through the
preconditions into a well established take
off within the orbit of the democratic world,
resisting the blandishment and temptations
of communism. This is, I believe, the most
important single item on the Western agenda.
Rostow's book is based on the latter question, an
assumption which led him to indulge in intellectual
speculation. Such approach has been blind to objective
historical reality. We say this because
it is our belief that underdeveloped countries
as we observe them today are a product of
historical forces, especially of those forces
released by European expansion...Europe did
not discover the underdeveloped countries, on
the contrary she created them.45
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Keith Griffin, "Underdevelopment in History," in
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Rostow assumes that "preconditions are created generally
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in response to the intrusion of foreign power." No one
would disagree with him on the issue of capital flow or
the intrusion of capital into the newly independent nations.
The problem, however, is his assertion that it had and
could set a precondition. Paul Baran, in his article, "The
Political Economy of Backwardness," notes:
There were, no doubt, colonies and
dependencies where the populations profited
from inflow of foreign capital. These
benefits, however, were few and far between,
while exploitation and stagnations were the
prevailing rule.
The author, in a desparate move called upon the
elites of the developing countries to take the initiative
and responsibility of their country. He pleaded:
The non-communist literate elites in these
transitional societies bear a heavy responsi
bility for the future of their people. They
have the right to expect the world of advanced
democracies to help on an enlarged scale...it
is they who must focus their minds on the talks
of development. 48
Rostow, on behalf of the Western capitalist countries,
reminded the newly independent states of the Third World of
the possibility of modernization by embarking on the path
Charles K. Wilber, The Political Economy of Development and
Underdevelopment (New York: Random House, 1979), p. 81.
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traversed by those capitalist countries. We would, however,
like to close Rostow1s discussion by pointing out the
following. His assumption neglects: 1) the political and
economic effects of the era of imperialism, 2) the neo-
colonial economy of the newly independent nations
(dependency) and 3) the functioning of these countries
economies within the international trade system which was
established by and for the sole interests of the metropole.
The Soviet theoreticians, on the other hand, have
misused the names of Marx and Lenin in their theory of
the non-capitalist path of development for sheer political
purpose. A critical investigation of the theory exposes
its faults. It reconciles class struggle and advocates
the subordination of communists aims to those of national
democratic parties. 9 When one asks why, the response
further exposed their opportunistic line:
Marxists-Leninist have always upheld the
decisive role of the working class in the
advance of the socialsit revolution, in
socialist construction, and they continue
to do so; however, in countries where a
working class has not yet taken shape, this
approach to the leading role of the working
class is something that the country can
attain at a specific stage of non-capitalist
development after first rejecting the
capitalist path.50
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Marxism-Leninism has no double standard nor does it
advocate a transition to working class rule after the
consummation of the so-called non-capitalist development.
Empirical evidence based on the Chinese and Vietnamese
experience teach us that countries with a relatively small
working class can transform a semi-feudal and semi-
capitalist society into a socialist society under the
dictatorship of the proletariat. The vanguard role in
both countries was played by the proletariat with the
support of the peasantry and the progressive segment of
the petty bourgeoisie. And the socio-economic reality of
the countries alleged to follow the non-capitalist
development, "Algeria, Syria, South Yemen, Somalia,
Tanzania, the Peoples Republic of the Congo, Guinea and
Burma" depicts nothing so much as dependency. Ulyanvosky
admits that the non-capitalist development approach has not
been accepted by the international communist movement,
thus further strengthening our position that the theory
advanced in the names of Marx and Leriin is only'to disguise
the political motive of the Soviet Union. In fact, the
theory of "non-capitalist development" is simply a rebuttal
of the theory of "the stages of economic growth." This




The objective need for cooperation between
the socialist countries and the national
democracy makes specific demands on the
latter. The foreign policy tenets and
concepts which at one time served as a
common platform for all Third World countries
now require to be developed and hence defined
more precisely. Positive neutrality and non
interference can no longer be interpreted as
an effort to steer a course of balance between
the two systems. Non-capitalist development is
not possible on such a basis. It demands closer
relations with the socialist community in the
common struggle against the imperialists and a
clear understanding of the social implications
of socialism and imperialism, opposition to the
theory of "rich and poor nations" or that of
the two superpowers based on a rejection of the
class character of the two camps in the modern
world. ^ (emphasis mine).
To Reiterate
The above discussion should convince us to reject the
theory of multipolarity of the world system as advanced by
Crabb, Kegley and Wiftkoff. We have shown that the
differences that exist among the capitalist countries are
non-antagonistic in nature and reconcilable. As has been
made evident in the above discussion, the quantitative
differences that exist among those countries have not
nor will it prevent them from taking a united and strong
ideological stand against the "Soviet threat" in Europe
and the containment of "Soviet expansionism" throughout
the world. We have also depicted the Third World countries
as being perturbed and bewildered in this politically
Ibid., p. 65.
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complrx but ideologically bipolar world. The efforts of
both blocs to woo the support of these countries have been
described. It has become common knowledge that the
ideological contradictions between the so-called moderates
and progressives that persist within the non-aligned
movement is a clear and potent testimony of their in
ability to play an independent role vis-a-vis the two
blocs. The sum total of all these shows the superficial
ity of the theory of multipolarity.
The Loose Bipolar System of Morton Kaplan
Kaplan in his study observes that there are six
alternative theoretical models of international systems
out of which only two of them, the "balance of power system"
and the "loose bipolar system" have historical parallel
or correlate.-14 In the balance of power, international
system, it is argued that all the actors are nation-states
such as France, Germany, Italy, etc. and that the system
needs the equal participation of each - at the minimum-
five. However, this system was overtaken by new develop
ments and was transformed into a "loose bipolar system"
when deviant but powerful actors emerged and the non-
deviant actors failed to take countermeasures. New inter
national ideologies and supranational organizations like
54
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the communist bloc, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
and also universal organization like the United Nations
made their appearance and pledge to stay.55
The loose bipolar system reflects the existing reality
where interactions and activities are carried out by the
supranational actors and the universal actor. It is true
that almost all the national actors are members of the
universal actor and that most of the major national actors
belong to one or the other major supranational bloc. It
is equally true that some national actors are not members
of any of the major blocs.
Kaplan further introduces us to the type of structural
relation that prevails in the supranational organizations.
While he characterizes NATO as relatively non-hierarchical,
he identifies the Warsaw Pact as hierarchical. This
structural relation, he believes, determines the cohesive-
ness of the national actors in the bloc. He argues that
since the functional integration in the hierarchical bloc
is so great, it would be difficult for satellite members
to withdraw or to form a viable national entity if they
did. On the other hand, the non-hierarchical bloc has a
looser hold over its members.57 In this connection we






have played a part in the determination of the nature of
the structural relations of national actors in their
membership in their respective supranational organizations.
The Warsaw Pact is hierarchical not only because the
Soviet Union is economically and militarily stronger than
its allies, but also because most of the so-called
satellite countries are its neighbors and depend on it for
protection and economic development. Unlike the Warsaw
Pact, NATO is non-hierarchical because the United States,
the strongest nation of the bloc, is geographically located
thousands of miles away from its allies. Had they all
shared the same geographical location, the nature of the
relationship in the structure of NATO would have been
different. It was the U.S., through the Marshall Plan
program, that reanimated and resuscitated the economics
of its allies. Just like the Soviet Union reacts to any
kind of change in the leadership of its allies, Poland,
Czechoslovakia, Hungary and the rest so also America had on
many occasions expressed its resentment and displeasure
when the "socialists" or the "communists" assumed power
in the countries of its allies, France, Italy, Greece,
Spain, Portugal, etc. With allies that are geographically
close subversion and coup d'etat are commonplace as in the
Dominican Republic, Chile, Cuba and now Nicaragua and El
Salvador.
U.S. News and World Report corroborated this contention:
57
Over a period of nearly 150 years, U.S.
armed forces swept into Central America
and the Caribbean more than 60 times to
topple governments, install friendly regimes,
and or suppress revolutions and support
American business interests.5"
While Kaplan has argued unequivocally that the nature
of the present international system is bipolar, he has
however, qualified it as "loose1 for the reasons outlined
above.
Unlike Crabb, Kegley and Wittkopf, who suggested that
the non-antagonistic contradictions that exist among
Western countries signal the deterioration and breakup of
the alliance system, Kaplan argues that these differences
are not sufficient to reach such a conclusion. Hence, he
coins his own terminology "non-hierarchical" to show the
looser hold of the bloc on its members. This structural
relationship gives the members of the supranational actor
leeway to express their differences while simultaneously
maintaining their cohesiveness vis-a-vis the other bloc,
for the rule of the game is the elimination of the rival
bloc. Of the many rules enunciated by Kaplan, the follow
ing are relevant to this discussion. 1) All blocks sub
scribing to hierarchical or mixed hierarchical integrating
principles are to eliminate the rival bloc. 2) All blocs
subscribing to hierarchical or mixed hierarchical inte-
Susanna McBee, "In Central America: Why Distrust of
U.S. Runs Deep," U.S. News and World Report, 17 October
1983, p. 36.
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grating principles are to negotiate rather than to fight,
to fight minor wars rather than major wars, and to fight
major wars - under given risk and cost factors - rather
than to fail to eliminate the rival bloc. 3) All bloc
actors are to increase their capabilities relative to those
of the opposing bloc. 4) All bloc actors are to engage in
major war rather than to permit the rival bloc to attain
a position of preponderant strength. 5) Non-bloc member
national actors are to act to reduce the danger of war
between the bloc actors. 6) Non-bloc members are to refuse
to support the policies of one bloc actor as against the
other except in their roles as members of universal actors.
Rules one through four give a clear picture of the
antagonistic nature of the relations between the two blocs.
They also put in perspective the current tense relations
betweenthe two blocs. The recent harsh exchange of un
friendly words between the leaders of the two blocs is a
fervent attestation. Reagan reminded the United Nations:
Reactions to the Korean airliner tradegy
are a timely reminder of just how different
the Soviets' concept of truth and inter
national cooperation is from the rest of
the world...peace cannot be served by
pseudo arms control. We need reliable
reciprocal reductions. I call upon the
Soviet Union today to reduce the tension it
has heaped on the world in the past few weeks.
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To which Andropov replied:
The Soviet state has successfully overcome
many trials, including crucial ones, during
the six and half decades of its existence.
Those who encroached on the integrity of
our state, its independence and our system
found themselves on the garbage heap of
history. It is high time that everyone to
whom this applies understood that we shall
be able to insure the security of our
country, the security of our friends and
allies under any circumstances.^-^
Coming back to the analysis of the rules of the loose
bipolar system, rules five and six refer to the small and
so-called non-aligned countries which are supposed to play
a mediatory role lessening tensions between the two blocs.
But since these countries are in fact ideologically sym
pathetic to one or the other bloc, depending upon the
socio-economic and political system of their countries,
they have found themselves exacerbating the already shaky
relationship between the two blocs. This will be sub
stantiated in the following three chapters.
The Three Worlds of the Chinese Theoreticians
It is alleged that Chairman Mao advanced the theory of
three worlds "at a time when the two superpowers, the Soviet
Union and the United States became locked in a cut-throat
struggle for world hegemony and were actively preparing for
a new war."62 it is contended that the Chairman told a
^ew York Times, 29 September 1983, p. 6
Editorial, "Chairman Mao's Theory of the Differentia
tion of Three Worlds," Peking Review 45 (November 4, 1977),
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visiting leader of a Third World country that the United
States and the Soviet Union constituted the First World
and Japan, Europe and Canada formed the Second World. The
Third World is made up of countries from Africa, Latin
America and Asia including China with the exception of
Japan.°-*
Since this theory is an extension of the theory of
"Soviet social imperialism" and "capitalism has been
restored to the Soviet Union," discussion to clarify this
contention is in order. It is obvious that the Chairman
did not stand alone in this belief. Although the number
of Western "revolutionary intellectuals" who are convinced
of the "restoration of capitalism in the USSR" is not
known, Charles Bettelheim, Martin Nicolaus and the lately
converted Paul Sweezy are at the vanguard. Since Nicolaus1
book entitled A Critical Study of the Restoration of
Capitalism in the USSR is at the forefront of all the work
done on the topic, we would take issue with some of its
arguments.^4
They all agree that the restoration of capitalism in
the USSR came after the death of Stalin and during the
assumption of the leadership by Krushchev, Malinkov and
Marshal Zhukov, who are considered the "bourgeois officers
63 TV,Ibid.
64,
Martin Nicolaus, A Critical Study of the Restoration
of Capitalism in the USSR (Chicago: Liberator Press, 1975),
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corps" by Martin Nicolaus. He contends that it was
after 1953 that the dictatorship of the proletariat
degenerated when it slipped into the hands of those
"reactionaries."
The takeover was bloodless and completely
'legal' according to party rules; but it
was nevertheless in essence a right-wing
military coup that insured the Krushchev
victory. Without a doubt, his power grew
out of the barrel of a gun, only not the
gun of the revolutionary soldiers and
peasants, but the gun of a bourgeois
officers corps.^6
On recalling the Soviet Union of the Stalin era, he
declared:
Its elementary features were that state
power was solidly in the hands of the
workinq class, the major power opposition
bloc within the party had been exposed and
defeated and unity of the party was strong.
While the so-called "bourgeois officers corps," were
still members of the party, to say that state power was
solidly in the hands of the "working class" weakens the
argument. It weakens the arcrument for the simple reason
that it is contradictory. If the major opposition bloc
was defeated and "the unity of the party were strong"
where did the "bourgeois officer corps" come from to sub
vert it? Were not they members of the party? How can
one speak of "strength" and "unity" while the "bourgeois






to relate it to the means of production. They merely
assert. Nicolaus wrote, "But others of the leading neo-
bourgeois forces that took power after Stalin's death had
party careers that involved them rather more heavily in
the affairs of engineering and industry."
Why "neo-bourgeois forces?" Do they own the means of
production? Is this usage within the context of a Marxist
definition of classes? Classically, bourgeois refers to
someone who owns a means of production. Nicolaus has
coined another term "bureaucrat capitalist." These people
are according to him, accomplices who are assigned to
function as capitalists. He declared: "He (she) is a
'bureaucrat capitalist'...put into his post in order to
function as capitalist and if he fails in this role, the
bureaucracy relieves him of his duties."
These pseudo-Marxist concepts are consciously used
to implicitly ingrain biases of his own in his readers
mentality to conclude, without scientific analysis, that
there is in fact, a "bourgeois force" and/or "bureaucratic/
capitalist" that exist in the Soviet Union. We are yet to
be convinced that capitalism has been restored in the Soviet
Union. Until evidence is provided to the contrary, we
will continue to work under the assumption that the Soviet




The Chinese theoreticians svear that Lenin was the one,
in his thesis on imperialism, who pointed out that imperial
ism means the progressively mounting oppression of the
nations of the world by a handful of Great Powers. Their
interpretation of the situation is that:
This handful of imperialist powers has been
reduced to only two superpowers, the Soviet
Union and the United States which are capable
of contending for world hegemony and all the
other imperialist powers have been relegated
to the status of second or even third rate
powers.71
This is a degeneration of Marxism-Leninism par
excellence, where class analysis has been forfeited to
satisfy one's political interest. This interest is
glaringly manifested in the claim that China, a socialist
"big nation"'^ j_s considered a member of the Third World.
China's political struggle with the superpowers in the
effort to control the Third World countries has gotten
ideological cover thereby allotting itself the vanguard
position in the struggle against hegemonism. What is the
theoretical base for the alliance of the Third World with
the Second World? They argued:
The establishment of the Common Market in
Western Europe, the independent policies
pursued by France under de Gaulle, the
collapse of the dollar centered monetary
70
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system in the capitalist world and the
sharpening trade and currency wars between
Western Europe and Japan on the one hand
and the United States on the other...all
these facts mark the disintegration of the
former imperialist camp headed by the United
States.73
The reason(s) for the socialist East European countries
to join the United Front? It is contended: "the East
European countries have never ceased waging struggles
against Soviet control. Since the Soviet occupation of
Czechoslovakia, the people's resistance has continued to
grow."74
We feel that the analysis of the situation in both
western and eastern Europe is devoid of Marxist-Leninist
theoretical underpinnings and is a mere reflection of
parochial political interest. Earlier it was argued that
the differences among imperialist countries are non-anta
gonistic and hence easily reconcilable. The Chinese
theoreticians who have been preaching for a united front
of the "Third World" and the "Second World" against the
"First World" betrayed this cause when they aligned them
selves with the United States and Apartheid South Africa
against the revolution in Angola and when once again they
found themselves in alliance with the United States to
73"Chairman Mao's Theory of the Differentiation of
the Three Worlds," p. 30.
74Ibid., p. 31.
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subvert the revolutionary uprising in Zaire. Expressing
their praise for Mobutu they said: "The Zairian people are
a heroic people. United under the leadership of President
Mobutu, they have, in the past few years, repeatedly stood
up to the social-imperialists1 blackmail and pressure."
Should we be surprised at the degeneration of the
Chinese theoreticians? The answer is both yes and no. We
should be surprise because it was Chairman Mao, of all
theoreticians, who amplified and expounded on the theory
of contradiction. At the same time we respond in the
negative because' almost all communist countries use
Marxism-Leninism to rationalize and justify their foreign
policies, thereby displaying realism and pragmatism. Put
another way, this an example of the primacy of national
interest over proletarian internationalism. So we conclude
that the theory of the Three Worlds is a theoretical
construct which does not depict the reality of the world.
The Three International Systems of J. Edelman Spero
Spero in her superb book, which is considered to be
among the best of its kind to date, has amply demonstrated
the hitherto neglected interrelationship of economics and
politics. According to the author, her effort is to rein
state the natural relationship of the two disciplines which
75,,-.
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have been artificially divorced by liberal theorists.
However Spero sees three international systems, her
analysis recognizes two things. First, it recognizes the
dialectical relationship between the dominant economy of
the center and the dependent economy of the periphery,
which is an explicit revelation of the neo-colonial
relations between North and South. It also recognizes the
fact that most of the so-called Third World countries are
capitalist-oriented in their development. Thus, unlike
Crabb, who contends that these countries play an independent
role in international relations, Spero's analysis implicitly
suggests that they can only play a subordinate role.
Secondly, her analysis recognizes the antithetical nature
of the relationship between the Western capitalist countries
and the Eastern socialist countries, thus in effect dividing
the world into two antagonistic social systems. She
observes:
In the West, the Bretton Woods System of
international economic management established
the rules for commercial and financial
relations among the major industrial states.
In the East, Soviet hegemony in Eastern
Europe provided the foundation for a separate
and international economic system. Finally,
during the first postwar decade, the greater
part of the Third World remained politically
and economically subordinated. Linked with
the developed countries of the West in formal




had little choice but to acquiesce to the
international economic system established
for them.78
Contrary to Crabb, who concludes that a multipolar
world exists due to the split in the Western world and
the existence of the Third World, Spero contends that
the differences are only family affairs. She says:
Most international interaction involves
elements of both conflict and cooperation
...in situations involving high levels of
cooperation, there is often an element of
conflict; and even when groups share
interests, there is usually conflict over
specific interests and specific solutions
...thus within a framework of common goals,
states conflict over the best means to
achieve their common end.79
The author initially drafts a picture of economic
independence between the two antipode social systems,
and to that extent quotes Stalin as follows:
China and European people's democracies
broke away from the capitalist system and,
together with the Soviet Union, formed a
united and powerful socialist camp con
fronting the camp of capitalism.8^
She consummates her picture and updates her analysis when
she discloses that detente, lagging agricultural and
industrial growth, and retarded technological development
g 1
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with the West. However, it should be stressed that this
economic interaction has not changed the fundamental
nature of the bipolar world. What it has done, more than
anything else, is strengthen Kaplan's thesis of the loose
bipolar world!
The Balance of Power Thesis of President Nixon
Former President Nixon is quoted as pleading:
We must remember the only time in the
history of the world that we have had
any extended period of peace is when there
has been a balance of power...it will be a
safer world...if we have a strong, healthy
United States, Europe, Soviet Union, China,
Japan, each balancing the other.82
At the outset, we would like to state that the former
President did not speak of the existence of balance of
power systems currently but simply shared his firm
conviction that peace is only possible when there is a
balance of power. With all due respect to the President
and most of all being fully cognizant of the intri
cacies and complexities of world problems, we would like
to differ with his contention both theoretically and
ideologically.
Theoretically, the contention is ignorant of what
constitutes power and the importance of capabilities in
the whole scenario. Hans J. Morgenthau, in his famous
book Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and
82 .
Nixon quoted in Kegley and Wittkopf, World Politics-
Trend and Transformation, p. 391. " ~
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Peace, gives a succinct analysis of the elements of
power. He contends that geography, natural resources,
food, raw materials, industrial capacity, military pre
paredness, technology, leadership quality, quality of
armed forces, population, national morale, etc., are the
salient factors on which power of any nation depends.83
Using Morgenthau's thesis as a frame for analysis,
President Nixon's reason(s) for selecting Japan as one of
the countries in the balance of power scheme escapes us.
Japan is an island nation formed of four main islands,-
Honshu, Shikoku, Kyushu and Hokaido. Collier's Encyclo
pedia points out that the soils of Japan are "generally
infertile and unproductive."84 with a population of
11,938,811, "Japan is the most industrialized Asian
country, and the only one so highly developed that its
standard of living matches that of many Western European
countries." However, on the natural mineral resources,
Hasley et al., wrote: "Japan's mineral resources are
meager...the bulk of the minerals used in Japanese
industry must be imported."86 (See table below).
Q O
Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, pp. 112-148.
84 .
William D. Halsey, et al., Collier's Encyclopedia
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Having studied the elements of power Japan posses,
we have come to the conclusion that Nixon's choice of Japan
is solely based on his own predisposed picture of the
country based on its miraculous industrial and technological
development. with only one-half of the population of either
the United States or the USSR and one-ninth that of the
Peoples Republic of China, and a miniscule army (250,000)
it cannot be considered a power. Japan's military superiority
is long gone.
With respect to Europe, in addition to saying that the
same argument can be applicable, we would like to point out,
however, that Europe is divided into two antagonistic
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socio-eocnomic and political systems. And any analysis of
the European situation should benefit from this empirical
reality. Apparently Nixon was oblivious to this obvious
fact when he argued that Europe (both East and West) is one
of the balancing powers. His proposition begs for a
reconciliation of the two systems which is, to say the
least, not realistic. Statesmen and social scientists have
found it difficult to develop a theory on which Western
European countries could be united for the simple but
important reason that the differences that exist among
these countries are real problems to reckon with.
R. MacFarquhar, writing on European federation, observed;
The obstacles will be considerable. In
contemporary Europe we are nine nations
speaking seven languages, attempting to
unite after centuries of independent develop
ment and mutual strife...Yet despite the
progress so far made, a new strategy is
almost certainly needed if the long march
to union is to resume.
Finally, as regard to Nixon's views on the global
balance of power we ask, what about China? Could it be
one of the balancing powers? Although China is endowed
with all the elements that make it a potential world power,
that has yet to materialize. By the then- ideological and
other differences with the Soviet Union and the rest of the
socialist countries would have been resolved. That is,
87
Roderick MacFarquhar (MP), "The Community, the Nation
State Region," in E rnard Burrows, et al., Federal Solutions
to European Issues (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1978) ,
p. 20.
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either China will be part of the socialist bloc, or its
flirtation with the United States and Western Europe will
have derailed it from its course and it will ;join that
camp. This is assuming that there could only be two
antagonistic systems. Thus, we would conclude that the
balance of power system advocated by Nixon is unrealistic.
To Reiterate
In this chapter, we have been able to ascertain two
important points. First, after examining various theories
that attempt to explain the causes of conflict and war, we
conclude that Silviu Brucan's theory of scarce and uneven
distribution of resources identifies the supreme cause of
conflict and war. It should be pointed out, however, that
other factors could play secondary roles. The second
conclusion is that, after examining different theories on
international systems, we find that Morton Kaplan's "loose
bipolar system" comes closest to depicting the reality of
the present world. Hence, these two elements form the
framework of this analysis.
CHAPTER III
ANTAGONISTIC FOREIGN POLICIES IN THE HORN OF AFRICA AND
THE CREATION OF DISPLACED PEOPLE IN THE REGION
The antagonistic nature of the foreign policies of the
two principal countries of the Horn of Africa, Somalia and
Ethiopia, has resulted in many wars. Thus contributing to
the unacceptable number of lives lost, developmental infra
structures destroyed and millions of displaced people
created.
The conflictual relationship of the two states has not
only encouraged the participation of the superpowers, who
have been locked in competing and jockeying for geo
political and strategic positions, but also has resulted in
a revamp of alliance of forces unwitnessed in the history
of the region. For example:
- Who could have imagined the coming of Israel and
Libya (two enemies par excellence) to the side
of Ethiopia?
- Who could have envisioned Israel on the same
side with the Soviet Union against the United
States?
- Who has contemplated the two superpowers switching
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sides in the conflict between Somalia and Ethiopia?
- Who had expected the Peoples Republic of China
to support Somalia's expansionist war, once
again being the same camp with the United
States as it once had in Angola?
Clearly, these scenarios are products of clashes of
many'-and varied national interests pursued by their
respective governments. Tension areas like the Horn, the
Heart and Southwestern Africa depict the global nature of
the security of the superpowers. At the same time-they
remind us that the security concerns of the smaller
countries remain, as always, safe and secure borders,
friendly neighbors and possibly a stable region.
The Concept of National Interest
Students of international relations who have studied
the evolution of the concept ascribe to it "vagueness,"
2
"broadness and generality." Nevertheless, the definition
of the concept, developing from its initial narrow defini
tion of "dynastic interest" has grown to incorporate
"values held by some, many, perhaps even all of the
K.J. Holsti, International Politics: A Framework for
Analysis (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1977),
p. 139.
2
Fred A. Sondermann, "The Concept of National Interest,"
Orbis 21:1 (Spring 1977), pp. 126-127.
Charles A. Beard quoted in Sondermann, p. 122.
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members of a given society."
Robert E. Osgood, among others, breaking from the
traditional taboo of defining and operationalizing the
concept ventured to describe it as follows,
National interest is understood to mean a
state of affairs valued solely for its
benefit to the nation. The motive of
national egoism, which leads men to seek
this end, is marked by the disposition to
concern oneself with the welfare of one's
own nation; it is self-love transferred to
the national group.5
Recognizing the ambiguity and vagueness of the concept
of national interest, Holsti chose to employ the surrogate
concept "objective" and applied it in his critical study
of foreign policy. In his version of the development of
the concept of objectives, he pointed out that there was a
dichotomy between the "state" and the "monarchs" who
ascribed their "sovereignty" and "absolution" to God.
Thus, he argued that the state could only serve as a
vehicle for protecting the wealth, security and patrimony
of a particular dynastic line. Relating these types of
leaders to their opposite extremes, he observed that there
are governments that gladly commit the wealth of the nation
to the growth and expansion of ideologies and messianic
philosophies. Holsti is not forgetful of the centrists,
4
Sondermann, p. 124.
Robert E. Osgood quoted in Sondermann, p. 124.
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those countries which he considers to be "modern states"
that give priorities to the well being and development of
the nation, welfare and security of the citizens, access to
trade routes, markets and vital resources.
Having convincingly pointed out the different types of
leadership and their objectives, Holsti, however, runs
into difficulties with his classification of them. He
declared:
We will employ a combination of three criteria:
1. the value placed on the objective, or the
extent to which policy makers commit themselves
and their countries' resources to achieving a
particular objective; 2. the time element
placed on its achievement; and 3. the kinds of
demands the objective imposes on other states
in the system.
From these we can construct categories of objectives such
as the following: 1) "core values" of the first type to
which governments and nations commit their very existence
and that must be preserved or extended at all times;
2) "core values" of the second type i.e. interest that
are motivated by the control and defense of neighboring
territories enclosed with national resources; 3) middle
range objectives of the third category where many different
forms of self-extension and imperialism are perpetrated;
4) long range goals which concern the ultimate political
K.J. Holsti, International Politics: A Framework for
Analysis, pp. 138-144^ '
7Ibid., p. 144.
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or ideological organization of the international system.8
Holsti's approach will therefore assist us to
analyze the objectives of the various states1 foreign
policies towards each other and the region. The chapter
will therefore be organized as follows: first, the long
standing conflict between Somalia and Ethiopia is investi
gated. Questions of the following type are entertained:
What are the problems between these two neighboring
countries? What are the objectives of their foreign
policies towards one another? Are these conflicts aggra
vated by superpower involvement and intervention?
Second, the interests, objectives and roles of the
superpowers is explored, and third the motives of the Arab
countries towards the region are examined.
Somalia-Ethiopia Conflict
Since the emergence of a Somali nation-state and its
joining the family of nations in July I960, successive
governments of that nation have refused to accept the
boundaries between Somalia and Ethiopia, Somalia and Kenya
and Somalia and the Republic of Djibouti. It is this
rather guixotic political stand with its equally irrational
foreign policies that has made the Horn of Africa a hotbed
of tensions. To explain why Somalia stubbornly insists and




Pre-colonial, Colonial and Post-colonial History of the
Region
Unlike the colonial history of the other countries in
Africa whose fates were negotiated and determined at the
Berlin Conference in 1870, colonialism in the Horn of
Africa and especially in Somalia was quite different. The
areas that had been inhabited by Somalis experienced not
only European colonialism but also Egyptian expansionism.
Egypt then was an autonomous Ottoman province. This drive
was aborted and hence halted by the unflinching spirit of
Ethiopian nationalism at Harar (its Eastern province) and
the subsequent Mahadist rebellion in the Sudan in 1883. The
Egyptian Army had to be withdrawn and redeployed in Sudan
to quell the insurgence there hence giving the Ethiopians
the needed time to consolidate their still shaky hold of
9
Harar.
No matter how scanty, the few studies done on the
area agree that a "Somali nation," argued by the leaders
of the Republic of Somalia, had never been in existence.
Scholars such as Kaplan et al. have even gone to the
extent of suggesting that much of the central and parts of
northern Somalia had at one time been inhabited by Oromo
peoples many of whom now live in Ethiopia and Kenya.
This was the case from the first quarter of the seventeeth
century until the 1860s when they were evicted by the
9
Harold D. Nelson, ed., Somalia; A Country Study
(Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress, 1982), p. 12.
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newcomers, Somalis, who made their way from the lower
Juba River. Even today remnants of Oromo and Swahili
speaking people still persist in Somalia.
J.H. Spencer, writing on the same topic has the
following to say:
Somalia itself had never existed as a
separate entity. Before the advent of the
Italians much of the coastal area was
claimed by the Sultan of Zanzibar from whom
Italy purchased the Benadir coast by agree
ment in 1905 for the sum of fel44,000
payments which continued until 1937. Other
areas were claimed by various Sultans who
readily sold themselves into Italian
protection, such as the Sultan of Obbia.
Brownlee, corroborating Spencer's historical recital
forwarded his share:
In a series of treaties between 1884 and 1886,
the tribes on the northern Somali coast were
made the object of British Protectorates.
Italy established protectorates over a large
sector of the Indian Ocean littoral in a
series of treaties with the tribes, princi
pally in the years 1887 to 1896.12
As the undisguised ambitions and objectives of Italy
had repeatedly manifested later, the territory held by
the Somalis was only meant to serve as a springboard for
landing into the rich, fertile, and potentially prosperous
Ethiopia. The 1891 and 1894 treaties between Britain and
Irving Kaplan, et al., Area Handbook for Somalia
(Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress, 1977), p. 15.
John H. Spencer, Ethiopia, The Horn of Africa and
U.S. Policy (Cambridge, MA.: Institute for Foreign
Policy Analysis, Inc., 1977), p. 9.
12
Nelson, Somalia: A Country Study, p. 14.
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Italy defining their respective sphere of influence without
the knowledge and participation of Ethiopia was only a
prelude to their ultimate objectives. The 1896 debacle
which Italy suffered at Adowa at the hands of the Ethiopian
warriors led by Emperor Menelik, and the war of 1935, the
eve of the Second World War, declared by Italy against
Ethiopia are potent testimonies. In the words of Holsti,
"imperialistic" and "self-extension" thus manifesting the
second priorities of their foreign-policies - middle range
objectives of the third category. Spencer observed, "In
1935 Ethiopia went to war in defense of the Ogaden when it
was invaded by Italy," thus displaying the primary
objective of its foreign policy - and in the words of
Holsti, once again, core interest of the first type.
While the victory at Adowa brought recognition of
Ethiopia's boundary defining the Ogaden as part and parcel
of Ethiopia's territory, the Italian invasion in 1935 and
the subseguent annexation of the Ogaden thereof voided any
such claim. Nelson remarked, "The Ogaden was detached
from Ethiopia and included in the new, enlarged province of
Somalia...nearly 40,000 Somalis had been mobilized to




Spencer, Ethiopia, The Horn of Africa and U.S Policv
p. 10. ~ ■ —<-'
Nelson, Somalia: A Country Study, p. 24.
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The occupation of the Ogaden was later to change hands
when Britain launched an offensive against Italian occupa
tion forces in February 1941 and liberated both Mogadishu
and Addis Ababa. However Britain's true motives were then
revealed when, instead of returning the Ogaden back to
Ethiopia, it chose to set up its own military administration.
The occupation was working against Ethiopia's interest by
undermining its sovereignty. As the contradictions deepened
Italians in the British occupied areas formed political
organizations and started calling for a return to Italian
rule. To counter this demand, Britain encouraged the
creation of the Somali Youth Club which later changed its
name to the Somali Youth League. One can argue that the
formation of the Somali Youth League marked the birth of
the idea of "Greater Somalia" or the unification of all
territories where Somalis reside. And this idea is the
brainchild of British colonialism.
As in all other disputed colonial territories after
the end of the Second World War, the contradictory
positions that were simmering in that region were forwarded
to the Allied Council of Foreign Ministers at their Potsdam
Conference. The positions adopted by the four allies
reflected their basic national interests. France threatened
by the idea of "Greater Somalia," which wcruld contribute to
its loss of Djibouti, advocated a return of Italian rule.
Britain unashamedly stated its position for British super-
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vised trusteeship over all territory with the eventual
birth of a "Greater Somalia" nation. The Soviet Union,
fearing the entrenchment of Great Britain in that strategi
cally located region and wishing to express its support
for the Italian Communist Party which has the prospect of
coming to power in Italy, condemned Britain's position.
The U.S. also opposed Britain's aim for two important
reasons: first, the loss of the Ogaden would have jeopardized
the Sinclair Oil Concession and second, the President
wanted to court the Italian-Americans in order to obtain
their support in his upcoming election. The Americans
called for an international administration. The four
failed to reach a consensus. Britain returned the Ogaden
to Ethiopia in 1948 and in Decmeber 1949 the General
Assembly of the United Nations took a position on the
unresolved issue of Somalia. The Assembly assigned Italy
to administer the territory for ten years under the
supervision of the United Nations.16
The Somali Nation (the amalgamation of the British
Somaliland and Italian Somaliland) was born on July 1, i960.
Ever since its independence, the new nation has continued
the foreign policies of its departed colonial masters, i.e.
the extension of their domination over the adjoining
territories under the pretext of creating "Greater Somalia."
16Ibid.
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In other words, Somalia's foreign policy has, ever since
then, been dictated by its desire to incorporate the
modestly rich regions of its neighbors. Thus we can argue
that its foreign policy has been dictated by what Holsti
would refer to as its core interest of the second type.
The antagonistic political relation that the Republic
of Somalia has with its neighbors Ethiopia, Kenya and
Djibouti, stems form its unrealistic and unacceptable
demand for the territories of these countries. Kaplan,
et al. in their introductory chapter observed that the
"reason for claiming major portions of neighboring
territories is the fact that these areas are inhabited
principally by ethnic Somalis."17 The same authors
testified also that remnants of the Oromo and the Swahili
speaking nationalities linger in the Republic of Somalia
today. Would the world condone it if Ethiopia and/or Kenya
declared war against the Republic of Somalia to liberate
their "colonized" breathren? How would this policy, if it
were to be pursued, be different from the present policies
of the leadership of the Republic of Somalia? What then
would be the logical conclusion of this kind of unrealistic
demand both in terms of regional and continental peace and
stability."
Exposing the source of the problem from the rostrum
Kaplan, et al., Area Handbook for Somalia, p. ix.
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of the United Nations General Assembly, the Foreign Minister
of Ethiopia reminded the world that:
Over the years, successive governments and
leaders of Somalia have publicly reiterated
their ambition, which is enshrined in the
Somali constitution and encrusted on the
Somali national flag in the form of a five-
pointed star. While the two points on the
Somali flag represent the former British and
Italian colonies, the rest are supposed to
symbolize Eastern Ethiopia, the Republic of
Djibouti and the Northern region of Kenya.18
The clear implication of the above is that so long as
the Republic of Somalia maintains and entertains this
aspiration, peace and security for the countries of the
area in particular and to the whole region in general
is impossible.
In a nutshell, this short colonial history of the
region reveals the following important points: a) colonialism
with respect to Somali inhabited territory was unique in the
history of European colonization in that it was of
voluntary nature where the leaders surrendered their in
alienable right to constitute and form a government of
their own; b) the interests of the colonizers were not
actually in the colony they held but the territories of
the adjacent countries; c) the territories of the adjacent
countries temporarily occupied as a result of a colonial
war of expansion have been claimed by the leaders of the
"I Q
Feleke Gedle-Giorgis, Minister for Foreign Affairs of
Ethiopia, Statement to the 3 2nd Session of the United
Nations General Assembly, 10 October 1977, pp 16-17
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Republic of Somalia; d) finally, the foreign policy
objectives of the other three countries of the region,
Kenya and Djibouti (since independence) and Ethiopia ever
since the scramble for colonies in the region, spring from
their core interest of the first type, i.e. the maintenance
of their territorial integrity, thus giving due respect
to the principles of the Charters of the United Nations
Organization and the Organization of African Unity.19
What are the Underlying Problems Between Somalia and Ethiopia
The seemingly irreconcilable differences between the
Republic of Somalia and Ethiopia, can be understood by
applying the theory advanced by Silviu Brucan, addressed in
Chapter Two, i.e. the theory of scarce and uneven distribu
tion of resources and social and national inequality as a
culprit of conflict and war.
In this connection, one can apply the theory by
comparing the resource endowments of Somalia and Ethiopia.
As mentioned before, the underlying point of Brucan's
thesis is that nature has not been equitable in its dis
tribution of natural resources which are of primary
necessity for the propagation of life and the development
of our material and cultural needs.
The Republic of Somalia is a country in which
the F 2' "»"»««*. I- 3 and 4 of
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three-fifths of its three million people are nomadic.
What does this mean in terms of the political economy of
the country? It means that the government reaches only
two-fifths of the population on a regular and immediate
basis. It also means that due to the relatively small
population, the country lacks labor power for its socio-
economic development. It also means that the government
is not able to collect enough revenues to meet or even to
plan its annual program. The sum total of these and other
deficiencies is the retardation of the country's progress
which also contributes to the ever-deepening dependent
nature of the country's politico-economic relations to the
center.
This problem is compounded further by the dearth of
proven mineral resources. This is not to suggest or to
imply that the country does not have any mineral resources.
The northern part of the country is known to posses -
although in very limited amounts - copper, chromium, lead,
manganese, molybdenum, nickel, zinc, etc.21 Nonetheless,
the mining industry in Somalia is barely in its infancy.
Somalia, a country which is mostly desert has only
two permenantly flowing rivers, the Juba and the Shebelle,
both of which originate in Ethiopia. I.M. Lewis observed:
20., ,
Kaplan, Area Handbook for Somalia, p. 55.
Ibid., pp. 51-52.
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Both rivers contain water in all seasons
and together make up the main river system
of the whole Somalia...the southern part of
the Somali Republic between the Shebelle and
Juba rivers...constitute the richest arable
zone.22
The unfairness of nature towards Somalia becomes
glaringly evident when one looks across the border into
Ethiopia. Ethiopia's geographical location and topographi
cal diversities account for three distinct climatic zones.
According to Robert L. Hess, the Dega zone is defined as
any area over 8,000 feet in elevation with the temperature
rarely rising above 60 degrees (F). The Woinadega has an
elevation between 5,000 feet and 8,000 feet above sea
level with a mean temperature range between 60 and 80
degrees (F). And the Qolla zone includes areas below 5,000
23
feet. John Spencer, recognizing the problem that the
natural riches have brought to Ethiopia, made the
following observation:
By her size, population...and resources,
Ethiopia dominates the Horn. Yet at the
same time, her fertile farming grazing
lands and temperate climate and strategic
location on the shores of the Red Sea and
its exit at the Strait of Bab-el Mandeb
have rendered her an attractive and vul
nerable target. The sources of all of the
water of Somalia and Djibouti and of 80%
of the waters of the lower Nile, Ethiopia
22T .,
_I.M. Lewis, A Modern History of
mrv r?°£ert L* HeSS' Ethiopia: The Moderniz.tinn ^
cracx (Ithaca: Cornell University: Press, 1970), p. 6.'
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has been throughout history the object of
covetous design.24
We have tried to demonstrate that the Ogaden has been
coveted not only by Somalia but also by Italy and Britain.
The picture depicted by Spencer clearly suggests that the
glaring differences in the distribution of natural resources
and the desire to control these has always been the cardinal
problem between Ethiopia and Somalia. Nevertheless, this
objective reality, which we consider as the primary cause,
has been subordinated by the Somali government to the sub
jective and secondary cause which is ethnicity. The weak
ness of this argument has been pointed out above. Heedless
of this, successive governments of the Republic of Somalia
have made irredentism the supreme priority of their
policies. The establishment of diplomatic, trade and
cultural relations have all been, motivated by this ulterior
motive. Kaplan et al. have pointed out that, the
issue that dominates all other considerations of foreign
relations for the majority of Somalis is the status of
their fellow Somali in adjacent countries."25
To translate this into a reality, the establishment of a
strong Somali army has been of paramount importance. We
would .not be too far from the truth if we assert, as would
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in Somalia of "scientific socialism" was nothing but a
tactic to obtain the all-out support of the Soviet Union
in particular and the progressive world in general against
Ethiopia and its supporters particularly the United States.
This alliance of forces demonstrates the loose bipolar
nature of the international system.
The Soviet Union and Somalia
Under this subheading, we will try to analyze why
Somalia invited the Soviet Union to be its ally, why the
Soviet Union accepted this invitation, and the degree of
influence of the Soviet Union on Somalia.
Just after its independence the government of Somalia
sought financial support from the United States for an
army it intended to create. However, cognizant of the
fact that Somalia had a stated goal of expanding its
territory at the expense of its neighbors (and especially
Ethiopia which was then very closely allied with the CJ.s)
and also cognizant of the fact that this unrealistic
priority of militarism would jeopardize Somalia's economic
development, Washington expressed its dissension and
offered only $10,000,000, enough to build 5,000 man force
oriented towards internal security. The Somali government
then turned to the Soviet Union which granted it $320,000,000
to expand and modernize its army. This loan was later to
reach $55 million and Moscow began to take the responsibility
of training and equipping the Somali army. In return
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Somalia provided Moscow with its first naval base at
Berbera and an airfield of 5,000 meters, long enough to
land and accommodate large bombers.
Africa Report/ gives a chronological description of
the development of the arms race in the region:
In an attempt to put some muscle behind its
irrendentist claims on parts of Ethiopia
and Kenyan territory, Somalia increased its
military expenditures from $7 million in
1966, to $21 million in 1975. Somalia
military spending in 1975 accounted for
6.7 percent of the Gross National Product.
During this period the Soviets pumped in
$134 million in arms another $500 million
1975-76 with more scheduled for this year
1977...Kenya's military expenditures moved
up to $51 million in 1975 from $11 million
in 1966. An increase from 1.6 to 34. percent
of the Kenyan Gross National Product.
Ethiopia's military expenditures increased
from $32 million in 1966 (2.4 percent of the
Gross National Product) to $110 million
(3.8 percent of the GNP) in 1975. Most of
its $183 million in arms imports during the
decade came from the United States.^'
A similar picture is presented here by the United
States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and the Somalia
government when their aggregate data record shows that
defense expenditures have surpassed the combined amounts
budgeted for health and education. In addition, the 1977
World Bank figures show that the government had appropriated
in equivalent per capita amounts of about $7 for defense,
Nelson, Somalia: A Country Study, p. 258.
27Africa Report 22:2 (March/April 1977), pp. 50-51.
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while education and health received $5 and $2 respectively.28
After signing the 1974 Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation
with Moscow, Somalia was provided with the latest and most
sophisticated weapons in the Soviet Union's arsenal. This
included MIG 21 supersonic jets, T54 tanks, Sam 2 missiles,
etc. Furthermore, Soviet military advisors were increased
to 1,500 supplemented by fifty Cubans.
The obsession with "Greater Somalia" and the need to
maximize its capabilities to realize these objectives
coincided with the equal obsession of the Soviet Union to
expand its sphere of influence via the Middle East to the
Indian Ocean. Somalia was then found to be an ideal
country. It is no secret that the Soviet Union's objective
in this regard is to break the containment knot tied
by the United States and its allies since the end of the
Second World War. In this connection we would mention
NATO, SEATO, METO, ANZUS, etc. As METO (Middle East Treaty
Organization) was meant to contain the Soviet Union from
expanding in and around the Middle Eastern countries, the
Soviet Union had to do everything possible to abort this
measure. Why? Anatoly Gromyko hit the nail on the head
when he said:
First of all, the USSR has a stake in
preventing the appearance of a strategic
threat to it from the southern direction.
'-y o




It is no secret that dozens of planes based
on American aircraft carriers in the Persian
Gulf have a wide range of operation and can
carry nuclear weapons. The Soviet Union, just
as all littoral and hinterland countries, is
interested in the safety of sea routes passing
through the Indian Ocean because they not only
link the USSR with the littoral states but are
also the only year-round sea routes linking the
European parts of the USSR with its far Eastern
parts.jU (Emphasis mine).
In order to guarantee its security and maintain its
national interest, the Soviet Union has found it necessary
to compete with the United States for influence among the
Third World countries.* In the process they ended up
substituting ideological purity for ideological opportunism,
What do we mean by ideological purity? In short, class
analysis and class approach have taken a secondary
importance. Support of developing countries has become
the clarion call. A resolution adopted by the Communist
Party of the Soviet Union Central Committee on the 60th
anniversary of the October Revolution stated that the
Anatoly Gromyko, "The Imperialist Threat to Africa,"
International Affairs 7 (July 1981), p. 44.
*This is true especially in those countries that have been
receiving U.S. and Western military and economic aid. While
Annex I, Table 1 shows the military aid that some Third
World countries receive from the Soviet Union (1959-1980)
An^e^o^ Tobl? 2 Shovs the re3i°nal distribution of this'
aid (1955-1979), Annex II, Table 3 displays the major
recipients of the Soviet Bloc economic aid (1955-1980)
It should be mentioned that the majority of the recipients
are countries strategically located, i.e. Middle East,
Indian Ocean and South Asia. See Stephen T. Hosmer and
Thomas W. Wolfe, Soviet Policy and Practice Toward Third
World (Lexington, MASS.: Lexington Books, 1983).
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Soviet Union and the socialist countries are and have been
giving all kinds of support to the developing countries in
their legitimate struggle against imperialism. It is
this ideological impurity that exposed it in Egypt and
Sudan where Presidents Sadat and Nimeiri respectively -
two anti-communist and notorious for imprisoning and
executing communists - benefitted from the labor of the
socialist workers of the Soviet Union before they ended
their relationship and ignominiously expelled their Soviet
advisors. It is this ideological opportunism that urged
to give the Repubic of Somalia a "socialist" license under
the cover of "socialist orientation." Vorobyov underscored
this fact when he said, "A considerable number of young
independent states are carrying out programmes of national
construction which are socialist in orientation."
Gromyko writing on the same issues observed that "most of
the socialist oriented countries - over a dozen of them -
are in Africa accounting for 30 percent of its territory
and nearly 25 percent of its population."33
How genuine are the so-called "socialist oriented"
Anatoly Gromyko, "The October Revolution and Africa's
Destiny," International Affairs 9 (September 1977), p. 98.
32
V. Vorbyov, "Colonialist Policies in Africa," Inter
national Affairs 10 (September 1978), p. 40.
33
Anatoly Gromyko, "Socialist Orientation in Africa,"
International Affairs 11 (September 1979), p. 95.
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countries in their effort to build a scientific socialist
society? What do they understand by socialism? Somalia's
Minister of Information and National Guidance, Mohamed
Sheikh Aden, responding to a question posed to him by
Anthony J. Hughes, said:
The main objective of the revolution has been
to transfer the economy from the hands of the
new colonial masters, the petit bourgeoisie or
compradors...and by breaking away from that
pattern we arrived at the socialist system.34
(Emphasis mine).
Hence, it is a small wonder when we learn that the
"socialist orientation" was only superficial and indeed a
misnomer for state capitalism. Steward Powell of U.S. News
and World Report, observed: "Soviet prestige is declining
steadily across much of Africa as one country after another
discovers that Russia is able to provide little help beyond
weapons." An anonymous Somalia official is then quoted
as saying, "the whole idea behind the socialist orientation
was that it was the quick way to development. But the
only thing the Soviet Union supplies is arms. What we
need is economic aid."
Hence it is legitimate to ask why the Soviet Union
should consider these countries "socialist oriented." The
34
Anthony J. Hughes, "Interview With Dr. Mohamed Sheikh
Aden," Africa Report 26:3 (May/June 1981), p. 12.
35
Steward Powell, "In Africa.It's the Soviets on.the




answer is partly revealed by Eugene J. Meehan's psycholo
gical explanation, in which motives/ objectives and goals
explain the unstated intentions of human beings. Thus is
revealed the truth behind the seeming insincerity of
Soviet President Leonid Brezhnev who declared:
Our Party supports and will contine to
support peoples fighting for their freedom.
In so doing, the Soviet Union does not look
for advantages, does not hunt for concessions,
does not seek political domination and is not
after military bases. We act as we are bound by
our revolutionary conscience, our communist
convictions.37
Soviet activities in the Middle East, especially in Syria
and Irag, (at one time in Egypt and Sudan which are anti-
communist of the highest degree) and its former relation
with Somalia were motivated purely by its national interest.
And in this connection we would say that foreign policy,
instead of reflecting domestic policy, as is claimed by
3 8
Kapchenko, is a reflection of the national interest,
which in turn is influenced by the international system.
In this case, competition with the United States in this
loose bipolar system has influenced Soviet foreign policy.
It should be recalled that Moscow's objection to the creation
of "Greater Somalia" in the late 1940s was not based on the
conviction that the Ogaden belonged to Ethiopia but on the
37
Quoted in Gromyko, "The October Revolution and
Africa's Destiny," p. 98.
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N. Kapchenko, "Scientific Principles of Soviet
Foreign Policy," International Affairs 10 (October 1977),
P. 83.
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desire to expel Great Britain, then a relatively strong
nation, from that strategically important region. Hence,
the Soviet Union's policies are consistent not only in their
efforts to thwart imperialism in the area, but also to gain
access to navel bases in the region. This it did in
Berbera, Somalia. It should be stressed that the Soviet
Union equipped and trained the armed forces of Somalia
knowing fully the ambitions and motives of that government.
By doing so, the Soviety Union implicitly endorsed not only
the objectives but also the means that the government of
Somalia was to employ in the invasion of Ethiopia's territory.
The United States and Ethiopia
The relations between the two countries were founded
on Ethiopia's core interest and the United States' middle
range objectives of the third category. Ethiopia's long
standing fear of encirclement and domination by the Arabs39
and U.S. interest of expanding its influence in the newly
independent countries of Africa were the primary reasons
for relations. Speaking about the importance of Ethiopia
to the United States, William E. Schaufele, Jr., Assistant
Secretary for African Affairs said:
During the early post-World War II period
our interests in Ethiopia were primarily
continental and bilateral, we hope that
our longstanding relationship with
39
Richard Moose, "Before the Subcommittee on Africa
of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs," Department of
State Bulletin 79:2025 (April 1979), p. 12
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Ethiopia would assist us in establishing
good relations with the newly independent
states of Africa.40
Realistically speaking, U.S. ^support for the rein
statement of Eritrea to Ethiopia was not based on the
historical argument of Ethiopia's right to claim its
lost territory, but on its own interest in obtaining '
access to Ethiopia's envied strategic location. Schaufele,
expressing the significance of the Kagnew Station stated:
We developed our important communications
facility at Kagnew in Asmara; and we bene-
fitted from access to Ethiopia's ports and
airfields. In the past few years the
relationship with Ethiopia has also
acquired increased regional and strategic
importance...the Kagnew Naval Communications
Unit remains important to us as does access
to Ethiopia's airfields and ports at a time
when our interests and operation in this
increasingly important area have grown.41
For Ethiopia, we can say that it was fear of Arab
domination that pushed her into signing a Mutual Defense
Agreement with the United States in 1953.42 Ethiopia, a
Christian ruled weak nation increasingly found its
national security, i.e. its core interest of the first type
becoming entangled in Middle Eastern politics. Convinced
that it was out-muscled by its Arab neighbors, it became
close to Israel. As the saying goes, the enemy of my
40 .
William E. Schaufele, Jr., "Statement Before the
Subcommittee on Africa of the Senate Committee on Foreign
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enemy is my friend. Expressing his opinion on the issue,
Spencer said, "confronted with this hostility...Ethiopia
did what might be expected under the circumstances: she
drew closer to the other non-Moslem, non-Arab state at
the northern end of the Red Sea, Israel."
As has become evident in this analysis, Ethiopia's
geographical location vis-a-vis the rest of Africa has not
much to do with determining its foreign policy. It is the
strategic location of the country on the Horn of Africa,
vis-a-vis the Red Sea, Bab el Mandeb and Indian Ocean that
influence its relations with the outside world. The fact
that both superpowers consider the region to be of paramount
importance to their respective interests has made the area
a hotbed of tension.
On closing this sub-topic, we would point out that in
order to maintain its special relation with Ethiopia the
United States has provided the country with a sum total of
$575 million in aid. Schaufele said:
The extent of our relationship with this
nation of 28 million can be measured by
the amount of aid we have provided. This
has amounted to over $350 million in
economic aid since 1952 and over $275
million in military assistance.44
In this connection., if one looks at the argument of Francis







goes "to regions of the world in which the United States
45
has special foreign policy and security interests,"
carries very little weight.* If the amounts of aid, both
military and economic, were a measurement of the importance
of Ethiopia, the fact that the Soviet Union provided a
billion dollars in just three years (1977-80) surely shows
that it and not its counterpart coveted Ethiopia most.
Corroborating our analysis but writing more in regional
terms F.S.B. Kazadi, in his article in Afr ca Report
observed:
A look at recent foreign aid budgets reveal
that Africa receives less U.S. foreign
assistance than Asia, far less than the Near
(or Middle) East, and only slightly more
than Latin America...For example, the Carter
Administration, in its assistance proposal
for fiscal year 1981, has asked for $54
million in aid for African refugees, which
total more than three million, or approxi
mately one-half of the world's displaced
persons. In the same budget proposals,
however, the Administration requested $323
million for Kampuchean refugees.46
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Francis Moore Lappe, et al., Aid As Obstacle (San
Francisco: Institute for Food and Development Policy,
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F.S.B. Kazadi, "Development: The Politics of U.S.
Foreign Assistance," Africa Report 25:3 (May/June 1980),
p. 51.
*While Annex III, Table 4, shows the Ten Top Recipients of
Bilateral Economic Assistance (1980), Annex III, Table 5
shows the Ten Top Recipients of U.S. Military Assistance
(1981).
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The Arab States and Ethiopia
The Arab states have manifested their intolerance for
this economically and militarily weak and Christian dominated
country. It should be underlined that their dislike,
motivated by religious fanaticism and reaction to its
socialist revolution, is exacerbated by the strategic
location which Ethiopia happens to occupy, thus leading
many a scholar to view the struggle over Eritrea and the
Horn of Africa as part and parcel of the Red Sea and the
Middle Eastern affairs.47
Ethiopia, as pointed out above, had fought and
repulsed invasions by Egypt in both the Ogaden and Eritrea
48
in the 1880s. History shows that Egypt had argued
against the return of the Ogaden and the federation and
unification of Eritrea with Ethiopia. However it is
important to point out that despite conflicting reports
with respect to Egypt's position on the question of the
federation of Eritrea with Ethiopia, in favor49 and
opposition, there is a consensus on the Egyptian
behavior towards Ethiopia; it was antagonistic, unfriendly,
47
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and against the principles of the Charter of the United
Nations. In addition to the severe negative propaganda
from Egypt against Ethiopia,* it advanced its fantasy by
calling for the Unity of the Valley of the Nile under its
leadership. l In 1958 it organized the secessionists52
which led to the birth of the so-called Eritrean Liberation
Movement (ELF) in 1961.53 These and other similar activities
directed against the territorial integrity and national
security of Ethiopia, i.e. its core interest, constituted
a grave threat to peace in the region.
Following the creation of the Organization of African
Unity in 1963 and a rapprochement between Egypt and Ethiopia,
anti-Ethiopian activities were carried out by Syria, Libya,
Iraq, the Peoples Republic of Yemen, Saudi Arabia, etc.54
Writing on Syrian and Libyan positions on the territorial
integrity of Ethiopia, Spencer said:
For example at the World Islam Congress
converged in Mogadishu in December 1964,
the Syrian representative called for the
support of all Moslems for the Greater
Somaliland movement. At the OAU summit
conference at Addis Ababa in 1973, Libya
proclaimed Ethiopia to be an imperialist
^ observed that at the Paris Peace Conference of







state, faithless to African traditions,
because of her opposition to the aspirations
of the Somalis for a Greater Somaliland and
called for the removal of OAU headquarters
from Addis Ababa.
Tunisia, expressing its dislike for Ethiopia, proposed
the representation of the Eritrean Liberation Front at
the 1975 OAU summit in Kampala. A Palestine Liberation
Organization journalist, writing on the linkages of the
Eritrean "revolution" with that of "Arab liberation" and
"Palestine liberation," urged his fellow Moslems to support
Eritrea by saying:
The Arabs have to understand that (in Eritrea)
a revolution in an Arab country is in the
making, a revolution that is inseparable from
the liberation movement or from the struggle
to liberate Palestine or from the Arab
revolution in any other Arab country. We
are therefore obliged to sympathize with the
struggle of this people.57
The People's Democratic Republic of Yemen expressed
its position by allying itself with Libya, serving as a
conduit for the transfer of arms to the "Eritrean
5 8
nationalists." The only Arab state that Ethiopia can
check is the Sudan with which it shares a long border.
Resisting actual open conflict between each other, they
however have interfered in each other's internal affairs by
55Ibid., p. 30.
56Ibid., p. 32.




backing liberation movements in each other's countries.
Why should Ethiopia be the object of antagonism by
its surroundings? Among other factors that have already
been expressed that contributed to this unenviable
position, we believe that the potential natural resources
that the country posses are the underpinnings. Spencer
eloquently testified:
Ethiopia is the ganglion of the network
of rivers that radiate outwards - north
east, southeast, and south...Ethiopia
supplies 100 percent of the waters of
the three Somalilands, and over 80 fi0
percent of those of the Nile in Egypt.
The possession of these natural resources, have
compounded and deepened the historical religio-political
enemity between Ethiopia and its Arab neighbors.
The Ethiopian Revolution and the Political Situation in the
Horn of Africa
Observed within the context of the loose bipolar
world or the East-West relations, the Ethiopian revolution,
it is contended, has contributed to the deterioration of
world peace and hence to the start of the Second cold
war. We should add to this that the "thoroughgoing and
Ibid., p. 64.
Spencer, Ethiopia; The Horn of Africa and U.S.
Policy, p. 48.
Fred Halliday, The Ethiopian Revolution (London:
Maxine Molyneaux, 1981), pp. 211-212.
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far reaching revolution" had alienated its foremost
enemies, the surrounding Arab states, and has eventually-
brought a restructuring of the alliance of forces in the
region.
The conservative Arab governments of the area,
threatened by the revolution in Ethiopia, and more so by
the eventual solidarity between Ethiopia, the People's
Democratic Republic of Yemen and Libya, encouraged the
deterioration of already chilly relations between Sudan and
the Soviet Union as a result of the latter's involvement
in two aborted coups. In order to obtain the financial
backing for his ambitious economic development program,
Nimeiry had to subscribe to their policies and objectives,
i.e. providing sanctuary and transferring arms to the
"Eritrean Liberation fighters" with the purpose of over
throwing the revolutionary government in Ethiopia.
This unfriendly behavior from the Sudanese government
coincided with a change of policy in Libya wich abandoned
its material and political support for the government of
Somalia and the "Eritrean Liberation fighters." The common
dislike for and threat from the Sudanese government
Marina Ottaway, Soviet and American Influence in the
Horn of Africa (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1982), p. vi
Tom J. Farer, "Dilemmas on the Horn," Africa Report
22:2 (March/April 1977), pp. 12-13.
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coalesced the two, Ethiopia and Libya, to overthrow the
Nimeiry government. The aborted coup of July 1976 was a
joint effort of the two countries.
The threat from the two countries convinced Nimeiry
of the need to associate himself more with Egypt. In fact,
right after the coup attempt
Nimeiry traveled to Cairo...to sign [a]
defense pact with President Sadat, who
took him on to Riyadh to meet the Saudi
King Khalid and discuss the burgeoning
political and economic cooperation
between their three countries.65
Thereafter, Nimeiry became the self-appointed mouthpiece of
all reactionary regimes in the region! He threatened
the government of Ethiopia with the "250,000 refugees,"66
mostly Eritreans, and openly associated himself with the
demand of the "Eritrean Liberation fighters" by calling it
just and right. He is quoted as saying, "the people of
Eritrea were demanding a just right...I will work with the
people of Sudan to return this right to its owners."67 The
Somali Minister of Health, Musa Rabili, expressed his
country's solidarity with the Sudan at the Second. National
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and seconded Nimeiri's call for the withdrawal of the
Organization of African Unity (OAU) from Addis Ababa.68
Ethiopia's response was to call the world's attention to
the violation of the UN and OAU charters perpetrated by
69
Nimeiry. Africa Research Bulletin reported that on
February 4, Lieutenant Colonel Mengistu Haile Mariara told
the world that except for South Yemen, Ethiopia had no
friends in the region and accused Saudi Arabian royalists
and anti-communist reactionaries in the Sudan of supporting
anti-government elements in Addis Ababa.70 The position
taken by the government of Nimeiry with regard to Ethiopia's
territorial integrity was finally endorsed by- the People's
Assembly when the Assistant Secretary of the Sudanese
Party called upon African states and other Third World
countries to sympathize with the Eritrean tragedy.71
These unfriendly relations and the contempt exhibited
by the Arab states towards Ethiopia show the discordant
politics between the Arabs and Black Africa. This was to
manifest itself when Senegal and Nigeria expressed their
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We hasten to deplore the role of Sudan and
some members of the Arab League...Sudan in
particular has not only been ungrateful, in
forgetting so soon what weight Ethiopia
brought to bear in stemming the threat of
Southern secession but has also seemed
shamelessly unimpressed by the injunction
on the territorial integrity of member
states contained in the Charters of the
United Nations and the OAU. About two weeks
after asking for the removal of the OAU
headquarters from Addis Ababa, Sudan's
Jaefar El Nimeiry has now called for the
UN to intervene in Ethiopia on the part of
the Eritreans. We do not endorse the removal -of
the OAU capital from Ethiopia...We are aware
of the religious bias that Sudan might have
for Eritrea...once secessionist attempts
succeed in Ethiopia, other incipient
secessionist organizations could blossom.
Then. Africa will be engulfed by civil wars,
since no African nation is completely free
from the danger of disintegration.72
In April, Africa Research Bulletin reported the
accusation of Colonel Mengistu Haile Mariam against the
Sudanese government of violating the territorial integrity
of Ethiopia and for arming and extending artillery and
tank support to the Ethiopian Democratic Union (EDU),
remnant of the ancient regime.73
What was the position of the United States towards
the revolution in Ethiopia? The United States, which
entered a binding agreement to assist, arm, and train
the Ethiopian army for 25 years (1953-1978), declared, in
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to Ethiopia under the pretext of "human rights violations."
At the same time the Carter Administration promised to
sell arms to Sudan and Somalia, two arch enemies of
Ethiopia. In April 1977, President Carter is quoted as
telling his Secretary of State, Vance, and National
Security Advisor, Brzezinski "to move in every possible
way to get Somalia to be our friend." Disappointed and
frustrated by the behavior of the Carter Administration,
the Ethiopian government ordered the closing down of the
Kagnew communication station; the U.S. Military Assistance
Advisory Group (MAAG), the U.S. Naval Medical Research
Group and the U.S. Information Service (USIS) and condemned
the administration for not having spoken against the
violation of human rights during Haile Selassies' time.77
The hypocrisy of the Carter Administrations' human rights
policy manifested itself when the President, despite the
plea of the assassinate Archbishop, Oscar A. Romero, urged




rnment which was notorious for human
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Secretary of State Vance quoted in Halliday, The
Ethiopian Revolution, p. 223.
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Of the ten countries which receive ninety percent of
U.S. military assistance (Annex V), Israel, Egypt, Turkey,
South Korea, the Philippines and Thailand are widely
accused of trampling upon human rights. Explaining the
hypocrisy of the Carter policy, Francis M. Lappe and et al.,
noted: "The truth is that however abhorrent such regimes
are to most Americans, they share common interest with
U.S. corporate lobbyists and foreign policy decision
79
makers." Thus, we can deduce that the socialist path
chosen by the Ethiopian government was the main reason
for the volte face in U.S. policy towards Ethiopia.
History recalls Chile, Ghana, Jamaica and now Nicaragua
and El Salvador. As will be made evident in the next
section, we will find the U.S. joining with the surrounding
reactionary governments to subvert the revolution in
Ethiopia.
The Soviet Union was not only trying to strengthen its
position, but was also trying to get the United States out
of the Horn of Africa. The Soviets had already had a base
in Berbera and South Yemen. Access into Ethiopia would
have completed its triangular objectives. And it is to
this end that President Nikolai Podgorny visited Africa.
Complimenting this effort, President Castro of Cuba




Somalia and Ethiopia in Aden, South Yemen. Arthur Gavshon
observed:
In Aden, Castro proposed the formation of
an Ethiopian-Somali-South Yemen commission
to take the confederation project further.
The Soutn Yemenis countered with the
suggestion that Cuba, too, should join
the group as its fourth member. Siad
refused both propositions and the talks
broke down. *-*
Exacerbating the problem between Ethiopia and the
United States, the Soviets promised the high level dele
gation from Ethiopia that visited Moscow in December 1976,
$386 million worth of military aid.81 It should be pointed
out that consistent with their policy of weakening the U.. S.
hold in Ethiopia and in the region, the Soviet Union, in
1960, had offered Ethiopia $100 million worth of weapons.
Cognizant of the motive of this gesture and convinced
that Ethiopia would accept the offer, the United States
increased its military aid to Ethiopia. But that was a
different time and an altogether different social system.
This was the picture of the politico-military situation in
Horn of Africa on the eve of the 1977 Somalia-Ethiopian war.
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The July 1977 Somali-Ethiopian War and its Repercussions
In retrospect, we could say that the war between
Somalia and Ethiopia was inevitable. We say this because
we realize now that a politico-military balance did not
exist and was in favor of Somalia. The government of
Somalia had not discarded its expansionist demand. And
President Barre has rejected the call for a confederation
between Ethiopia, Somalia and South Yemen. Moreover, he
has armed his military forces heavily and their morale
was high. Ethiopia, on the other hand, was bogged down
by secessionist wars in its northern province, Eritrea, in
the south against the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) and in
the northwest against the Ethiopian Democratic Union (EDU).
The Derg was not only in disarray but also at each other's
throat for it is believed that there were sympathizers of
all the anti-revolution forces within it. In short, both
the internal and the external conditions were ripe for the
Somalis to invade and realize their longtime dream.
How did it all begin? What role did the United States
play in the war? What role did the Soviet Union play in
war? What about Cuba? And the Arab states?
However preoccupied the Ethiopian government had been
m fighting secessionists and internal reactionary forces,
its vigilance on its border with Somalia, it seems, was
as strong as ever. Its intelligence, as early as January
1976, had shown troop movements on the Somali side indicating
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preparation for war. The memorandum distributed to many
African Heads of State in January 1976 noted:
While the ultimate objective is to recover
by force what Somalia calls her "lost
territories" - the Ogaden, the territory
of Djibouti and the former Northern
Frontier District of Kenya - by forment-
ing a war of subversion in Southern and
Eastern Ethiopia, by helping to intensify
the secessionist war in Eritrea, and
finally by creating a situation of con
frontation around the territory of Djibouti,
the immediate objective is to force Ethiopian
forces into being deployed thinly in many
parts of the country, so that Somali forces
in areas bordering Ethiopia would have the
maximum freedom of action to make a move
against Ethiopia at a time and place of
their choosing.°3
That is exactly what happened. But the government of
Somalia contended that while the decision to invade was
its own, it was, however, encouraged by the Carter Admini
stration through messages transmitted to it through its
Ambassador to Washington who had met with President Carter
on two different occasions, May and June 1977,84 and also
by Kevin Cahill. Newsweek reported:
Cahill, who is no stranger to the world of
secret diplomacy, flew to Mogadishu in
mid-June after conferring with Mathew
Nimetz, the top troubleshooter for
Secretary of State, Cyrus Vance, and one
of his former law partners. Cahill told
Siad Barre that he had a message from "the
very top" of the U.S. government. Washington
was 'not averse to further guerilla pressure
and David
84
Halliday, The Ethiopian Revolution, p. 228.
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in the Ogaden," he said and was now-
prepared to consider sympathetically
Somalia's legitimate defense needs."^
This was the time when the alliance of forces started
to take shape. The Carter Administration made it amply
clear that it was to subvert the revolution in Ethiopia.
To that end the U.S. pledged to Somalia instruments of war.
However, in order to avoid accusation for direct involve
ment in the war, it tried to hide behind its surrogates
in the region. The Shah's subordinates have openly
acknowledged that Iran had been encouraged by the U.S. to
arm Siad. And the Egyptians, having received the same
encouragement, provided $30 million in Russian equipment.
The CIA provided the government of Somalia with $7 million
worth of arms towards the end of 1977.86 The government
of Saudi Arabia, in addition' to the already $400 million
promised, added $60 million more.87 Annex IV, outlining
international attitudes towards the war in the Horn,
demonstrates that. The war, as one can discern had already
been internationalized. It is wise, however, to point out
that in the initial stages of war, the government of
Somalia insisted that it was the "Western Somali Liberation
Front" (WSLF) that was doing the fighting. But then it
Newsweek, 26 September 1977, p. 42.
86
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Bulletin 14:9 (September 1-30, 1977), p. 4553
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hastened to add that "we will not stop nor shall we ever
stop to take sides with' our brothers who are struggling
O Q
for their freedom."
The role of the Soviet Union during the initial stage
of the war seemed very ambiguous. It was supplying weapons
oq
to both warring countries. In fact, the record shows
that the Ethiopian government, suspicious of Somalia's
intentions, asked the Soviet Union to confirm or deny
its suspicion. The Soviet Union assured the Ethiopian
government that its suspicion was unfounded and that it
could move the Third Division - a division that up to that
point was permanently deployed on the Somali-Ethiopian
border - northwards to fight the EDU. The Ethiopian
government, inexperienced in international politics, and
more so because of its crude and hence dogmatic ideological
position (socialist Somalia would not invade socialist
Ethiopia) moved its troops thus giving Somalia a chance to
invade in July 1977. Could the Soviet Union have known
Somali's intentions? If it did, then why did it not stop
it or why did it give the Ethiopian government wrong
information? What was its motive?
It is fair to assert that the mere fact that the
Soviet Union had a strong influence both in the military
o o
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and security of the Somali superstructure,'it must have
known the making and preparation of the war. Brian
Cozier observed:
The Russians have access to all investigations
and reports [of the National Security Office],
and advise their Somali counterparts in
evaluation and administration. They are thus in
a unique position to influence security
activities, and by the same token to protect
their own position in the country, since the
NSS now has a network of informers from the
top levels of government down to the villagers.
Tom J. Farer, writing on the same issue said, "the
Somalis were deeply dependent not only on Soviet materials,
but also, it is believed, on direct Soviet participation
92
in logistics." Failing to obtain plausible evidence
otherwise, we would then ask a very pertinent question:
Why did the Soviet Union choose not to alert Ethiopia?
While recognizing its friendly and internationalist over
tures, we would entertain the following points: the Soviet
Union was fully aware of Somalia's longstanding desire to
unite all territories in which ethnic Somalis live under
one flag by any means; it was also aware of the fact that
Somalia was building and preparing its army for its
expansionist purpose; it was also aware of the fact that
socialism in Somalia was a farce and a misnomer; we are
convinced that the relation of the Soviet Union with
92
. Tom J. Farer, "Soviety Strategy and Western FPar(! »
Africa Report 23:6 (November/December 1978), p. 5? '
116
Somalia was based solely on political expediency - provide
arms and training and acquire access to Somalia's port
(Berbera) and air base in return - and not on ideological
grounds; the Soviet Union knew that, although it has a
Treaty of Friendship with Somalia, the latter is also a
member of the Arab League to which its allegiance is
greater; the Soviet Union was also aware of the fact that
these Arab countries had been courting Somalia for some
time in an effort to persuade it to break with the Soviet
Union; the Soviet Union, cognizant of the inevitability of
the loss of its naval and air base in Somalia wanted to
make sure that its new partnership with Ethiopia, which
had just broken military relations with the United
States under pressure, would be founded on a more
advantageous ground for itself; hence the hiding of the
intelligence from the Ethiopians and, worst of all, the
encouragement to switch its attention northwards can only
be explained by analyzing the motives of the Soviet Union
as they relate to its "middle range" objectives of the
third category.
It would be very easy to draw historical parallels.
In the 1967 Arab-Israeli War - popularly known as the
Six Day War - the Soviet Union was reported to have given
wrong intelligence information to Nasser on Israeli troop
movements on their border with Syria. Safran, giving the
"view from Cairo," wrote:
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Nasser has indicated on several occasions
that the Russians had informed him on May
13, 1967, that the Israelis were planning
to attack Syria on May 17 and that they
had concentrated on the Syrian front 11 to
13 brigades for this purpose...It happens,
however, that the alleged Israeli troop
concentration did not take place. The
United Nations Truce Supervision Organiza
tion, which had many times in the past
checked similar allegations and submitted
reports that obtained the credence of
Israelis, Arabs, and United Nations Organs,
explicitly reported this time it had
failed to detect any Israeli troop concen
tration. 93
A close examination of the motives of the Soviet
Union in both instances - Ethiopia and Egypt-Syria -
reveals its national interest. With respect to Ethiopia
the motive was to further the deterioration of relations
between Ethiopia and the United States beyond repair
thus paving the way for a better strategic position for
itself than it had in Somalia where its influence was on
the decline. This could only materialize when Ethiopia
was engaged in a fierce war to defend its territorial
integrity.
With respect to the Six-Day War, the motive was to
consolidate its precarious influence in Syria which was
slipping away due to the unpopularity of the government
resulting from communist participation. Hence, the Soviet
Union reasoned that the only way it could maintain its
influence in Syria was by encouraging that government to
93
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take a militant position vis-a-vis Israel and the United
States, thus demanding patriotism and vigilance from its
people. Moreover, convinced that even a small scale
action from Israel could topple the Syrian government,
the Soviet Union could only persuade Nasser to assist
Syria when it brought to Nasser's attention Israel's
preparation for an all out war against Syria. The
result has been that the Soviet Union has been well
entrenched in Syria protecting its interest ever since.
Cuba and the Somali-Ethiopian War
There are those who consider Cuba's role in the
Angolan civil war and the Somali-Ethiopian war as that of
"surrogate"* and "mercenary"** doing the dirty job of
its patron the Soviet Union!
David Newsom, U.S. Undersecretary for Political
Affairs, made a distinction between the motives and roles
of the Cubans and the Soviet Union:
Soviet and Cuban objectives in Africa
are harmonious, but not necessarily
synonymous...Castro, emphasizing the
African element in the Cuban population
sees a special mission...Soviet motivations
are probably a mixture of geopolitical,
94
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*Kissinger denounced Cuba as a surrogate in 1975; for more
see Gavshon, Crisis in Afrir*. p. 107.





This distinction must have been drawn after President
Castro told a rally of 1.2 million Cubans "we are a Latin-
African nation... African blood flows freely through our
,,96
veins."
Although there are those who are inclined to tarnish
Cuba's reputation, its role in easing the predicament
many African and other nations find themselves in, since
its socialist revolution, has earned praise and respect.
In the words of Arthur Gavshon:
While the Russians, for instance, were
distributing armaments to handpicked
customers...the Cubans were telling
Asians how to breed bulls. Long before
fighting wars in Black Africa, Castro
was sending out builders' brigades...
Cuban engineers helped needy clients in
three continents to build roads and dams.
Cuban teachers taught African children to
read and write.97
Cuba has been discharging its internationalist duties
and responsibilities of the highest degree. Its role in
the Angolan civil war can be explained within this
ideological context. So also is its participation with
Ethiopia against chauvinism and reaction. Explaining his
position with respect to the Somalia-Ethiopian conflict -
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right after his failure to form a confederation between
Ethiopia, Somalia, and south Yemen - Castro said "the
Mexicans have more right to Arizona than Somalia has to
9R
the Ogaden."
The participation of Cuban forces in the war between
Ethiopia and Somalia was a justified one. Ethiopia
defended its invitation of Cuban forces by calling world
attention to Chapter VII, Article 51 of the Charter of the
United Nations where the "inherent right of individual or
collective self defense" is not infringed upon "until the
Security Council has taken necessary measures to maintain
international peace and security." It was also in
accordance with the OAU resolution of 1964 where it
declared "that all member states pledged themselves to
respect the borders existing in their achievement of
national independence."
It was at the request of the government of Ethiopia
to assist it in repulsing the expansionist invaders that
the Cubans were brought into the war. However, this does
not hide the fact that the Cubans had been in Somalia
long before that, extending their solidarity both in
economic development and military training. But after
Somalia exhibited its true color and motives, Cuba switched
sides at the request of the Ethiopian government. While
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it can be argued that Cuba does not have the capabilities
- especially economic and military - to compete with both
the Soviet Union and the United States for influence in
the region, its commitment to Marxist-Leninist ideology
and its anti-imperialist stand have forged a foreign
policy which is compatible with that of the Soviet Union.
President Nyerere elaborated on the justified role
played by the Soviet Union and Cuba and explained the
position of most members of the Organization of African
Unity, when he said:
Cuban and Soviet forces are...in Ethiopia,
at the request of the Ethiopian government.
The reasons for their presence are well
known. They have helped the Ethiopians to
defend their country against external
aggression. They have not - nor has the
Ethiopian government - engaged in any
fighting outside Ethiopian borders.9^
The Peoples Republic of China and Israel in the Somalia-
Ethiopian War" ' ~ ~
International politics has become so complex and
intricate that even the practitioners would have had a
hard time, unless in retrospect, picturing the Peoples
Republic of China siding with the United States and the
neighboring reactionary Arab states on the one hand, and
Israel siding with the Soviet Union and Cuba in the war
between Somalia and Ethiopia, on the other hand.
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The relation between Ethiopia and Israel was founded
on their mutual distrust for neighboring Arab states of
the region. Ethiopia, as the host country of the
Organization of African Unity, had played a very construc
tive and significant role furthering Israel's African
policies. Haile Selassie's favorable predisposition
towards Israel had enabled Ethiopia to become Israel's
largest economic aid recipient in Africa. It is common
knowledge that Ethiopia had benefitted from Israel's
expertise in police and counter-insurgency group training.100
However, due to Israel's occupation of Arab territories,
the OAU in 1973 adopted an extreme position vis-a-vis
Israel, i.e. severing diplomatic relations until Israel
returned all occupied territories. Ethiopia abided by
the resolution not because it was convinced that it was
a rational option, but because it wanted to appease certain
Arab countries which were extending their support to the
Eritrean Liberation Front and to Somalia.
Be that as it may, the fundamental concern of both
countries, Arab reaction and Arab chauvinism, had still
bound them together. This was to manifest itself when
Somalia invaded Ethiopia and Israel came to Ethiopia's
side. The London Times observed that, "paradoxically in
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Ethiopia, the Cubans are partnered by the Israelis, who
have given the tottering Ethiopian forces incalculable
help in keeping American logistical equipment going."
I.M. Lewis hit the nail on the head when he said:
Israel's willingness to supply napalm .
and military technicians was readily
intelligible in terms of her interest in
sustaining a powerful Christian presence
in the Red Sea as a counterpose to Arab
influence.102
Although both the United States and Israel have a
common interest in keeping open the Persian Gulf, the Red
Sea and the Bab el Mandeb, their approaches to attaining
this goal have been very antagonistic' It seems that
the U.S. feels safer with the area dominated by Arab
states while Israel prefers a strong Ethiopia, despite
the presence of the Soviet Union.
China, on the other hand, seems to chart its foreign
policy with the intention of challenging the "Soviet
social-imperialists" and "hegemonists." China assumes
that the Soviet Union is the primary enemy and confronting
it is its paramount interest. It was this misguided
assumption that led it to stand shoulder to shoulder with
the United States and apartheid South Africa against
liberation movements in Angola. And again it was this
101
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assumption that led it to adopt a pro-Somali stance in
the Horn of Africa. By so doing, it once again stood with
the United States and the reactionary Arab regimes of the
region.
The New China News Agency, commenting on the problem
between Somalia and Ethiopia said:
While knowing quite well that the
territorial issue between Somalia and
Ethiopia was a hangover from old
colonialism, the Soviet Union has meddled
in the affair and aggravated it and, with
an ulterior motive, peddled its sinister
'confederation staff.'103
Following that ambiguous assessment of the problem
between Somalia and Ethiopia, Ping-nan, a member of the
delegation of the Chinese Association for Friendship with
Foreign Countries, on September 11, 1977 reaffirmed his
government's position by saying China "totally supports
the Somali people's just struggle for independence and
national sovereignty."
China is a nation with its own national interest.
Although lack of economic and military capability has
hindered its competition with the United States and the
USSR for influence in the Third World, it has exhibited
several paths to attaining its goals. Analyzing and
103
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synthesizing the foreign policy objectives and ambitions
of the Peoples Republic of China, Arthur Gavshon has the
following to say:
Politically, the Chinese aim was to foil
what was portrayed as the Soviet Union's
pursuit of world hegemony. For sometime
the United States, as the only other
superpower, was also accused of seeking
the same objective. But as the struggle
evolved Peking, in special situations,
lined up with the Americans or their
friends in opposition to the Russians.
China's leaders themselves disavowed any
hegemonistic pretensions but did not
conceal an ambition to lead the Third
World. Strategically, the Chinese strove
to circumscribe superpower aspirations
by mobilizing the Third World to play a
balancing almost a controlling role.l°5
Hence, China is not and cannot be immune from what
guides and dictates foreign policies of all nations.
Although it may be concealed, disguised with and/or
rationalized by ideological explanations, the crux of the
matter, however, is that real politique, the pursuit of
the pragmatism dictated by national interest remains the
motivating force and this in turn explains the pragmatism
which directs nation-states' foreign policies.
Antagonistic Foreign Policies and the Creation of Displaced
People in the Horn "
How do we substantiate our thesis that in fact
antagonistic foreign policies and not drought/famine or
105
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the drive for economic benefit are the culprits? This is
a legitimate question, especially in light of the current
African economic catastrophy and the prevalent drought.
Since the displacement of Ethiopians had taken place
from both the Ogaden and Eritrea regions into Somalia
and Sudan respectively, discussion of the whys and the hows
is in order.
In Somalia
Both Gavshon and the Africa Research Bulletin107
estimate that 600,000 Ethiopians had been displaced as a
result of the war. Africa Report quoting United Nations
officials hastened to add that "only nine percent of the
108
refugees are over 15." UNHCR Fact Sheet: Somalia,
declared the magnitude as follows:
UNHCR assists some 70,000 Ethiopian refugees
located in 35 camps in the region of Hiran,
Gedo, the North West and Lower Shebelle.
Most arrived in Somalia following the events
in the Horn of Africa in 1977-78. Almost 80
percent of the refugees are women and children.
Anthony J. Hughes in his article "Policy Options in
the Horn," said, "Somalia is burden with more than one
Ibid., p. 270.
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million refugees from the Ogaden." Stressing the fact
that it is the conflict of the two countries that is the
culprit, Africa Report wrote on the displaced people in
Djibouti by saying, "like the refugees in Somalia, the
Djibouti refugees fled Ethiopia in 1977 to escape the
Ogaden War."111
The Sudan
David R. Smock argues that Ethiopians displaced from
both the Ogaden and Eritrea constitute the largest numbers
of refugees in the continent. 2 And on giving the reason
for the Eritreans to flee Ethiopia he said, "the Eritreans
have fled their homes to escape the prolonged warfare
between the Ethiopian forces and the Eritrean liberation
movements, a conflict which dates back to 1962."113 Smock
does not stop there. He implicated the Government of
Sudan for its intervention in the internal affairs of
Ethiopia. He said:
Sudanese sympathy for Eritrean refugees
is reinforced by their support for the
liberation efforts. Although the Fronts
have not organized military camps inside
the Sudan, the EPLF and ELF did have offices
110,
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there and virtually all Eritrean supplies
for the war coming from various Arab
states pass through Sudanese ports.114
Of the many policies which Ethiopia pursued vis-a-vis
the Sudan, bombing the Sudanese territories was one which
was acknowledged and disclosed by the Sudanese government.115
Africa Confidential writing on why Ethiopia bombed the
Sudanese territory said:
The Ethiopia plan is seen as designed to put
pressure on the Sudanese authorities in order
to stop them from giving assistance to
Eritrean refugees and cut the supply route
over their territory which reaches Eritrean
guerrilla forces through port Sudan and
Kassala. 116
UNHCR Fact Sheet; Sudan giving the number of refugees
reported, "The Sudan is host to an estimated 665,000
refugees...the majority (some 460,000) are from Ethiopia
and have taken refuge in the eastern region of the
country."
Our contention that these people are only displaced
people and not refugees is corroborated by Smock's
finding. Smock interviewed displaced people in two
settlement schemes - at Umbrush and at Awad-el-sid in
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None of those interviewed had any intention
of remaining permanently in the Sudan.
Their attachment to Eritrea is deep, and
they fully intend to return as soon as
the liberation struggle is successful or
a negotiated settlement brings an end to
the fighting.118
The same is true for the displaced people at Awad-el-Sid.119
Could economic benefit be the motive for those fleeing
into Sudan and Somalia. The answer must be a negative one.
According to the United Nations, all three countries,
Sudan, Somalia, and Ethiopia are among the twenty-five least
developed countries in the world.120 Africa Emergency
Map (see Annex V) points out that Ethiopia and Sudan are
among the most critically drought affected countries while
Somalia is described as "critically affected."121
Colin Legum et al. describing Sudan's economy said,
"the disastrous state of the economy continued to
deteriorate and, by the end of 1981, the country was
12 2
virtually bankrupt." Legum, et al. have the following
to say about Somalia's economy. "In tackling the acute
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economic problems facing the country, the Government has
moved further away from the "scientific socialism" which
it had espoused over 1969-1979."123 Smock hit the nail
on the head when he said that most Eritreans were far
better off economically in Ethiopia than in the Sudan,
they fled for survival. By the same token, the famine/
drought factors are not and cannot be the causes for
displacing Ethiopians into Sudan and Somalia for all
three countries do form part of the Sahel and hence are
hit hard by the drought. This is why we argue that
antagonistic foreign policies .iro responsible for
creating displaced people in the region. In other words,
the climate for war is primarily responsible for the
displacement of these people and it is agreed by most
students of African politics that these wars are either




THE RELATION BETWEEN FOREIGN POLICIES AND DISPLACED
PEOPLE IN CENTRAL AND SOUTHWESTERN AFRICA
The problems that engendered the conflictual relation
ship between Zaire and Angola and the resultant foreign
power interference may be different in terms of form from
those of Somalia and Ethiopia. In essence-and content,
however, they are very much alike. How are they similar
and different?
In the former, foreign interference was carried under
the pretext of giving all liberation movements (FNLA, UNITA
and MPLA) a fair and egual chance to form a representative
national government where no group dominates one or the
other two. This was the line advanced by Zaire, the
United States, China, South Africa, Zambia, and a few
other African countries. Opposing that contention and
interfering on the side of the government established by
the MPLA were the Soviet Union, Cuba, East Germany and most
African countries.
In the case of the Horn of Africa, however, foreign
interference was manifested by supporting Somalia's expansion
ist foreign policy (USA and most Arab countries) perpetrated
against the territorial integrity and national unity
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of Ethiopia which called for interference on the side of
the aggressed by countries like the Soviet Union, Cuba,
Libya, etc.
In both regions, however, the overriding motive, i.e.
the raison d'etre for interference is the same: national
interest viewed in terms of economic, geopolitical and
strategic interests.
To concretize our assertion, it is of paramount
importance that we entertain the following points: What
were the motives of Zaire in Angola? Were the motives of
the United States similar with those of Zaire or did the
United States have its own motives? What about the
objectives of Apartheid South Africa? Were there similarities
in foreign policy objectives between the United States and
South Africa? Did the United States influence South Africa
to intervene in the Angolan civil war? What about the
objectives of the Peoples Republic of China? Were the
convergence of the foreign policies of the United States
and China by design or the result of coincidence? Was the
foreign policy of the Soviet Union motivated by the
principle of assistance to and unity with the workers of
Angola and the vanguard party of the MPLA? What were the
objectives of Cuba's involvement on the side of the MPLA?
Was Cuba's foreign policy induced by the Soviet Union or
could they be regarded as coincidentally complimentary
to one another? What role did mercenaries play in the
whole scenario in the region? Can one make a principled
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and hence a legitimate distinction between Cuba's participa
tion in the war on the side of MPLA and that of the
mercenaries on the side of FNLA, UNITA, and South Africa?
Finally, we would ask, how did all these interventions
contribute to the creation of displaced people in Angola
and Zaire?
It is clear that the points raised above call for a
systematic analysis of the objectives of the foreign
policies of each individual country vis-a-vis Angola in
particular and the region in general.
Before embarking on this project, it is appropriate to
give a synopsis of the intricate and protracted development
of the liberation process in Angola, it being the source
of the conflict.
The Liberation of Angola and the Jockeying for Strategic
Position by the Superpowers
The independence of Angola and its sister countries,
Mozambigue, Guinea Bissau and the Cape Verde Islands,
countries which experienced Portuguese colonialism for
over four centuries, caught not only the West but also the
East and the African countries off-guard and by surprise.
My contention is shared by Arthur Gavshon. Eguating the
coup in Portugal with the liberation and independence of
the colonies he said:
The swiftness of the Lisbon coup caught
Washington and Mocsow by surprise. The
failure of the CIA to anticipate and to
alert the administration to the uprising
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called for the scorn of the House Select
Committee on Intelligence in January 1976.
Kremlin reactions to the parallel performance
of the KGB did not, apparently, become a
subject for investigative reporting by Soviet
journalists. ■'■
The Western countries, led by the United States, had
romanticized over the notion that the liberation movements
in southern Africa, namely FRELIMO of Mozambique, ZAPU and
ZANU of Zimbabwe, ANC of South Africa, SWAPO of Namibia
and MPLA, FNLA, and UNITA of Angola, did not possess the
military, political and diplomatic capabilities to triumph
over their oppressors and colonizers. Hence independence
and freedom were only wishful thinking. Arthur Gavshon
put it thus:
In Washington, the administration was still
captive of a four-year-old appraisal that
Portugal's wars in Africa would go on in
definitely. (Then quotes NSSM 39) 'The rebels
cannot oust the Portuguese and the Portuguese
can contain but not eliminate the rebels.2
Hence it goes without saying that the West formulated
and pursued its foreign policy as dictated by National
Security Study Memorandum 38* which assumed that the White
man's rule in southern Africa was there to stay indefinitely.
Arthur Gavshon, Crisis in Africa; Battleground of
East and West (New York: Penguin Books, 1981), pp. 233-
2Ibid.
♦National Security Study Memorandum 39 is a study done during
the early part of Nixon's administration with the intention
of formulating U.S. policies in Southern Africa.
135
The Soviet Union must have shared the same opinion.
And it could be one of the reasons why the "Russians in
1973 switched their support from Neto (of MPLA) to Daniel
Chipenda (the leader of a splinter group)."3
African countries, which had stood behind the
liberation movements and contributed their dues to the
OAU Liberation Committee, started taking different and at
times antagonistic positions especially on the question
of the formation of a government in Angola. Of the three
different liberation movements, two, FNLA and UNITA,
espoused a diametrically opposed socioeconomic and political
view from that of MPLA. The emergency summit conference
of the Heads of State and Government held in Addis Ababa
from January 10-12, 1976, and the split that followed is
a strong testimony to the divergence of national interests
and socioeconomic and political views they pursue and
variable proclivities of their foreign policies.
The independence of Angola and its sister countries
would not have caught these countries by surprise if they
had been doing their homework. It is beyond doubt that
independence was not handed to these countries on a silver
platter. They bled and died for it! Writing on the change




Portugal's 'group of captains' who led the
Armed Forces Movement against the dictator
ship of Prime Minister Marcelo Caetano on
25 April 1974 did not cause Lisbon's deci
sion hurriedly to dismantle the 500 year
old Lusitanian Empire in Africa. They
prompted recognition that the long, grinding
wars of independence, waged by the people of
Mozambique, Angola, Portuguese Guinea, the
Cape Verde Islands and Sao Tome and Principe,
could not be won. To most Portuguese those
wars had begun to seem endless. Nearly,
12,000 had died, more than 40,000 had been
wounded...ordinary Portuguese folk were more
than ready for change.4
Although Portugal is a country located in Europe, its
socioeconomic development is pathetically backward. It is
a country which subsists on the perennial rent it obtains
from the United States for its use of the Azores military
base. The country is so poor that the problem of unemploy
ment, underemployment, and flight of skilled labor power
to the other European countries makes it more like a
Third World country than a colonial power. The war it was
waging against the liberation movements in its African
colonies was financially covered by NATO countries. To
understand the qualitative changes that took place in
Portugal, one has to look at this internal contradiction
from a materialistic perspective. As Mao observed:
Changes in society are due chiefly to the
development of the internal contradiction
in society, the contradiction between the
productive forces and the relations of
production; the contradiction between
classes and the contradiction between the
4Ibid., p. 233.
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old and the new...Does materialist dialectics
exclude external causes? Not at all, it holds
that external causes are the condition of
change and internal causes are the basis of
change, and the external causes become
operative through internal causes.5
The wars in the colonies were the external causes for
the changes in Portugal. Thus these countries would not
have been caught by surprise if they had paid attention to
the role and place of the liberation movement in Portugal's
domestic affairs.
The independence of Mozambique, Guinea Bissau and
Angola, and the civil war in Angola led the superpowers to
jockey for stratetic positions. The Soviet Union had to
attain parity not only in amassing the instruments of war
but also in obtaining military strategic positions. The
United States, having lost the war in Vietnam felt threatened
and perturbed. The establishment of progressive and
socialist oriented governments in Mozambique, Guinea Bissau
and the Cape Verde Islands not only changed the alliance
of forces in favor of socialism but also brought the
revival of the "Zero-sum game" and "domino" theories. The
loss of a country or a region to the enemy camp, in this case
the communist camp, was considered to be minus for the
capitalist camp. And the loss of a country like Angola,
rich in natural resources, located in a strategic position
Selected Works of Mao-Tse-Tung. Vol. 1 (New York-
Pergamon Press, 1965), p. 314.
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(Southwest Africa and Atlantic Ocean) and bordered by
Namibia, Zambia and Zaire, all capitalist oriented
countries dominated directly or indirectly by South Africa,
was seen as the start of a chain reaction leading to
diminished U.S. influence. Hence subverting the revolution
and overthrowing of the government of MPLA under the pre
text of "equal share for all liberation movements"
became U.S. political strategy.
What Were the Objectives of Zaire's Foreign Policy in the
Angolan Civil War
Zaire's involvement could have been precipitated by
many factors. In this context different writers have given
it varied interpretation. Nzongola Ntalaja views it as a
combination of both class interest and national interest.
Expounding on the class interest factor, he said:
Zaire's intervention in the Angolan civil
war, far from being a simple execution of
American directives by the government of
President Mobutu Sese Seko, was primarily
related to the latter's struggle for sur
vival... That is to say that the Mobutu
regime intervened in Angola to defend its
own class interest.6
With regard to the national interest factor, he notes:
Zaire does have an important economic and
strategic stake in Angola. It consists in
maintaining access to the ports of Lobito
in Angola and Matadi in Zaire. Of the four
exit routes for Zairean copper exports, the
Nzongola Ntalaja, "The U.S. and Zaire in Angola,"
in Rene Lemarchand, ed., American Policy in Southern
Africa (Washington, D.C.: University Press of America,
1978), p. 147.
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Benguela railway from the Southeastern
frontier with Angola to Lobito on the
Atlantic Ocean is still the quickest and
the best.7
The national interest scenario could be expanded by
including Mobutu's longstanding interest in incorporating
Cabinda into Zaire's territory. Blinded by national
interest to historical reality the Mobutu regime had
continued, even after the defeat of Portuguese colonialism
to argue that Cabinda was a separate entity and that
Q
referundum should decide its future. This cynicism was
exposed by Ernest Harsh and Tony Thomas when they unravelled
the motives behind it all. They wrote, "Despite official
denial Mobutu appeared to covet the oil fields of Cabinda,
as well as its ports which could have given Zaire improved
g
access to the ocean."
Cabinda, according to Africa Research Bulletin, is a
small enclave found between Zaire and the Congo Peoples
Republic. The territory is known for its extensive deposits
of oil with official reserves set at 300 million tons.
Its geographical proximity had also attracted the attention
7Ibid., p. 159.
Tony Hodges, After Angola: The War Over Southern
Africa (New York: Africana Publishing Co., 1978), p. 54.
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Ernest Harsch and Tony Thomas, Angola: The Hidden
History of Washington's War (New York: Pathfinder Press,
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Africa Research Bulletin 12:7 (July 1-31, 1975),
p. 3706.
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of the Congo Peoples Republic which had a short history of
supporting secessionists in the territory. The Foreign
Minister of the Republic is quoted as having said: "Cabinda
exists as a reality and is historically and geographically
different from Angola and that a referendum should be held."
Mobutu's unremitting interest in the territory has
persuaded him to make a political arrangement with Holden
Roberto, leader of FNLA, who desperately needed the
diplomatic/ political and military support that Mobutu
could give him in his bid for power in Angola. Africa
Confidential described it as follows:
Suspicion has been raised in the last few
weeks that President Mobutu has in fact
come to an arrangement with Holden Roberto,
the FNLA leader, that, in return for
independence in Cabinda, he will make sure
that Roberto and FNLA get control in Angola.
The inclination of Zaire towards FNLA did not arise
with the coming of Mobutu to power. A chronological study
of the development of the liberation movements in Angola
along with the chronological study of the change of power
and leadership in Zaire (then Congo-Leopoldville) since its
independence shows that starting from the government of
Cyrille Adoula in 1963 to that of Mobutu in 1965, and
until 1974-75, Roberto was Zaire's darling. The
nibid.
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end result was that while FNLA had been allowed to
operate in Zaire, MPLA was excommunicated and its leaders
detained or killed.
Mobutu made his regime's interest clear on May 20,
1975 when he told AZAP in Kinshasa that "Cabinda is not
Angola, it is separated by Zaire...and its people should be
allowed to decide freely through a referundum what future
they sought for themselves."
The second theory is the one propounded by Kissinger
and was really, a pretext for U.S. intervention. Kissinger
argued that Zaire's involvement in the civil war was pro
voked by the potential threat posed to its territorial
integrity and security. Posing the concern of Zaire as a
common problem shared by Zambia, he said:
By mid-July the military situation radically
favored the MPLA. Zaire and Zambia became
more and more concerned about the implications
for their own security and'turned to the
United States for assistance in preventing the
Soviet Union and Cuba from imposing a solution
in Angola, becoming a dominant influence in
South-Central Africa and threatening the
stability of the region.15
It seems that Kissinger's contention must have
Arthur Jay Klinghoffer, The Angolan War: A Study in
Soviet Policy in the Third World (Boulder, Col.: Westview
Press), p. 46.
14
Quoted in Colin Legum, Foreign Intervention in
Angola (New York: Africana Publishing Company, 1978), p. 33
Quoted in John Marcum, "Lessons of Angola," Foreiqn
Affairs 54:3 (April 1976), p. 415.
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originated with President Kaunda of .Zambia's visit to the
United States which took place early in April 1975 to
assess the ramifications of the coming of MPLA to power.
However, we are convinced that the conclusion must have
been drawn by the Ford Administration with the intention
of getting the support of Congress, which opposed the
participation of the U.S. in a civil war in Angola. It
was clear from the outset that the United States did not
want to see "the MPLA lead the nation-building process in
Angola fearing a socialist style regime with close ties
with the Soviet bloc." Hence we could say that the
"security theory" expounded by Secretary Kissinger was
only a pretext for U.S. involvement. Angola, a country
which had j.ust won its independence and was engaged in a
devastating civil war instigated by the same countries,
could not have been a threat to the security of Zaire and
Zambia. The core interest, of the first type, of this
desperate country was the establishment of a viable
government, the maintenance of its independence and
territorial integrity, and the establishment of cordial
relations with its neighbors.1 However this aspiration was
to be shattered by Zaire whose core interest, of the second
Robin Hallett, "The South African Intervention in
Angola," African Affairs 77:308 (July 1978), pp. 355-356.
Mohamed A. El Khawas, "South Africa and the Angolan
Conflict," Africa Today 24:2 (April-June 1977), p. 26.
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type was the expansion of its territory and the subversion,
and overthrow of the government of MPLA. Zaire became an
accessory to foreign interference, an action which did not
give an iota of respect to the principles of the Charters
of the United Nations and those of the Organization of
African Unity. Arthur Klinghoffer hit the nail on the
head when he said, "Zaire also colluded with the United
States, China, France, Belgium, South Africa, UNITA and of
course, FNLA to escalate the war."18
There is a one argument which gives some credence to
the "security theory" of Henry Kissinger. Mobutu's motive
for his participation in the civil war has been made
evident above. However, in hindsight it could be also
argued that although territorial expansion was his
immediate motive, his long term objective may have been to
wipe out his opponents, the one time followers of Tshombe.
This group of Katangan rebels have now made Angola their
home and, after twenty years still harbor animosity for
Mobutu's government.
As if his effort to topple the MPLA and destabilize
Angola was not enough , Mobutu refused to honor the agree
ment signed with President Neto at the end of the civil
war and not show any inclination to disarm the remnants of
the FNLA saboteurs who resided in Zaire. Thus it is
believed that Neto lost his trust for Mobutu and encouraged
I Q
Klinghoffer, The Angolan War, p. 47.
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the Katangans to invade. The invasion of Shaba province
and the near success of the effort of the invaders to
topple Mobutu was a result of many intrinsic problems
pertaining to the neo-colonial economy of the country.
"The fall in the price of copper, the collapse of agri
culture and the corruption and inefficiency of the admini
stration" had alienated not only the populace but also
the military who had lost confidence in the government
and the zeal to fight. Hence one can say it was an
opportune time for the Katangans to invade. The reason
why it did not succeed, however, is because of the subjective
condition, i.e. the organizational ability of the National
Liberation Front of the Congo (FNLC) was not equal to its
objectives. The objective condition, however, was ripe.
Another factor for the failure of the effort of FNLC was
the intervention of Morocco, France, the U.S., China,
Belgium, etc. on the side of Mobutu.
Blaming Cuba and the Soviet Union for the incident,
Mobutu broke off diplomatic relations with Cuba on April 4,
1978, l and recalled his Ambassadors to the Soviet Union,
19
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Algeria and Libya thereafter. Responding to Mobutu's
accusation, Vice President Carlos Rafael Rodriguez of Cuba
told the United Nations General Assembly on May 30, 1978
that "Cuba has not participated directly or indirectly in
the events in Shaba...and did not supply the arms for that
purpose nor did it train those who attacked."23 The
Angolan government, on the other hand, while not denying
its role on the invasion said:
The Angolan government had condemned reports
of Moroccan troops and Chinese military
supplies being sent to Zaire...in Shaba and
other Zairian provinces the people want
change and that any foreign attempts to
retard this change are bound to fail.24
While the invasion is considered as "separatism1 by
Zaire and its friends, Angola, the London Times and the leaders
of the FNLC viewed it from a different light. The London
Times' report reads as follows:
The invaders are not secessionists
invoking Tshombe's shade. They are
calling on Zaireans to rise against a
discreted autocrat. They are in contact
with rebels in Kivu, the surviving remnants
of the Gizengist and Mulele faction.25
And an FNLC spokesman said in Rome:
22








The FNLC forces, together with the
insurgent population opposed to the
Mobutu dictatorship will do everything
possible to protect the foreign citizens
in Kolowezi...The insurgent Congolese
population seeks only one object - to
topple Mobutu's dictatorial and anti-
popular regime.26
This is why we argued that the "security theory" even
following the line of argument delineated here is far
fetched. Simply put, it is not clear cut and not convincing
enough.
This leads us to•the next theory: Zaire intervened in
the Angolan civil war to "oppose communism." We had asked
earlier if the motives of Zaire were similar to those of
the United States in their Angolan adventure in particular
and in the Third World in general. Who can answer this
paramount question to our satisfaction better than the
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs?
He said:
Despite temporary aberration (Mobutu) has
been a good friend to the United States
...We do have a warm spot in our hearts
for President Mobutu...There is a basic
commonality of attitude and policies in
foreign affairs between our two countries.
Stephen Weissman, writing on Kissinger's obsession
with the danger of communism and Zaire's usefulness in
Africa Research Bulletin 15:5 (May 1-31, 1978),
27
Quoted in Stephen Weissman, "The CIA and U.S. Policy
in Zaire and Angola," in Western Massachusetts Association
of Concerned African Scholars, U.S. Military Involvement in
Southern Africa (Boston: South End Press, 1978), p 395
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frustrating or subverting socialist revolution said:
Given such outstanding reliability (of
Mobutu) Secretary of State Kissinger was
reportedly "banking" on Mobutu to 'oppose
Moscow's interests' in Africa generally
and to further Washington's interests in
various international forums'...since
Zaire was to bear much of the burden of anti-
communism in Africa and modernization in the
Third World, a high State Department official
noted a thrust in Washington to bolster the
country 'in the hope that it could extend its
hegemony throughout the continent,' in the
same vein CIA Director William Colby designated
Zaire 'a future regional power'28
It would be a truism to state that Zaire, as a member
of the international system advances its national
interest. However, the group in power [the petit bourgeoisie
and the comprador bourgeoisie] has class interests which
are linked to those of the bourgeoisie in the metropole.
Hence, it is only logical, for the class in power to make
the country an appendage of these countries and play
reactionary roles in the system. This role works on
reciprocity. Aluko said:
The Western powers intervened in 1977 and
again in 1978 in' Zaire to prevent the country
from going...'the way of Marxist Angola.1
The direct or indirect involvement of the
Soviet Union and Cuba in the Shaba invasion
of 1977 and 1978, could not be totally
divorced from [a] desire to promote or




Olajde Aluko, "African Response to External Inter
vention in Africa Since Angola," African Affairs 80:319
(April 1981), p. 162. ~
148
This case study once again reminds us of the existence
of the loose bipolar world discussed in Chapter Two. As
outlined above, the function and role of developing nations
within this system, far from being independent, has been
subordinated to the whim of one or the other superpower.
We would like to close this subheading by pointing out that
Brucan's theory in this regard, would have to be supplement
ed by the ideological and political concerns of President
Mobutu who did not disguise them nor hesitate to act and
translate them into reality.
What Were the Reasons for the U.S. to Intervene Directly
or Indirectly in Angola's Civil War?
As many writers have pointed out, the motives for the
U.S. intervention were economic, political and military-
strategic interests.
However, before going into the analysis of these
factors, we would like to point out that the United States
had taken a politically motivated position vis-a-vis the
three liberation movements as early as 1962. It is common
knowledge that Holden Robert, leader of FNLA, had been the
"Moses" of Angola, chosen by the United States to lead
Angola to independence. Gavshon observed:
In 1962 the CIA selected Roberto as a
moderate worth cultivating for his chances
of heading the future government of an
independent Angola. For the next seven
years Roberto was on the CIA payroll, with
a personal stipend worth about $10,000 a
year mainly for keeping the Americans
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informed about what was going on in the
Angolan resistance movements.30
The United States1 all out support for Roberto's
movement was obstructed by the NATO doctrine which limited
U.S. support of decolonization in Africa. This doctrine
has two purposes. Its first purpose is a reguired
abstention of member countries from extending support to
the liberation movements to undermine the colonizers. Its
second purpose is to provide support for the effort of
the colonizers, in this case Portugal, France, Britain and
Belgium, financially, materially and politically.31
Thus, until the coup in Portugal and the civil war in
Angola (1974-75) the U.S. was committed to maintaining the
status quo. To the surprise of many, Portuguese colonies
were included in the security of the North Atlantic Alliance
Organization thereby expanding the concern and influence of
NATO the South Atlantic and Indian Ocean. Christopher
Coker put it thus:
In December 1974 the State Department
admitted that Portuguese Africa had been
included in NATO contingency planning, an
admission which went far beyond the NATO
secretariats earlier declaration that only
the security of areas in its immediate
defense perimeter had even been discussed.
Gavshon, Crisis in Africa, p. 2 36.
31Ibid., p. 227.
32
Christopher Coker, "The Western Alliance and Africa,
1949-1981," African Affairs 81:324 (July 1983), p. 326.
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Although the NATO doctrine limited and contained
America's sole desire to control the economic riches of
the country, this was to explode in 1974-75 when Portugal
left the country and America and its NATO allies provoked
the civil war.
What made Angola different? Why was MPLA
less acceptable to Portugal and its NATO
backers than FRELIMO or PAIGC? All three
movements stood for the same principles,
non-alignment, no foreign military bases
on their soil, social justice, an end to
unbridled exploitation by foreign mono
polies, and the building of a socialist
economy as the only way to bring peace
and prosperity to all their people.
There was nothing to choose between the
three. Yet Angola was different from
either Mozambique or Guinea Bissau and
Cape Verde. It was an immensely wealthy
country, with huge off-shore oil reserves
which by 1975 earned it a mention on CIA
world oil reserve charts, even though
production was still very low by world
standards. Enough foreign mining surveys
had been undertaken to prove that Angola
was a promising source of a range of
strategic minerals as comprehensive as
those in South Africa: uranium, cobalt,
chrome, fusing-quarte, and many others.
Neither Mozambique nor Guinea Bissau and
the Cape Verde archipelago could compete.
Africa Confidential points out that the
country is the second largest coffee producer in Africa,
next to the Ivory Coast. Its oil and coffee account for
fifty-seven percent of the nation's export. Diamond and
iron-ore account for ten and six percent, respectively.
Michael Wolfers and Jane Bergerol, Angola in the
Frontline (London: Zed Press, 1983), p. 1~.
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The large iron-ore deposits have attracted the investment
of West Germany, France, South Africa, Japan, etc. Other
minerals worth mentioning include manganese, phosphates,
copper, granite, marble, asphalt, rock and gypsum.34
Nzongola Ntalaja looked at the U.S. intervention in
Angola holistically. That is, instead of isolating U.S.
interests from those of the rest of the capitalist countries,
he prefers to maintain the dialectical complimentarity
between U.S. interests and those of others. He said:
An adequate interpretation of American inter
vention in Angola becomes possible, therefore,
when viewed from this more general framework
of neocolonialism. The interests to be pro
tected are neither singularly American nor
exclusively economic. They comprise all
those interests necessary to the preserva
tion of the world capitalist system...they
include the interests of the international
bourgeoisie as well as those of the state
bourgeoisie of post colonial countries still
subjected to imperialist exploitation.35
Before going to the next sub-topic - political interest
- we would like to quote the late President of Angola,
Agostino Neto, who lamented over the economic sabotage
and boycott perpetrated by the United States and the
multi-national corporations:
The United States and other imperialist
nations have begun to organize a boycott
against us. Some of our overseas bank
34
"Angola: Rich Problems," Africa Confidential 16:1
(January 10, 1975), p. 5. ~
35
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accounts have been frozen. Certain air-
crafts which we paid for have not been
delivered. Some American companies, Gulf
Oil in particular, have begun to sabotage
our oil economy.36
Neto's disclosure corroborates and strengthens
Nzongola's thesis that the interest of U.S. imperialism
in Angola and the world over for that matter, is tied to
the interest of world imperialism.
U.S. Political Interest
Although we are dealing with the economic, political
and strategic interest of the United States in Angola,
we would like to state that the dialectical and organic
link between them is not forgotten.
Having said that, we would like to pursue the point
by trying to straighten out one fact. There are those
who consider the intervention of the Soviet Union on the
side of Angola primarily as a challenge to the Chinese
influence in the region. Colin Legum contends that the
"Sino-Soviet rivalry was the principal one."37 Gerald
Bender said: "When Kissinger took his first serious look
at Angola in early 1975...he stumbled into a Sino-Soviet
3 8
dispute." We feel that this diagnosis is erroneous and
"Angola Interview," Africa Report 21:1 (January/
February 1976), p. 2. *'
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is a result of the failure to understand the theoretical
underpinning of what constitutes capabilities that
contribute to being a superpower. As discussed in Chapter
Two, the international system is a loose bipolar system
where the dominant powers of the poles are the Soviet
Union and the United States. The problems of today's
world are the manifestation of the contradictions between
the two. The Chinese theoreticians wrote: "Therefore the
Angolan question, like many other questions in the world,
39
reflects the fierce contention between the two superpowers."
Following the line pursued by the Chinese theoreticians,
the Wall Street Journal on December 17, 1975 editorial
noted:
Yet when all the economic, military and
strategic considerations are set aside,
the Soviet challenge in Angola is primarily
directed at the U.S...clearly the Soviets
are in Angola and elsewhere testing American
resolve.40
Despite all these, the Ford administration was very
clear with the challenge and its repercussion on inter
national stability. In his first testimony before the
U.S. Senate Subcommittee on Africa on January 29, 1976,
Africa (Washington, D.C.: University Press of America,
1978), p. 114.
39
"The View from China: Peoples Daily Express Vicious
Aims of Soviet Intervention in Angola - Peking, December 7,
1975," in Africa Report 21:1 (January/February 1976), p. 10.
40




The Soviet Union's massive and unprecedented
intervention in the internal affairs of
Africa - with nearly $200 million of arms,
and its military technicians and advisors,
with 11,000 Cuban combat troops and with
substantial sea and airlift and naval
cover in adjacent waters, is a matter...
directly [affecting] global stability.41
In his news conference after the North Council
meeting, Secretary Kissinger warned that the military
activity by the Soviet Union in areas thousands of miles
away from its border, can affect the relations of the two
42
superpowers.
On discussing and analyzing this sub-topic from this
perspective, one will not get the full picture of U.S.
involvement in Angola. What it has done, so far, is that
it had portrayed America's involvement in the war as a
reaction to Soviet "expansionism." This is not the case!
The truth of the matter, however, is that the United
States had been involved in the war clandestinely long
before 1976 through the CIA, neighboring countries and
mercenaries. Arthur Gavshon points out that Kissinger
failed to tell the Senate Subcommittee on Africa the fact
that: "the CIA had resumed funding the FNLA in July of that
41
Gavshon, Crisis in Africa, p. 223.
42
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Council Meeting, Press Release 606, Department of State
Bulletin, De^pmbfr'12, 1976, p. 54.
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year (1974) without formal authority." 3 Kissinger also
purposely failed to tell the Subcommitte that, "the four
member '40 Committee1 on 22 January adopted a CIA plan to
give the FNLA $300,000 for immediate political action...
Kissinger and Colby were members of the '40 Committee1."44
Former Senator Dick Clark, then Chairman of the Subcommittee
on African Affairs exposed the administration's so-called
covert activities by saying:
It is clear from what has appeared in the
press that the Administration had already
made a substantial commitment of American
resources and prestige in Angola, and
intends to increase that commitment in
the near future. Yet the Administration
has never come to Congress or the public
to ask for authorization for its military
assistance to factions in the Angolan
civil war, to answer questions or to
explain why it believes this involvement
is worth the risk it is taking.45
During the early months of the CIA involvement in the
civil war, the Administration did not want American arms
to be seen in Angola. Hence, it gave funds to Mobutu so
that he would purchase arms for the FNLA and UNITA from
the European market and possibly Belgium.46 As the purpose
of the Administration was the subversion of the socialist
43
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revolution and the overthrow of MPLA, it had done every
dirty thing, and tried every trick in the book including
"the recruitment of an undercover army composed of
American and European mercenaries to fight in Angola."
Most of the recruits that joined this adventure were active
members of the United States Army with combat experience.
Ernest Harsch and Tony Thomas revealed the following:
Citing high state department sources Sean
Gervasi, an adviser to the Center for
National Security studies revealed at a
December 19, 1976 Press Conference that
numbers of U.S. mercenaries have come
from regular units by volunteering and
that they leave behind them letters of
resignation from the regular forces in
case such letters should be needed. Regular
commissioned and non-commissioned officers
have been approaching enlisted men to ask
whether they might be interested in
volunteering.48
Regreting the impossibility of carrying out direct
military confrontation, and recognizing the fact that
Angola is one of the "gray areas," Kissinger condoned the
involvement of mercenaries in the war for reasons of
leverage, without which, he contends, diplomacy is impotent.49
Obviously, Secretary Kissinger was fully aware of the fact
that the United States has legislation forbidding the
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governments for the purpose of advancing one's foreign
policy objectives. Ward Churchill/ discussing that
legislation says:
In a body of law generally referred to
as "The Neutrality Act" there is a section
(Title 8, U.S.C. Sect. 1481(a)(3) which
reads in part "any citizen of the United
States who enters the armed forces of a
foreign state without the written authori
zation of the Secretaries of State and
Defense, shall lose his citizenship.50
In addition to this section of the "Neutrality Act,"
there is a provision which bans U.S. nationals from attempt
ing to overthrow other governments. U.S. Code Title 18,
Section 960 reads:
Whoever, within the United States, know
ingly begins or sets on foot or provides
or prepares a means for or furnished the
money for, or takes part in, any military
or naval expedition or enterprise to be
carried on from thence against the
territory or dominion or any foreign
prince or state, or of any colony,
district, or people with whom the United
States is at peace, shall be fined not more
than $3,000 or imprisoned not more than
three years or both.51
The President's condemnation of the so-called "un
justified and unwarranted execution of Daniel Gerhart, [an
American mercenary] by the government of Angola"52testifies
Ward Churchill, "U.S. Mercenaries in Southern Africa,
The Recruiting Network and U.S. Policy," Africa Today 27:2
(1980), p. 22. L
Quoted in the Atlanta Journal, 11 September 1984.
14-A.
52
"Statement by the President on July 10, 1976,"
Department of State Bulletin 75:1936 (August 2, 1976), p. 163,
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to the fact that the administration was fully aware of the
heinous tactics perpetrated by the CIA against the
territorial integrity of Angola. Speaking on the same
issue, Secretary Kissinger showed his contempt for African
intelligence when he declared that, "Furthermore, no evidence
whatsoever was produced during the trail of Mr. Gerhart in
Luanda that he had even fired a shot during the few days
he was in Angola before his capture." (Emphasis mine).
Legally speaking, we feel that, neither the President nor
the Secretary of State has whatsoever grounds to speak
on the issue. And if there was one, it was against them!
Politically speaking, mercenariat is not measured by the
number of shots one fires but by the ideology he/she
stands for and by his/her commitment to translate it into
action, i.e. combat!
We would Ike to conclude this discussion - U.S.
political interest - by quoting Kissinger who told the
Senate Subcommitte on African Affairs that what is at hand
is the reputation of America and its resolve in the face of
Soviet "expansionism." He said:
But our deeper concern is for global
stability. If the United States is seen
to emasculate itself in the face of
massive, unprecedented Soviet and Cuban
intervention, what will be the perception
of leaders around the world as they make
53Ibid., p. 163.
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decisions concerning their future security.
U.S. Military Strategic Interest
The United States is cognizant of the fact that the
Soviet Union is not only closing the gap in building
strategic and conventional weapons, which some specialists
in the field consider as parity has been reached,55 but
also in jockeying for militarily strategic positions. The
United States defeat in Vietnam and the subsequent break
down of the South East Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO)
have shaken its superiority in the Indian Ocean. Its recent
successes in Mombasa (Kenya) and Berbera (Somalia) are
equally matched by the Soviet Union's naval base in Aden
(South Yemen) and access to military and naval facilities
in Ethiopia and Mozambique. The South Atlantic would be
exposed if Angola were to let in the Soviets for the Soviet
Union already has access to military and naval facilities
in the People's Republic of the Congo and Guinea. However,
this assessment would only be of theoretical interest if
it were not part of the strategically crucial Persian Gulf
and its oil routes, via the Indian Ocean, the Cape Coast
and the Atlantic Ocean, then to the U.S., Europe and Japan.
54
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The United States depends for fifteen percent of its oil
on the Gulf while the percentage for Europe and Japan is
sixty and ninety, respectively. It goes without saying,
then that the "raw material vulnerability"56 of the Western
world has compounded its "strategic vulnerability."57
Relating this to the strategic location of Angola,
Gavshon said:
Self-evidently, a left leaning Angola could
exercise a progressive influence on the
affairs of southern and central Africa. In
a regional sense, so long as Angola remained
under threat of attack by its neighbors, the
Russians or Cubans would be bound to maintain
a strong military presence in the country...
Soviet access to Angolan air and sea.ports,
in global strategic terms has extended the
reach of Moscow's air and sea force to the
South Atlantic. Already Soviet and East
European countries were routinely flying and
sailing to and from Angola, facilitating
their watch on Western air and sea movements.58
While we could speculate that this is the short-term
concern of the United States, its long-term interest is
the safety and security of the surrounding pro-Western
countries, namely Zaire, Zambia, Namibia and South Africa,
where the "domino theory" could become operative unless
Soviet "expansionism" is checked. And since
Angola's economy is strong and completely
independent of south Africa...•and with
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movements fight apartheid, colonialism
and Western exploitation59
direct military intervention was a necessity to topple the
government of the late President Neto. For instance, the impor
tance of Zaire to the U.S. could be explained as follows:
First let there be no mistake that our
interests in Zaire are long-term in nature
...Zaire's geopolitical and economic weight
in African scales of power is significant
...with its population of 27 million, it is
the third largest sub-Saharan African state.
In terms of land area, it ranks second in '
size and its borders on nine other states in
central and southern Africa. It is a fact
that Zaire's sheer size and economic potential
make it critical to regional stability.60
Richard Moose solidifies Walker's assessment by
quantifying Zaire's importance. He said, "we must not
forget Zaire is the world's leading producer of both cobalt
and industrial diamonds, the world's seventh largest producer
of copper and the world's 13th ranked producer of coffee."61
On South Africa's importance to the United States,
Lawrence Litvak, et al. said:
United States banks and corporations rank
high in terms of the foreign contribution
to South Africa's economy. After Britain,
America is the largest foreign investor
m South Africa...American companies have
59
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at least $1,665 billion of direct invest
ments in South Africa, comprising 17% of
all direct foreign investments there. In
addition, U.S. banks have over $2 billion
in outstanding loans to South Africa,
accounting for 33% of all loan claims
against the country.62
The logical conclusion is that the United States
cannot afford to see Angola "export" its socialist
revolution to country after country and jeopardize its
economic, strategic and political interests in the region.
This brings us to the next country - South Africa, and its
reasons for intervening in Angola.
Why Did South Africa Intervene in Angola?
Apartheid South Africa and Namibia are the two
countries in southern Africa where settler colonialism
persists. Its persistence, however, cannot be understood
without a simultaneous study of the interests of the NATO
countries, particularly the United States, Britain, France
and West Germany.
The liberation of Mozambigue and Angola shook not only
the politico-military security of NATO countries, but also
the psychological foundation of Apartheid on which it is
built. While South Africa's economy is tied to Mozambique
Committee on Foreign Affairs, March 5, 1979, Department
of State Bulletin 79:2926 (May 1979), p. 42.
62T
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its fear of any threat coming from Mozambique is not
seriously considered as compared to the Angolan front, a
country which is rich in natural resources and whose
economy is independent of South Africa. In short,
whereas it had and has a leverage in Mozambique, it did
not have any in Angola, The only way out of this predica
ment was to engage in subversive activities and direct
military intervention to overthrow the government
established by the MPLA.
Arthur Gavshon contends that South Africa's inter
vention was provoked by economic necessity and the deter
mination to destroy SWAPO. Amplifying South Africa's
reason, he said, "One stated purpose was to protect the
Cunene Dam and power complex, along the two sides of the
Namibia frontier. Another purpose was to pursue and destroy
SWAPO guerrillas in their Angolan sanctuaries."63 Tony
Hodges views it strictly from a military context and
national interest. In this case he suggests that the
creation of a stalemate between the three liberation
movements was the motive behind the intervention. He said:
Like the U.S. covert aid, the South African
intervention was designed to engineer a
military stalemate between the factions,
thereby giving Pretoria powerful leverage
with which to attempt to force concessions
from them, particularly with regard to
Gavshon, Crisis in Africa, p. 244.
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future Angolan policy towards definite
in Southern Africa and Namibia. 4
Another explanation is the theory of the prevention
of the establishment of a radical regime that could
jeopardize its colonial and economic interest in the
region. The fourth explanation is the encouragement
theory advanced by Klinghoffer. He argued that countries
like Zaire, Zambia, Senegal and Ivory Coast, which have
economic ties and which advocate detente with Apartheid
South Africa are the ones behind its intervention. The
fifth explanation is the theory of reaction where inter
vention by the Soviet Union and Cuba in Angola with the
intention of creating "a string of Marxist, states across
Africa from Angola to Dar es Salaam" provoked the
counter-intervention by South Africa to stifle and
frustrate their motive.
Thus the motive for South Africa's intervention in Angola
was to protect and advance its national interest. This
case is no different from the previous one. The world has
become one political stage where the national interests'
64
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of some countries have no bound and limit. The expansion
of their territories and/or the dismemberment of their
neighboring territories has been the fulfillment of
their national aspiration. That has been the case with
Somalia and is now the case with South Africa.
The second part of this sub-topic is the one that
deals with the relation between U.S. influence on South
Africa and the latter"s involvement in the civil war.
Was South Africa's intervention instigated by the United
States" Peter Botha clearly had unambiguously stated that
South Africa was encouraged to take part in the civil war.
Gavshon quoting Botha said:
The defense minister who in 1979 succeeded
Vorster as prime minister, later told the
Cape Town parliament with some bitterness
that Washington, after encouraging South
Africa to invade then, recklessly left us
in the lurch. °
The then prime minister, Vorster was asked if it would
be accurate to say that the United States solicited South
Africa's help to turn the tide against Russians and Cubans
in Angola last fall?, said in a diplomatic language:
I do not want to comment on that. The U.S.
government can speak for itself. I am sure
you will appreciate that I cannot violate
the confidentiality of government-to-govern
ment communications. But if you are making
the statement, I won't deny it.69
Gavshon, Crisis in Africa, p. 243.
69
Quoted in ibid., p. 245.
166
John A. Marcum contends that Pretoria announced that
its intervention was made on the basis that the United
States would furnish it with the necessary supplies to
offset the weapons superiority of the MPLA and Cuban
forces. Arthur J. Klinghoffer disclosed that State
Department Africanist, Edward Mulcany, had admitted that
the U.S. had regularly exchanged intelligence information
with South Africa. 1 John Stockwell is quoted as having
said:
The CIA Station Chief in Pretoria frequently
briefed BOSS (South African Bureau of State
Security) on American operations in Angola
and that BOSS director, Van Den Bergh went
to Paris to meet the CIA Station Chief of
that city. Van Den Bergh also went to
Washington to meet the Chief of the African
Division of the CIA.72
In spite of all the facts presented above, Secretary
of State Kissinger persisted in his denials of the
collusion and/or having a fore knowledge of South Africa's
intention. He said:
Some charge that we have acted in collusion
with South Africa. This is untrue. We had
no fore knowledge of South Africa's
intention and in no way cooperated with it
militarily. Nor do we view South African
,*JOhn AA Marcum' "Lessons of Angola," Foreign Affairs
(April 1976), p. 422.
Klinghoffer, The Angolan War, p. 45.
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intervention more benevolently than we do
the intervention (of) other outside powers.
It would be ridiculous to expect the Secretary to admit
the facts. Admission of the facts would have meant the loss
of support of many African countries which were inclined to
rally behind the United States1 call for a representative
government chosen from all three liberation movements.
In concluding this sub-topic we would like to point
out that the national interest of the United States - its
middle range interests of the third category - has been
complimentarily linked with the national interest of South
Africa i.e. core interest of the second type.
What Were the Objectives of China in the Angolan Civil War?
The political and ideological split between the Soviet
Union and the Peoples Republic of China which took place in
the 1950s and early 1960s has been a disaster for the world
socialist movement. Besides splitting the movement, it has
retarded the pace of its development in countries with
socialist potential. Their competition for influence in the
Third World has contributed to the degeneration of Marxism-
Leninism. The net result has been that the Peoples Republic
of China, consciously or unconsciously, has allied itself
with imperialism and against decolonization.
The manifestation of this volte face of policy and
reactionary deeds by the Peoples Republic of China is
73
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witnessed in Angola in 1974-75, when it was providing the
FNLA with war materials to counter Soviet assistance for
74
the MPLA. Colin Legum wrote that "China agreed to help
UNITA in its revolutionary struggle against Soviet imperial-
ism in Angola." (Emphasis mine). But China's contest of
Soviet's assistance to MPLA was not limited to arming the
other groups. It took matters a step further by entering
into the politico-diplomatic debate. Commenting on the
Organization of African Unity (OAU) extraordinary session
on Angola, the New China News Agency said that the African
countries had "witnessed an ugly performance of Soviet
social imperialsm, the ring leader who had provoked the
civil war in that African country."76
China's antagonism towards the Soviet Union reached its
pinnacle when it wrote on the problem of reconciliation
between the three factions and exposed its ahistorical
and theoretically bankrupt positions. Writing on the day
of Angolan independence, the Chinese government said:
The Chinese Government and people extend
their warm congratulations on the victory
to the Angolan people and all the three
Angolan liberation organizations. But it
has not been possible to form a government
of national unity...This is entirely the '
result of rivalry between the two super
powers and particularly the undisguised
74
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expansion and crude interferences of the
Soviet Union. Differences among the three
Angolan liberation organizations were
something normal and could have been
reconciled by them through peaceful
consultations...These actions of the
Soviet leadership have fully revealed its
true features as social imperialism.^7
We say it is ahistorical because the history of the
October Revolution demonstrated that the contradictions
between the Bolscheviks and the Mensheviks could not be
reconciled by peaceful means. By the same token the
history of the Chinese Revolution teaches us that the
contradictions between the Communist Party of China and the
Koumintang could not be reconciled by peaceful means. So,
may we ask why and how it occurred to the Chinese theore
ticians/historians that the contradictions between the MPLA
on the one side and FNLA and UNITA on the other could be
reconciled? The Chinese position is theoretically bankrupt
for the simple reason that as a theory it fails to come to
grips with the concrete reality of Angola which it attempted
to explain. Here, the contradictions between MPLA and the
other two parties were and still are antagonistic and hence
irreconcilable. Understandably, the Chinese misreading of
the situation is the direct result of the deductive reason
ing of the "Theory of the Three Worlds" discussed in Chapter
Two.
Quoted in Colin Legum, "Foreign Intervention in
Angola," p. 22.
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There are some suspicions that the meeting of the
foreign policies of the United States and China on Angola
was the result of concerted efforts by both. As Arthur Jay
Klinghoffer put it:
Angolan policies were coordinated in Zaire
as early as mid 1974 and were probably
discussed when Kissinger visited China in
November. Contacts continued in 1975, with
American liaison officer, George Bush
playing an important role in Peking.
Kissinger was in China in October 19-23,
1975 just before Angolan independence and
he was there again with President Ford in
December 1-5, 1975.78
Although China finally decided to withdraw its support
of the FNLA and UNITA, and retracted from its alliance with
U.S. imperialism, Apartheid South Africa, Zaire, and others,
it did so only after losing its credibility.
Reasons for Soviet Intervention in the Angolan Civil War
The question posed at the beginning of this chapter,
"Was the foreign policy of the Soviet Union motivated by
the principle of assistance to and unity with the workers
of Angola and their vanguard party MPLA?", goes directly
to the constitutional blueprint laid out by the CPSU.
Article 28 of the 1977 Soviet constitution reads:
The USSR steadfastly pursues a Leninist
policy of peace and stands for strengthening
the security of nation's and broad inter
national cooperation. The foreign policy of
the USSR is aimed at ensuring international
conditions favorable for building communism
78
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in the USSR, safeguarding the state interests
of the Soviet Union, consolidating the
positions of world socialism, supporting the
struggle of people for national liberation
and social progress, preventing wars of
aggression, achieving universal and complete
disarmament and consistently implementing the
principle of the peaceful co-existence of
states with different social systems.79
The Article recognizes the dialectical relationship
between the world political atmosphere and conditions with
the building of communism in the USSR. That is, the more
countries choose socialism for their socio-economic and
political development, the more secure communism is in the
Soviet Union. Conversely, the more subversive activities
are perpetrated against these countries the more threatened
communism would be in the Soviet Union. Hence the Soviets'
commitment to support countries struggling to build
socialism in their countries and those fighting for national
liberation. By so doing the Soviet Union is advancing its
national interest. In this case the core interest of the
first type of the Soviet Union, i.e. maintaining its
territorial integrity and its national identity is organi
cally linked to the strength of socialism and communism
the world over. Here we see the complimentarity of core
interest and middle range interest of the third category
of the Soviet Union's foreign policy! This is the case
79
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with the foreign policy of the United States as well.
However, this is not to deny the fact that Soviets'
assistance is limited to countries which consider themselves
"socialist" or which are labeled by Soviet theoreticians
as "socialist oriented" (case amply discussed in Chapter
Three). By the same token Soviet assistance to liberation
movements like the Zimbabwe African Peoples Union (ZAPU) led
by Joshua Nkomo was not dictated by ideology but rather,
was motivated by its contest with China and the West.
How is Angola different? There are many theories
advanced for the Soviet Union's intervention in Angola on
the side of the MPLA. The dominant ones, however, are
the ones that argue that the Soviet Union intervened to
challenge Chinese and U.S. influence. Africa Confidential
argues that, "it saw an opportunity to counter U.S. and
Chinese success elsewhere in Africa with the added possi
bility of advancing Moscow's ideological and probably
military position in Africa." Arthur J. Klinghoffer
contends that, "the Soviet Union's actions in Angola were
responsive to China, which was undermining the MPLA by its
support for breakaway factions of that movement and by its
aid to FNLA and UNITA."81
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The same author in another chapter speculates on Soviet
motives arguing that maybe, after all, the Soviet Union's
involvement was to create "a string of Marxist states across
South Central Africa and isolating the non-Marxist govern
ments of Zaire and Zambia which had engaged in dialogue with
South Africa."82
In a commentary entitled "Angola, Its Friends and
Enemies," Izvestia depicts the Soviets' assistance to the
MPLA as dictated by the principle of internationalism,
and also by the decisions of the United Nations and the
request of the Organization of African Unity.83 In response
to Kissinger's accusation of sending immense quantities of
arms and large expenditionary forces to affect far-off
events and dominate helpless people,84 Brezhnev retorted:
We do not hide our views. In the develop
ing countries, as everywhere, we are on
the side of the forces of progress and
democracy and national independence and we
treat them as our friends and comrades in
arms.85
At another occasion, in response to Kissinger, who not only
accused but also warned the Soviet Union and Cuba for
"their wanton disregard for the interest of others and
82TK'^Ibid.
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for the cause of world peace," Brezhnev replied:
Our party is rendering and will render
support to peoples who are fighting
for their freedom. We are acting as
our revolutionary conscience and our
communist convictions permit us.87
Leonid Brezhnev may say that. However, the experience
of the MPLA with the Soviet Union disproves that assertion.
It is a well known fact that Moscow had suspended its
assistance to MPLA, between 1972-73, and switched to
Daniel Chipenda, a leader of a splinter group of the MPLA
who later joined the FNLA, for the simple reason that Neto,
the leader of MPLA started manifesting nationalistic
tendencies.
The United States has made it a habit of drawing
world public opinion to the principles and objectives of
detente in its relation with the Soviet Union, especially
when day to day developments in the world arena do not
reflect and/or fall in line with its interests. Alleging
that Soviet involvement in Angola is a threat to detente,
Secretary Kissinger said:
The United States holds the view that the
essence of the U.S.-Soviet relationship,
if it is to proceed toward a genuine
easing of tensions, is that neither side
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vis-a-vis the other...the United States
considers such action (Soviet inter
vention) incompatible with a genuine
relaxation of tensions.89
Responding to Kissinger's allegation, the then leading
theoretician of the CPSU, the late Michael Suslov, said:
No one seeks to deny that the Soviet Union
and other socialist countries render moral
and material assistance to the Angolan
people and its vanguard, the MPLA. This
assistance contributed to the success of
the Angolan patriots in their armed
struggle against colonial rule- and now
helps them defend the sovereignty, indepen
dence and territorial integrity of their
country. As for the contention voiced from
time to time, even by responsible Western
government leaders, that this policy does
not accord with the spirit of detente, it
only testifies to a false understanding of
the meaning of detente which never implied
and cannot imply giving a free hand to
aggression.90
The ideological explanation could only give a sneak
preview of the intentions'and motives of the Soviet Union.
One should not lose sight of this country's national
interest. As stated earlier, "the Soviet Union, just as
all literal and hinterland countries, is interested in the
safety of sea routes passing through the Indian Ocean."
The safety of the sea routes can only be maintained through
naval and military presence in the so-called allied or
89
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friendly littoral countries/ via, Libya, South Yemen,
Ethiopia, Mozambique, Angola, the Congo Peoples Republic
and Guinea. The competition for controlling the sea-lanes
could not be looked at in isolation from the strategic
mineral resources found within the parameter of these
lanes. Although the Soviet Union is the largest oil
producer in the world, it has found it more profitable
to import from Iraq and Iran, as the location of the oil
resources in these countries are much closer to the areas
of their industries than their own. 1
There may not be disagreement in the assertion that
Soviet's presence in South Yemen, Ethiopia and Mozambique
is motivated by its geopolitical concern. Its presence in
Angola, however, is multi-purpose. National resources and
strategic location are of paramount importance in Soviet
thought and planning. Springing from Angola's experience
and many other flashpoints where the contention for
strategic materials is raging fiercely, Michale T. Klare
said:
Not only must we (they) worry about
conflict and instability in many key
producing areas, but also about possible
Soviet efforts to seize control of these
supplies. Some observers, including Haig
believe that the Soviets have a long-term
plan to overwhelm the 'resource lines of
the Western world.'92
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Sub-Saharan Africa is a region where the contention
between the two superpowers has become very obvious.
Writing on the importance of the region and its resources
to the West, Klare notes:
For those who fear a Soviet or insurgent
threat to Western minerals supplies, no
area is of greater concern than sub-
Saharan Africa. This region, encompassing
some of the most prolific concentrations
of minerals in the world, now supplies much
of the West's cobalt, manganese, chromium
and platinum. Long troubled by racial,
political, and tribal unrest, the area is
now expected to experience a fresh outbreak
of insurgent conflict - accompanied, perhaps,
by direct confrontation between the superpowers
and their allies and proxies. And quoting
Kissinger who said 'should future trends...
result in alignment with Moscow of this
critical resource area, the USSR would
control as much as 90 percent of several key
minerals for which no substitutes have been
developed and the loss of which could bring
the severest consequences to the existing
economic and security framework of the free
world.'y3
Making use of our "logical propositions" and "psycholo
gical explanation" and deriving from Brucan's theory of
scarce resources as reasons of conflict, we would conclude
that Soviet intervention in Angola was motivated by its
desire to control the sea-lanes and strategic materials,
which all contribute not only to its core interest but to
its middle range interest,of the third category as well.
One can raise a; somewhat logically sound question that since




the Soviet Union, the United States, China and the rest
are endowed with scarce natural resources, could Brucan's
theory be applicable to them? Libya and Chad could also
be included in that concern. However, it should be
indubitably clear that Brucan's theory springs from the
dialectical assumption that all kinds of resources, be they
scarce or otherwise, are depletable. Hence the logical
need to reserve or save the local resources for all
eventualities and scramble for the ones that are found in
the developing world which are not exploited for local use
and are sold at cheaper prices.
Gabriel Garcia contends that the first contact between
Cuba and MPLA took place in 1965 when Che Guevara was
[dispensing his selfless and principled internationalist
duty] in the Congo (now Zaire) in August 1965. Ever since
then Cuba's assistance to the MPLA has grown with the
intensity and magnitude of the latter's struggle for
liberation against Portuguese colonialism. Arthur Gavshon
says that about "100 Cubans had been aiding the MPLA in
Angola since the early 1960's, just as the others were
helping FNLA and UNITA."95 With the transformation of the
guerrilla war into a complex conventional war over the
94
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establishment of the government of Angola, and where many
countries, responding to their national interest, were
escalating the war, the Cuban government found itself
compelled to extend its assistance to its comrades-in-arms.
President Castro is quoted as saying:
We simply could not sit back when the
MPLA asked us for help. We gave MPLA
the necessary assistance to prevent a
people fighting for independence for
almost 14 years from being crushed. It
was our elementary duty, our revolutionary
duty, our internationalist duty to give
that assistance to MPLA regardless of the
price.96
Depicting the reality of the intricate situation and
the timing of Cuba's intervention, Gavshon said that
"Soviet arms and Cuban troops began flooding into Angola
after Zaire, China, South Africa, and the Americans became
97
involved." There are those who try to point out a
discrepancy between Cuba's economic and military capability
and the "adventurist risks" it takes in far away places like
Angola and Ethiopia. Hence they argue that the Cubans are
only "surrogates" of the Soviet Union. The Chinese govern
ment is quoted as saying:
In four war operations - twice in Zaire
and once each in Angola and the Horn of
Africa - Cuba had played the role of
'hatchet man1 in suppressing national
liberation movements. It served as
Wolfers and Bergerol, Angola in the Frontline, p. 30.
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catspaw of Soviet social imperialism in
(its) attempt to dominate the African
continent and Soviet places of strategic
importance.^8
In Chapter Three, where we discussed Cuba's reasons
for her participation in the war between Somalia and
Ethiopia, it was pointed out that Cuba's and the Soviet
Union's objectives may be "harmonious" but not "synonymous."
Expressing the independent actions of his government with
respect to its policies in Angola, President Castro
declared:
The USSR is extraordinarily respectful and
careful in its relations with Cuba. A
decision of that nature could only be made
by our own party...The decision to give
military assistance to Angola was taken by
Cuba completely independently. The Soviet
Union never approached us with a request to
send a single Cuban soldier."
Strengthening Castro's declaration, William Minter said
that Cuba's cooperation with the Soviet Union does not and
cannot imply that it is acting on its behalf. The fact
that it has been supporting liberation movements throughout
the Third World attest to its commitment to international-
ism.100
An example is the case when the Cubans and the Soviets
98
Africa Research Bulletin 15:5 (May 1-31, 1978),
p. 4852.
99
Klinghoffer, The Angolan War, p. 119.
Richard J. Payne, "The Soviet/Cuban Factor in the
New United States Policy Toward Southern Africa," Africa
Today 25:2 (April-June 1978), pp. 7-8.
181
took opposing stands in Zimbabwe, where Cuba was supporting
ZANU and the Soviet Union supported ZAPU. Thus it can be
argued that Cuba's actions in Angola were not dictated by
the Soviet Union, but rather derived from its own solidarity
with the Angolan revolutionary movement and, of course, its
concern with U.S. imperialism. The latter confrontation
will now be examined.
Cognizant of the economic, political and strategic
interest of the United States, the Cuban Communist Party
must have entertained the possibility of a confrontation
between them. This presumably had been discussed by the
Politbureau on the eve of its participation in the war.
Writing on the meeting and analyzing the opinion of the
politbureau members, Garcia wrote:
The U.S. had just freed itself from the
morass of Vietnam and the Watergate
scandal. It had a president no one had
elected. The CIA was under fire in Congress
and rated low in public opinion. The U.S.
needed to avoid seeming - not only in the
eyes of African countries but especially
in the eyes of the American Blacks - to
ally itself with racist South Africa.
Besides all this was in the midst of an
election campaign in its Bicentennial Year.
Furthermore, Cuba was sure it could count on
the^solidarity and material aid of the
Soviet Union and other socialist countries
although it was also aware of the implications
its actions might hold for the policy of
peaceful co-existence and international detente.101
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It was a scientific analysis where all the objective
factors were taken into consideration.' The correctness of
the diagnosis was witnessed in the absence of confrontation
from the United States which could only verbally threaten
it of potential reprisal. U.S. frustration was also
witnessed in the U.N. Security Council when it repeatedly
vetoed Angola's application for membership to the world
body.
In closing, this sub-topic, we would like to answer the
question raised at the outset of this chapter - could we
equate Cuba's participation in the war with that of a
mercenary? The answer is clearly no. There is a principled
and hence a genuine distinction between Cuba's participation
in the war from that of mercenary. While the Cubans believe
they were sacrificing the blood and lives of their children
for a just war and noble cause, the motto and motive of a
mercernary is and always will be money!
Antagonistic Foreign Policies and Their Contribution to the
Creation of Displaced People in Zaire and Angola
It is our hypothesis that antagonistic foreign'
policies are the causes for displacing Angolans into Zaire
and Zaireans into Angola. Could this simply be an assertion?
Could there be other factors like famine/drought and economic
necessity that contributed to the displacement of the
peoples in the region?
Since Angola is one of the most critically drought
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affected countries (see Annex V) and Zaire is not, the
concern is a justified one. However a chronological
study of the situation would exonerate our contention.
The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner
for Refugees in its report to the United Nations said "a
reassessment by the Government of Angola of Zairean
refugees adjusted the total to 20,000 including some pre-
10?
viously assisted by UNHCR." UNHCR Information; Zaire on
giving the number of refugees in Zaire said, "The total number
of refugees in Zaire is 305,000. The largest group (some
215,000) are from Angola and have taken refuge in Lower
Zaire, Kinshasa, Bandundu and Shaba." ■■ And this is
obvious that the Angolans fled to Zaire and vice versa
between 1975-1976 when the civil war in Angola was at its
height and that Zaire was participating in the war. We
have to point out, however, that Zaireans have also been
displaced in Angola as a result of the "pacification"
measures taken by the Zairean army. Africa Research Bulletin
illuminates our contention when it said that over 700,000
displaced Angolans in Zaire and 500,000 in Zaire could
only exacerbate the tension between the two countries.104
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This vas to manifest itself when a well-trained force of
between 3,500 to 6,000 the Congolese National Liberation
Front (FNLC) who were in exile in Angola, invaded the
Shaba province of Zaire on two occasions. Christopher
Stevens contends that Angola provided logistical support
while the Soviets and the Cubans provided the arms and
training respectively. Angola was only paying back in
kind for Zaire's assistance to FNLA, UNITA and FLEC.
Writing on what had been done to lessen tensions between
the two countries, Africa Report said:
President Mobutu's reconciliation with
Angola's late President Agostino Neto
and the repatriation of approximately
150,000 Zaireans who had fled into
Angola during the Shaba wars helped ease
tension in Southern Shaba.107
What we can deduce from this is 1) the unrepatriated
Zaireans who chose to remain in Angola are some of the
political refugees, the Congolese National Liberation Front
(FNLC) and their supporters and 2) the majority of the
repatriated people - 150,000 are only displaced people and
hence did not hesitate to go back to their country.
In answering the question could famine/drought
Colin Legum, "Foreign Intervention in Angola," p. 14,
Kenneth L. Adelman, "Zaire's Year of Crisis,"
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contribute to the displacement of Angolans into Zaire,
tfe would argue as follows: chronologically speaking famine/
drought is a phenomena that hit Angola in the 1980s and the
displacement of Angolans they were .sacrificing^ the blood and
and late 1970s.
Another reason why we argue in the negative is that
like the Chadian drought victims who chose to relocate
themselves within their own country, so also Angola's
drought victims. African-Emergency Facts; Angola said:
Some 500,000 people are estimated to be in
critical need of assistance, mainly in the
Northern, Central and Southern provinces.
The 1984 drought caused massive displace
ment from agricultural areas to urban
centers, roads and railway lines.108
Hence, the fact that there is a chronological difference
between the occurences of the civil war and drought, and
also due to the fact that Angolans have preferred to
displace or resettle within their own country strengthens
our contention that antagonistic foreign policies and the
ensuing war and civil war are the causes for the displace
ment of Angolans into Zaire and vice versa.
108a^ •
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CHAPTER V
FOREIGN INTERFERENCE AND THE CREATION OF DISPLACED
PEOPLE IN CHAD
At the outset, we should note that the dearth of
materials and information on the problem at hand has
curtailed the scope and ambition of this study. However,
it is safe to assert that it is one of the tension areas on
the continent which has been neglected by scholars. The
intricate and complex nature of Chadian national problems
should have aroused their intellectual appetite. This
did not occur. After all, we should not be surprised for
most scholars of African politics are only journalists by
another name whose scholarly zeal is either to romanticize
and/or dramatize problem areas that only involve the super
powers directly.
One of the underlining reasons for the political
problems in Chad is the unwarranted interference by Libya,
France, Sudan, Egypt, the United States and others*'in the
internal affairs of that country, the raison d'etre being
that their national interest, i.e. territorial security




economic, or geopolitical interests are threatened. Their
utter disregard for the well-being of the Chadian people
and most of all for the principles of the Charter of the
United Nations and the Organization of African Unity - the
sovereign equality of all Member States, non-interference in
the internal affairs of states and respect for the
sovereignty and territorial integrity of each state and
for its inalienable right to independent existence - have
contributed to the many thousands of lives lost and over
250,000 displaced people created.
An objective study of the case would require raising the
following pertinent question: What are the reasons for
Libya's interference in Chadian internal affairs? Are
there discrepancies between government pronouncement and
actual deeds? If so why? What are the reasons for France's
interference in Chadian internal affairs? Are the threats
allegedly posed by Libya detrimental to France's interests?
If so, in what way? What are the reasons for Sudan's
interference in the internal affairs of Chad? Does Libya's
interference in Chad pose a potential threat to the
territorial integrity of Sudan? What are the reasons for
Egypt's interference in the internal affairs of Chad? Is
there any relationship between its interference in Chad and
International Conference on Assistance to Refugees
(ICARA) 9-10 April 1981.
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its 1977 war with Libya? What were the reasons for the U.S.
to interfere in Chadian politics? Are there any relations
between its intervention in Chad and its politico-military
activities in the region as a whole? It is assumed that
to entertain these questions would give us- a vivid
picture of the motives and objectives behind their inter
ference.
Having said that, we start by giving a short political
history of Chad with the intention of exposing the root
cause of the problems. Then we will try to answer the
guestions raised above.
Chad Under French Colonialism
Although a landlocked country, Chad is strategically
located sharing borders with six countries. To the north
it is bordered by Libya, to the east by Sudan, to the south
by the Central African Republic, to the southwest by
Cameroon, to the west by Nigeria and Niger. The mere fact
that it shares borders with six countries and the fact that
it had not had a stable socioeconomic and political system
had been a nightmare to the advocates of the "domino-theory."
The subversion of Chad or a revolution "exported" from
Libya will only be a matter of time before it engulfs its
neighbors. Writing from this vein, Africa magazine asserts
that because of its "strategic position in the heart of




Chad was a victim of French colonialism from 1900 to
1960 and a neo-colony since then. The dependent nature of
this socioeconomic and political relation should be held
responsible for its quagmire. However, Samuel Decalo makes
only a passing remark to the problems generated by colonialism
and emphasizes the artificiality of Chad's colonial
boundaries, its immense size, its unfavorable geographical
location and economic non-viability as the root cause for
center-periphery strife. Although these are factors that
have to be_ reckoned with, it is clear that French colonialism
is responsible for the frame of Chad's boundaries and the
anatomy of its constituent parts. In other words, today's
Chad is a creation and a product of French colonialism.
Hence the factors listed above are only manifestations of
lingering neocolonialism.
The theory of dependency states that the problems of
the Third World countries, be they economic, political,
social, cultural, or otherwise are the product of the
historical and structural linkage between their economies
and those of the developed world countries. Paul Baran,
2
"Chad; Americans Move In," Africa 79 (March 1978),
p. 30.
Samuel Decalo, "Chad: The Roots of Center-Periphery
Strife," African Affairs 79:317 (October 1980), p. 492.
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the harbinger of the theory argues that Western capitalism
was responsible for destroying the socioeconomic institu
tions of what he refers to as the "backward areas." He
contends that the lamentable situation that is prevalent
in these areas resulted from this intrusion. In his words,
Western capitalism failed to improve
materially the lot of the peoples in
habiting most backward areas, it accom
plished something that profoundly affects
the social and political conditions it
introduced there, with amazing rapidity,
all the economic and social tensions in
herent in the capitalist order.4
The other eminent scholar of this school of thought,
Andre G. Frank, in his now classic article, "The Development
of Underdevelopment," argues strongly that the under
development of peripheral nations cannot be understood if
divorced from the development of metropolitan/colonizing
countries. He notes:
Yet historical research demonstrated that
contemporary underdevelopment is in large
part the historical product of past and
continuing economic and other relations
between the satellite underdeveloped and
the now metropolitan countries. Furthermore,
these relations are an essential part of the
structure and development 'of the capitalist
system on a world scale.5
Paul A. Baran, "On the Political Economy of Backward
ness," in Charles K. Wilber, ed., The Political Economy of
Deyelopment^and Underdevelopment (New York: Random House,
'Andre G. Frank, "The Development of Underdevelopment,"
in Ibid.,
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Yet a third scholar, Keith Griffin writes:
It is our belief that underdeveloped countries
as we observe them today are a product of
historical forces, especially of those forces
released by European expansion and world
ascendancy. Thus, they are a relatively recent
phenomenon. Europe did not 'discover' the
underdeveloped countries, on the contrary she
created them.6
What has been the consequence of this dependence on
the economies of the African countries? As African countries
had forfeited the autonomy of the development of their
productive forces, their economies have been relegated to
the role of subserviency. Such role is limited to providing
the colonial countries with raw materials and a dumping
ground (market) for the finished products of these countries.
Lopsided and uneven development became the order of the day.
How do we relate this theory to the Chadian case?
The colonizer preferring the economically most rewarding
and profitable region established its politico-economic
center in the south. The result was the dislocation of
the national economy and disparity in the economic develop
ment of the regions. Worst of all, the country became a
producer of cotton for export to the metropole, thereby
becoming a one-crop economy. This point is stressed by
Decalo when he says,
Griffin, "Underdevelopment in History," in Ibid., p. 81,
Decalo, "Chad: The Roots of Center-Periphery Strife,"
p. 492.
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Classified bv the United Nations as one of
the world's twenty-five least developed
countries...the country's main cash crop
is cotton cultivated in the south account
ing for up to eighty percent of Chad's
exports.8
And writing on the uneven development of the regions he
observed:
In the extremely sparsely-populated desert
northern half of Chad reside the semi-
nomadic and fiercely independent Toubou...
strenuously resisting the French intrusion
into the region...and they were not completely
pacified until the 1920s. Totally outside
the mainstream of political and economic life
until their rebellion in the mid 1960s, the
Toubou had been virtually left alone by the
French.9
What about the politics of the country? Although many
scholars tend to question the validity of the theory which
argues that the superstructure of a country, i.e. the
politics, culture, education, religion, philosophy, etc. is
in most instances a reflection of the economic base of that
country, the Chadian case indubitably confirms its appli-
capility. Sixty years of French colonialism had not been
able to create a government which could transcend paro
chialism and bring the ethnically, religiously and region
ally polarized people together to forge unity and nation-
building. In fact animosity, regionalism, ethnicity





French rule did not, however, result in a
strong centralizing administration that
might have alleviated centre-periphery
tensions and external counter pulls, and
soothed regionalist sentiments and inter-
ethnic animosities...the contending
political poles and their ethinic bases
remained virtually intact.10
What about the culture of the country? The motives of
colonialism are not only the domination of the politics and
economics of a country but also the disorientation and control
of the mind and cultural aspect of the petty bourgeoisie
leadership. It is believed that the control of the mind and
culture of the people facilitates the creation of a "French
man," an "Englishman," or "Portugueseman" out of the African,
the Asian and any other people that is a victim of colonialism.
The purpose being that the victim robbed of his/her heritage
and disarmed of his/her consciousness would become docile and
subservient. John Daniel in his article, "The Culture of
Dependency and Political Education in Africa," eloquently
argued how colonialism managed to suppress and control the
minds and culture of African people. He observed:
It must be remembered, however, that
capitalism is not just a political and
economic system. It is also a cultural
system with a distinctive set of values
whose absorption are no less essential to
the effective functioning of the system...
they are antithetical to the corporate and
communal values of pre-capitalist or tradi
tional Africa. Africa's penetration by
capitalism therefore precipitated a large-
scale cultural encounter between two sets of
10Ibid., p. 495.
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contradictory value systems, and initiated
a relentess and multifaceted assault upon
Africa's non-capitalist values...their
attack upon African culture was prompted
by their ideological stance which regarded
European culture "as the ultimate refine
ment and repository of all human excellence,
virtue and' industry'...the primary actor in
this assault was naturally the colonial
regime operating in collusion with such
auxiliaries and the missionary, the trader
and the educator...the missionary, both in
the role of the preacher and educator,
attacked virtually every aspect of African
culture: African religion was branded as
barbaric, ancestral beliefs were condemned
as witchcraft...however, it was a system
that served two of the ends of colonial
capitalism. First it separated the knowledge
of his own history and culture, his legends
and his customs. What it taught him alienated
him from his community and transformed him
into an individual in the mould of colonizer
...second like the church, the school pro
pounded capitalist values while also import
ing the basic literacy and simple technical
skills required for the servicing of the
lower echelons of the economy and administrative
superstructure.11
Chad is a microcosm of this cultural colonialism
which was the order of the day of Francophone colonial
Africa. As we have pointed out above, French colonialism
established its politico-economic center in the south
where the "Sara clans" were found to be friendly and
amenable to foreign culture and intrusion. Thus becoming
the people upon whom was bestowed the responsibility of
administering the country during the transition period from
11
John Daniel, "The Culture of Dependency and Political
Educations Africa," in Dennis L. Cohen and John Daniel,
fdS:; Political Economy of Afrir. (London: Longman Group
Limited, 1981), pp. 171-172.
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colonialism to neo-colonialism. Decalo writing on this
topic said:
Largely animist - though Christianity has
made its deepest inroads among them during
this century - the Sara were the main
group that grasped with any avidity
whatever meagre opportunities were
presented them for upward mobility by
the colonial power, to emerge eventually
as the economic mainstay, and the political
center of power of Chad:, until the recent
upheavals in Ndjamena.12
In bringing this topic to a conclusion, we would like
to affirm that it was French colonialism that is the
culprit for the situation that Chad finds itself in. We
would also like, however, to point out that the factors
discussed by Decalo have aggravated the problem of nation-
building.
In his own words, Decalo had said that the regime
of President Tombalbaye had inherited a polarized and
inherently unstable society with a weak administrative
apparatus only to exacerbate the already tense inter-ethnic
and regional frictions. It is hoped that this short
colonial history of the country would assist us in under
standing the subsequent civil strife which is the cause for
continuing displaced people's problems in the region.
12




Foreign Interference in Chad
As the above two chapters have indicated, interference
in the internal affairs of another country presupposes the
presence of an actual and/or potential political problem
between the government and some dissident groups who are
disenchanted with the way things are. The problems range
from demanding autonomy for their regions, out-and-out
secession, resisting unwarranted oppression, alienation,
etc, thus making it easier for the interferers to take
advantage of these problems. They do this, initially, by
extending material and diplomatic support to the dissidents
and finally, by taking active part in the war and exacerba
ting the situation.
This has been the experience of Chad where its northern
neighbor interfered in its internal affairs claiming that
the inter-ethnic strife that was going on in the country
was pushing it to disintegration.
The problems that exploded in late 1960 were simmering
during the colonial era. That abominable social system
had degraded the people socially, exploited them economically,
alienated them culturally and suppressed them politically.
It was just a matter of time before it exploded. This it
did during the neo-colonial status of the country when the
petty bourgeois leadership, incompetent and filled with
disdain for the people, continued from where the colonial
administration left. Constituted mostly of the educated
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Saran people, the government of President Tombalbaye
aggravated the already tense and polarized society.
Decalo, writing on Tombalbaye's government said:
In embarking upon a policy of widescale
repression, constant purges, constitutional
and electoral manipulations, and the
centralization of all authority in his own
hands. Tombalbaye confused, however, the
substance and myths of state power, grossly
overestimating his control of the former and
underestimating the fragility of the ethnic
and centre-periphery status-quo inherited
at independence...Thus, though the regime
certainly inherited a deeply splinterized
and inherently unstable society and a weak
administrative apparatus, the policies
that emanated from Ndjamena - practically
from independence - exacerbated existing
inter-ethnic and regional frictions and set
the stage for the violence that was to erupt
in full force in the mid-1960s.14
The political history of revolutions teachs us that
wherever there is repression there is resistance. And it
is only a matter of time before uprisings - spontaneous
or otherwise - take place. So in 1975 a military coup
took place claiming the life of the President. Apparently
the military was convinced that the problems confronting
Tombalbaye's government were overwhelming. They perceived
a dangerously high number of dissident movements threaten
ing the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the country,
And these were the direct result of the inefficient and
corrupt administration of the government. And thus it had
14Ibid., p. 492.
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to go. Colin Legum et al. point out that there were
ten political and military movements in Chad:
GUNT - Gouvernment d'Union Nationale Transitoire
FAN - Forces Armees du Nord
FAT - Forces Armees Tchadiennes
FAP - Forces Armees Populaires
CDR - Conseil Democratique Revolutionnaire
FPL - Forces Populaires de Liberation
ANI - Armee Nationale Integree
MPN - Mouvement Patriotique National
MPLT - Mouvement Populaire de Liberation du Tchad
RNDP - National Democratic and People's Party
Unlike the cases with Ethiopia and Angola where the
number of dissident groups are fewer, the Chadian situation
depicts an alarming number of centrifugal forces who had
falley prey to outside parties thereby facilitating inter
ference in the internal affairs of their country.
Libya in Chad
Different theories have been expounded on why Libya
chose to intervene in the Chadian internal affairs. Two such
theories have been propounded by Colonel Gaddafi while a
third was advanced by Africa magazine.
Gaddafi, on January 29, 1981, advanced his first
theory when he told the Libyan Congress in Tripoli that his
policy of intervention in Chad was prompted by historical
links and concern for Libyan security.
Colin Legum, et al., "Chad: Libya Moves Out," Africa
Contemporary Record (New York: Africana Publishing CoT~f
1980-81), p. A35.
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Libya had intervened militarily in Chad
in response to Frolinat,* ending the war
which lasted many years and resolving the
conflict in Chad in the interest of the
friendly forces and the people's forces
represented by Frolinat which led the
armed struggle for 20 years and defeated
the racist and reactionary forces and
imperialism backing them. For the secession
led by Habre had behind it Sadat, his stooge,
Nimeiri, and French agents in Africa... the
war in Chad was against the'. Jamahiriya. . .we
have crossed the border in self-defense when
an act of force was used to impose a pro-
imperialism regime hostile to the Chadian
people. The complete mass unity between the
two countries, based on people's power as
stipulated in the joint Libyan-Chadian
statement, is not like the familiar consti
tutional political unity. For there is a
very historical and interaction between the
Libyan and Chadian peoples, and between the
Chadian people and the Arab nation, and the
borders are open between the two countries.
The Chadian people are similar to the
Sudanese people in makeup. For there is a
large proportion of Arabs among the Chadian
people. Eastern and southeastern Chad is
entirely Arab and a large section of the
Chadian people are Arab by origin and race,
while the overwhelming number are Muslim and
Arab culture is the prevailing culture in
Chad. The Chadian people have a specificity
very different from all Black African people.
A very large number of Libyans emigrated to
Chad, settled there and became Chadians.
Similarly a very large number of Chadian
people are at present in Libya.15
Colonel Gaddafi has raised two very important points: the
threat or potential threat to the security of Libya and
Quoted in Legum, "The Crisis Over Chad," Ibid., p. A41
♦Frolinat: Chad National Liberation Front is the umbrella
of some of the military movements which forged unity: the
leader then was Goukouni Oueddei.
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the cultural-historical ties argument.
The purpose of these arguments, it would appear, was to
appeal to the patriotism of the Libyan people and obtain
their unconditional support for his military venture in
Chad. JV professor who had been in Libya during the height
of the war told me that it had worked. He said that it had
worked not only in involving and motivating the layman on
the street but also university professors and teachers with
whom he had a chance to discuss the situation. Thus giving
Gaddafi the support he needed to pursue his military
objectives in Chad. The fact that he had enemies in Sadat
and Nimeiri, of Egypt and Sudan respectively, had easily
penetrated the minds of the people with regard to the threat
or potential threat to Libya's territorial integrity.
The ".historico-cultural ties" argument had easily mobilized
the Libyan people. Gaddafi also said that he needed to
protect those Libyans who had emigrated to Chad. A
contemporary historical parallel would be that of the
Reagan administration's argument that it intervened in
Grenada because there was a threat to the "safety and
security" of American students on the island. In both
instances, i.e. Gaddafi and Reagan succeeded in obtaining
the support of the majority of their people. However, this
should not stop us from searching the actual underlying
motive.
In defense of his second theory, Gaddafi insisted that
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Libya's was invited by the "legitimate leader of Chad
Goukouni Oueddei •" Granted that the right to collective
self-defense is protected by Article 51 of the U.N. Charter,
Libya's presence in Chad calls for further investigation
and one should not take any official pronouncement at face
value.
Africa magazine, advancing the "all inclusive" theory,
aaid that "Gaddafi's foreign policy has three officially
stated objectives...These are Arab unity, Islamic solidarity
1 8
and a revolutionary Third World and African alliance."
Assuming that Libya's involvement in Chad is explanable by
any or all three objectives, the question that arises is
whether the intended Islamic unity and/or solidarity is
compatible with the unity of the Chadian people. In passing,
it must be noted that there are Muslims, Christians and
people of other creeds and religions.
What then are the motives of Gaddafi in Chad? Colin
Legum writing about him said:
Not since the late Dr. Kwame Nkrumah's heyday
in the early 1960s has an African leader
embarked so openly on a campaign to- subverting
governments in the name of 'revolution and
anti-imperialism' as has the Libyan leader;
but, unlike Nkrumah, Gaddafi has immense
riches to promote his aims and religious cause.
John Howe, "Libya: Ripples from Tripoli," Africa 113
(January 1981), p. 47.
1 R
"A Prophet with an Illusion," Africa 97 (June 1979),
p. 51.
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Legum, "The Crisis Over Chad," p. A35.
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Can these allegations be substantiated? To do so, one
must examine Colonel Gaddafi's record and its major foreign
policy decisions as they relate to other African countries.
His overt support for opposition elements in Senegal
and Gambia and his training of a 5,000 man Islamic Legion
to advance his foreign policy objectives provoked these
countries to break diplomatic relations with Libya in
20
1980. His distaste for Sadat, the late President of
Egypt, and Nimieri of Sudan is an open secret. Nimeiri,
on many occasions, has accused Gaddafi of fomenting
subversion and had implicated him in many of the aborted
coups d'etat against him. The 1977 war between Egypt and
Libya in which instance Sadat claimed to have taught
Gaddafi "a lesson he will never forget," should
refresh our memory of Gaddafi's relation with Sadat.
His relation with President Habib Bourgiba of Tunisia
was not different. It was filled with friction and
contempt. After the discovery of a Libyan arms cache in
southern Tunisia in 1978, Bourgiba accused Gaddafi of
trying to overthrow his regime.
20Ibid., p. A37.
"Egypt and Libya Clash Briefly," Africa Report 22:5
(September/Ocotber 1977), p. 23.
22
"Libya's Persistent Intervention," Africa Confidential
20:8 (April 1979), p. 7. ' "
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Gaddafi's objectives in Chad are not, in essence, very
different from those of Somalia in Ethiopia and Zaire in
Angola. It is his desire to incorporate the Aouzou strip
of northern Chad, rich in natural resources, to his
territory. And to that end, the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs of Libya had produced a map, as early as 1976,
showing the Aouzou strip being part and parcel of Libyan
23
territory as set by the Mussolini-Laval agreement.
Jingoist and expansionist as the policy was, the Chadian
people felt that their patriotism was being tested. They
expressed their commitment to the unity and territorial
integrity of their country by holding a demonstration
unparalled in their recent history. In his address to
the demonstrators, President Felix Malloum warned that
"Libya's annexationist designs do .not stop at Aouzou.
Libya has also made violent attacks against Baradai, Zouar
24
and. Oumanga in northern Chad."
What we are witnessing, in this case, is not only the
expressed intention of Libya's expansionist policy classi
fied as core objective of the second type by K.J. Hoisti,
but also the Chadian wish to defend its territorial inte
grity by all means as expressed by President Malloum, his
core interest and principal priority. In addition, we have
23
Legum, et al., "Chad," Africa Contemporary Record
(New York: Africana Publishing Co., 1976-77),.p. B485.
24
"Chad-Libya," Africa Research Bulletin 14:7 (July 1-
31, 1977), p. 4492.
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been able to ascertain Brucan's theory of scarce resources
and the scramble for them as the main reason for conflicts
between states.
Gaddafi has manifested his drive to incorporate the
Aouzou strip in many and various ways. His intense desire
and impulsive ambition to expand his domain and thereby
enhance his reputation could be proven by recalling his
failed policies of merger with Egypt, Syria and Tunisia.
His move to Chad, therefore, while not a new policy was
dictated by opportunism. It happened during the time when
Chad was going through an internal crisis and was very weak
to defend its territorial integrity. Political realism,
as it is said, is the antithesis of idealism and that
romanticism has no place. Somalia did it when Ethiopia
was going through its internal turmoil and Zaire did it
when the internecine war in Angola was at its height. So
why should we expect Libya to do otherwise?
The only difference between the Libyan leader and the
others is that, at times, he would manifest statesmanship
and at other times, its opposite. Part of his statement
quoted in Africa magazine reads:
Libya and Chad announced that they were
going toward complete unity between the
two countries, a unity of the masses in
which the power, the wealth and the arms
will be in' the hands of the people and
its instruments, the Congress and the
people's committees.25
25.
'"Libya's Gamble in Chad," Africa 114 (February 1981),
p. 47.
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At other times he would simply say, short of unity, Libya
would not settle unless, at least, it incorporates the
Aouzou strip. His obsession with the Aouzou strip was
so great that he. is believed to have bought it from
27
President Tombalbaye for 23,000 mCFA. In addition,
Gaddafi is believed to have "supported a number of factions
in past years in the hope that they would eventually
acquiese to the Libyan occupation of the reportedly
2 8
uranium rich Aouzou strip."
It would be a justifiable question to ask why the
acquisition of the Aouzou strip and other naturally rich
regions become his paramount policy. What were the motives?
He had made no secret about his drive to unite with or
conquer states that have areas endowed with natural
resources. His conflict with Tunisia over offshore oil
29
rights in the Gulf of Ghabes is only one of its kind.
His announced merger with and/or threat to annex northern
Chad, the Aouzou strip, reputed for its oil and uranium is
another. Africa Confidential reported that by 1978 Chad
Howe, "Libya: Ripples from Tripoli," p. 26.
27
Mme. Claustres Ordeal," Africa Research Bulletin 12:9
(September 1-30, 1975), p. 3759.
"Libya Persistent Intervention," p. 6.
29
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would produce enough oil to become an exporter,30 thus
further enhancing Gaddafi's determination to annex the
strip. Another country where Gaddafi's eyes are focused
is Niger and its uranium rich region which he has displayed
an unmitigated desire to conquer.
Libya, a country with barely 4,000,000 people, lacks
almost all the elements of power that we had outlined in
Chapter Two. Gaddafi, however, seems to be oblivious of
these facts. With the incessant accumulation of all kinds
of arms from both the East and the West, he is playing
senseless power politics. The danger, however, is that he
will psyche himself to the point where he would provoke
a war with a superpower like the United States as he once
did or any of the middle powers and the consequence would
be what he had never expected. It goes without saying that
the security of the smaller countries around Libya is
constantly threatened. Extending a helping hand to those
who need it - as he once did to the former President of
Uganda, Idi Amin - is part of his unrehearsed and sponta
neous policy decisions.
What do we make out of all this? Well, it seems to us
that there is a confusion between what the interest of the
"Chad: Great Power Rivalry," Africa Confidential
19:2 (January 2, 1978), p. 5. ~~
"Libya Persistent Intervention," p. 7.
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Libyan people and those of the person Gaddafi. Which is
paramount? We have no reason to doubt that he is doing
all this with the intention of securing and advancing
Libya's national interest. But since the outcome has been
the alienation of Libya from the community of nations, a
reappraisal and reevaluation of the priorities of the
national interest of Libya is in order! Having done that,
then Colonel Gaddafi can define his role to jibe with and
advance that national interest of his fatherland. We
earnestly believe that Gaddafi's incessant desire to be a
member of the nuclear powers - for which purpose he wants
to incorporate the uranium rich regions of Chad and then
Niger - should not and is not the paramount priority of
Libya.
France's Intervention in Chad's Political Crisis
The theory that has been propounded behind French
intevention in Chad is comprehensive. It touches all its
paramount concerns. Its historical responsibility, economic
interest and the wish to preempt a Soviet military presence
32
in the country have been noted by Colin Legum, et al.
Added to this is its military treaty with its former
colonies which gave it carte blanche to'interfere in the
internal affairs of Chad, by either taking active part in
32
Colin Legum, et al., "Chad," Africa Contemporary
Record (New York: Africana Publishing Co., 1976-77),
p. B487.
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the war supporting one faction against another and/or
providing the instrument of war pouring fuel in the fire.
At the initial stage of Libya's interference in the
Chadian crisis/ France displayed ambiguity and lack of
resolve to confront and drive out the invading army of
Colonel Gaddafi. This put France in an awkward position.
It either had to live up to the "defense agreements" it
entered into when, its colonies attained their independence
or risk an erosion of its political and economic interest.
France's impotence in the face of Libyan aggression,
and more so its plot to overthrow President Tombalbaye's
government seemed to aggravate its precarious position in
Chad and the rest of its neo-colonies. Colin Legum et al.
reported that:
At the beginning of July, the Chad Press
agency accused Jacgues Focart, the French
Secretary General at the Presidency with
responsibility for African affairs, of
plotting to overthrow the Tombalbaye
government. It warned against the inter
vention of any French troops stationed in
Chad against the existing regime.34
The reason for the plot was France's disillusionment
with the inept government of President Tombalbaye who
continued his policies of alienating the various ethnic
groups. We would like to point out, however, that the
33
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(January 1978), p. 44.
34
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Record (New York: Africana Publishing Co., 1973-74),
p. B 578.
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policies of the president were only manifestations of the
neo-colonial socioeconomic and political structure he
inherited from France.
However, the disappointed Tombalbaye had no choice but
to try to get out of that political dependency on France
and chart his own policy. It was only a matter of common
sense for him to reorient his foreign policy towards the
Arab world for the rebels are Moslems and their spiritual
and material support comes from that world. Declaring
his intentions, Tombalbaye said "it may disturb certain
people who have become used to regarding our republic...as
a docile satellite" and reminded France that Chad "was the
first African country to respond to General de Gaulle's
appeal and sacrificed a number of its sons to liberate
France form the Nazi Yoke." Tombalbaye continued to
exacerbate Chad's relations with France by withdrawing
from OCAM claiming that it was nothing but an "instrument
of imperialism and neo-colonialism."36
However, his high expectations from the Arab countries
could not reap him any benefit. Contrary to Tombalbaye's
wish, the rebels' war, instead of abating, mounted. Clearly,
this was the result of the assistance that the rebels were




disappointment by saying "that there would be no rebellion
in Chad if the rebels were not receiving outside help."
That was definitely directed against Libya whose leader,
time and again had said that his reason for intervention
in Chad was the presence of imperialist forces there.
Instead of making use of the opportunity and encouraging
Tombalbaye to slowly but surely break away from French
dependency, they drove him back to that dependent relation.
Colin Legum et al. said:
Relations with France had deteriorated
sharply during 1973 when Chad began to
forge closer ties with Arab countries,
but in 1974 it soon became apparent that
cooperation with the Arabs was giving
disappointing results and that Tombalbaye
was anxious to reestablish good relations
with Paris. A meeting of the joint Franco-
Chadian commission took place in Ndjamena
at the end of January.38
President Tombalbaye, innocent and novice to the
intricate world of international relations, and more so
to his actual power vis-a-vis a country as old and vicious
in its dealings with its opponents as France discovered .
it too late when his military overthrew him in 1975. /Indeed
the coup took place with the connivance of the French govern-
39
ment. The mere fact that France by-passed President
Colin Legum, et al., "Chad," Africa Contemporary






Malloum1s government to negotiate with the rebels led by
the current President of Chad, Habre, for the release of
40
Mme. Claustre, demonstrated not only its contempt but
also its high-handedness. General Malloum responded by
ordering the evacuation of French military bases and
repudiating the bilateral cooperation agreements.
One way of expressing one's dissatisfaction to the
oppressor and indicating that you are ready to stop, if
possible, or curtail that dominant-subordinate relationship
is by making friends outside of the camp. And this is
exactly what General Malloum did to demonstrate his
government's frustration. Africa put it thus:
Meanwhile, Chad has shown that France is
not its only contact...also in October,
the Finance Minister, General Djago,
returned from a series of visits to
Belgium, Rumania, and USSR. At one point
a Chadian delegaiton was in Peking at
the same time as Major Kamouque, Foreign
Minister was in Washington.42
Of all the colonial countries, France has earned the
notoriety for jealousy over its neo-colonies. And this
diplomatic flurry by the Malloum government threatened
France's special relation not only with Chad but also with
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